



















































body	 of	 anthropological	 literature	 criticizing	 the	 medicalisation	 of	 trauma	 and	
emphasizing	the	correlations	between	restrictive	migration	policies	and	migrants’	
mental	distress,	research	rarely	goes	beyond	the	categories	of	suffering,	illness	and	
health.	 The	 assumption	 that	 a	 psychic	 life	 falling	 outside	 the	 ordinary	 is	
fundamentally	a	predicament	is	rarely	questioned.	The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	fill	this	
gap	in	research,	by	considering	“divergent,”	non-ordinary	experiences	as	possible	
other	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world.	 Therefore,	 this	 study	 examines	 alternative,	
idiosyncratic,	 ways	 of	 perceiving,	 sensing	 and	 making	 sense	 of	 the	 world,	






migrants’	 sense	 of	 self	 and	 of	 belonging,	 arguing	 not	 only	 that	 mental	 distress	
happens	at	the	conjuncture	between	subject	and	macro	forces,	but	also	that	mental	
disorders	can	provide	a	privileged	perspective	on	the	work	of	ordering	mechanisms	
–	 namely,	 migration	 policies	 restricting	 citizenship’s	 rights,	 and	 interventions	
reproducing	precarity.	Also,	this	thesis	considers	the	relationality	of	mental	distress,	
arguing	that	even	the	most	idiosyncratic	experience	of	crisis	is	always	situated	in	a	
space	 of	 social,	 political	 and	 historical	 relationships.	 Therefore,	 crisis	 entails	 a	
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disruptive	potential,	for	it	creates	a	disturbance	into	the	social	world.	By	arguing	for	
the	 need	 to	 include	 divergent	memories	 in	 academic	 and	 policy	 discourses,	 this	
research	contributes	to	the	debate	surrounding	the	politics	of	“refugee	voices”	 in	
forced	migration	and	refugee	studies.	
































































































































































in	 the	 ex-Moi	 –	 the	 Torino	 2006	 Winter	 Olympic	 athletes’	 village	 –	 that	 was	
abandoned	and	then	occupied	by	refugees	in	2013.	I	had	been	called	by	a	friend	who	
was	 part	 of	 an	 activist	 group	 of	 physicians	 and	 psychologists	 advocating	 for	 the	
health	rights	of	refugees	and	migrants	and	offering	medical	advice	to	those	who	had	
difficulties	 in	accessing	 the	national	healthcare	system.	While	volunteering	at	ex-
Moi,	 they	 had	 met	 Mirela,	 a	 Romanian	 woman	 living	 with	 her	 boyfriend	 in	 the	







and	walk	 through	 a	 long	 corridor,	 avoiding	water	 leakages	 from	 the	 ceiling	 and	














electricity	 –	 the	 basements	 seemed	 to	 me	 a	 dangerous,	 harmful	 place	 of	
confinement.	 This	 was	 an	 uninhabitable	 space.	 Yet,	 what	 struck	 me	 most	 was	
Mirela’s	 deep	 attachment	 to	 that	 place,	 a	 home	 she	 had	 carefully	 decorated,	
collecting	and	arranging	objects,	and	thus	made	familiar	and	intimate.	A	concrete	
cellar,	turned	into	a	home.	Worried	about	her	conditions,	the	group	of	activists	tried	
to	 find	 other	 housing	 for	Mirela	 through	 Social	 Services,	 and	 finally	 a	 place	 in	 a	


















This	 thesis	 is	 rooted	 in	 anthropology.	 Anthropology	 provided	 me	 the	
theoretical	 lens	 and	 methodological	 practice	 to	 investigate	 the	 consequences	 of	
forced	 migration	 and	 displacement	 on	 people’s	 lives.	 Aiming	 at	 analysing	 the	
relationship	 between	 migration	 and	 health,	 I	 started	 my	 research	 reviewing	
anthropological	 literature	 on	 forced	 migration	 and	 medical	 anthropology’s	
perspective	 on	 trauma	 and	 migrants’	 mental	 health.	 Since	 anthropology	 is	
fundamentally	 an	 empirical	 knowledge,	 I	 defined	 the	 focus	 of	 interest	 for	 this	
research	 on	 how	 refugees	 experience	 mental	 distress,	 reflecting	 on	 the	 tension	
between	 psychological	 and	 social	 dimensions.	 On	 these	 grounds,	 I	 turned	 quite	
naturally	to	ethnography	to	find	my	methodological	tools.				
These	choices	mirror	my	background	and	reveal	from	the	very	beginning	the	
deeply	 personal	 nature	 of	 this	 research	 –	 and,	 I	 argue,	 of	 research	 in	 general.	 I	
started	my	career	studying	cultural	and	social	anthropology	and	when	I	carried	out	
my	first	fieldwork,	about	Albanian	migrants’	funeral	rites	and	mourning	practices,	I	







uneasy,	 intimate	 involvement	 with	 human	 complexity.	 The	 bluntness	 of	
ethnography	makes	me	uncomfortable,	and,	at	once,	I	feel	I	am	in	my	proper	place.		
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Hence,	 feeling	 questioned	 and	 challenged	 by	 ethnography,	 I	 tackled	 this	
sense	 of	 discomfort	 questioning	 and	 challenging	 ethnography	 itself.	 I	 explored	
different	 disciplines:	 I	 trained	 in	 clinical	 psychology,	 and	 more	 recently,	 in	
constructivist	psychotherapy,	focusing	in	particular	on	ethnopsychiatry.		In	the	last	
few	 years,	 I	 have	 been	 working	 with	 migrants	 both	 as	 a	 researcher	 and	 as	 a	
psychologist.	In	my	experience,	these	two	positions	–	observation	and	intervention	
–	influenced	and	transformed	each	other,	leading	to	an	interdisciplinary	approach	
to	 research.	 Although	my	 starting	 point	was	 an	 anthropological	 perspective,	 the	
research	 process	 led	 me	 to	 combine	 and	 compare	 literature,	 theoretical	
frameworks,	methods,	 thus	 creating	 a	 tension	 between	 different	 disciplines,	 and	
fashioning	my	own	way	of	doing	ethnography.	By	establishing	a	dialogue	with	other	










of	 migrants.	 Particularly,	 medical	 anthropologists	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	
application	of	Western	psychiatric	categories	often	conceal	the	social,	political,	and	
economic	 factors	 that	 affect	 refugees’	 health	 and	wellbeing	 (Summerfield,	 2001;	
Watters,	 2001).	 Also,	 epidemiological	 studies	 aimed	 at	 informing	 preventive	
strategies	and	mental	health	care	services	have	been	criticized	for	their	tendency	to	
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mental	 health	 of	 refugees	 and	 asylum	 seekers	 (Blight,	 Ekblad,	 Lindencrona,	 &	
Shahnavaz,	2009;	Blight,	Ekblad,	Persson,	&	Ekberg,	2006;	Craig,	Mac	Jajua,	&	Warfa,	
2009;	Humphris	&	Bradby,	 2017;	 Silove,	 Steel,	 &	Watters,	 2000).	 Other	 scholars	
have	pointed	out	how	refugees	are	often	wrongfully	portrayed	as	passive	victims	
suffering	 from	 mental	 health	 problems,	 therefore	 stressing	 the	 need	 for	 more	




goes	 beyond	 the	 categories	 of	 illness	 and	 health.	 Even	 scholars	 criticizing	 the	
overuse	of	psychiatric	categories	and	emphasizing	the	impact	of	social	and	political	
factors	 fail	 to	 transcend	 the	 health/illness	 dimension.	 In	 other	 words,	 mental	
distress	is	usually	considered	in	terms	of	a	disorder.	Whether	its	causes	are	traced	
to	individual	factors,	or	to	social	and	political	circumstances,	the	assumption	that	a	
psychic	 life	 falling	outside	 the	ordinary	 is	 fundamentally	 a	predicament	 is	 rarely	




idiosyncratic,	 ways	 of	 perceiving,	 sensing	 and	 making	 sense	 of	 the	 world,	
understanding	 them	 as	 unconventional	 narratives	 –	 and	 sometimes	 even	 as	
counternarratives	–	about	their	social,	political	and	historical	background.		
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The	 main	 objective	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 analyse	 the	 relationship	 between	
individual,	 non-ordinary,	 experiences	 and	 social	 critique/change.	 Following	
Desjarlais	(1997),	I	consider	refugees’	lifeworlds	as	their	ways	of	being	in	the	world,	
aiming	at	situating	personal	experience	within	structures	of	knowledge,	morality	
and	 practice,	 and	 thus	 ask:	 what	 are	 the	 “sensed	 grounds”	 of	 life	 in	 the	 asylum	
system?	 How	 do	 refugees	 orient	 themselves	 in	 time	 and	 space?	 How	 do	 they	
perceive	and	experience	their	new	world?	And	what	are	the	conditions	of	possibility	
of	 these	 experiences?	 Also,	 with	 Throop	 (2010),	 I	 consider	 articulation	 as	 a	
symbolically	 mediated	 process	 through	 which	 chaotic	 impressions	 take	 a	 more	
definite	 form,	 and	 I	 choose	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 opaque,	 ambiguous	 experiences	 that	
resist	articulation.	Therefore,	the	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	explore	the	ways	in	which	
personal	 experiences	 of	 suffering	 and	 crisis	 provide	 a	 critical	 angle	 on	 the	
predicaments	of	state	policies	and	practices	about	migration,	by	asking:		
- What	 is	 “crisis”	 in	 the	 asylum	 system?	 How	 do	 migrants	 experience	
distress	and	suffering	in	this	social	and	political	context?		
- What	is	the	relationship	between	individual	crisis	and	forms	of	exclusions	
and	 marginalization	 resulting	 from	 contemporary	 migration	 policies?	












but	 also	 the	 world	 around	 them.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 conduct	 an	 ethnography	 of	
experiences	of	 crisis	 in	 an	effort	 to	 find	new	ways	 to	 link	 the	 individual	 and	 the	
collective,	 the	 phenomenological	 and	 the	 political.	 I	 consider	 the	 experience	 of	
mental	distress	as	an	object	reflecting	a	crisis	in	the	conjuncture	between	the	subject	












as	 ethnographic	 field,	 to	 look	 at	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 supranational	 policies	 are	
transformed	locally,	affected	by,	and	affecting,	national	politics	and	society.	Since	its	
foundation,	 the	 European	 Union	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	 a	 tension	 between	
integration	 and	 fragmentation,	 due	 to	 distinct	 national	 histories	 of	 the	 state.	




Especially	with	 regards	 to	migration,	 Italy	has	had	 a	particular	 trajectory,	
more	 akin	 to	 that	 of	 other	 Southern	 European	 countries,	 than	 to	 Central	 and	
Northern	ones.	Migration	is	also	one	of	the	issues	which	reflects	more	significantly	
the	debate	around	 the	country’s	position	within	 the	EU. Historically	a	country	of	
emigration,	Italy	became	a	“destination”	only	in	the	1990s,	with	a	sudden	increase	
in	 its	 migratory	 inflow	 during	 the	 2000s	 (Ambrosini,	 2005).	 Similarly	 to	 other	
Southern	European	countries,	migrants	continue	to	be	considered	“useful	invaders”	
(Ambrosini,	 1999)	 and	 are	 accepted	 mainly	 as	 labour	 force	 for	 unskilled	
occupations,	 with	 a	 little	 possibility	 for	 social	mobility	 and	 secondary	 or	 higher	
education	(Calavita,	2005;	Reyneri,	2004;	Reyneri	&	Fullin,	2011).	Coherently	with	
other	 European	 countries,	 immigration	 laws	 have	 become	 progressively	 more	
exclusionary	and	 restrictive,	 thus	making	migrants	more	exposed	 to	exploitation	
both	in	the	regular	and	in	the	“grey”	or	“black”	labour	market	(Tuckett,	2016).		
The	 legal	 and	 economic	 marginalization,	 reinforced	 by	 widespread	
sentiments	 of	 racism	 and	 xenophobia,	 engender	 a	 sense	 of	 disappointment	 and	
personal	failure	(Grillo	&	Pratt,	2002).	For	these	reasons,	as	Tuckett	(2016)	argues,	
in	 the	social	 imaginary	of	migrants	 Italy	 is	often	portrayed	as	a	 “stepping	stone”,	
rather	 than	 a	 country	 of	 arrival:	 thanks	 to	 the	 relatively	 malleable	 Italian		
immigration	 laws	 and	 the	 possibilities	 offered	 by	 the	 Schengen	 Area	 (Tuckett,	
2015),	migrants	arrived	on	the	Italian	shores	apply	for	asylum	in	the	country,	but	
then	 try	 to	 move	 on	 to	 Central	 and	 Northern	 European	 countries,	 perceived	 as	
wealthier	 and	 more	 inclusive,	 with	 the	 hope	 of	 improving	 their	 life	 conditions.	
However,	as	I	will	argue	in	the	next	chapters,	mobility	is	often	more	imagined,	and	
desired,	 than	 practised.	 A	 lot	 of	migrants	 stay,	 or	 come	 back	 to	 Italy,	which	 has	
become	 in	 the	 last	decades	more	and	more	a	place	of	 residence,	 and	not	only	of	















asylum	policies	 and	 citizenship	projects.	The	 second	 section	 focuses	on	 research	
employing	the	notion	of	experience,	in	the	effort	of	comprehending	the	subjective	
acts	and	practices	within	the	system.	I	emphasize	how	the	notion	of	experience	has	
been	 frequently	 employed	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 system’s	negative	 impact	on	 individual	
lives,	 and	 therefore	 often	 associated	with	 the	 psychiatric	 category	 of	 “trauma”.	 I	
suggest	 reconsidering	 the	 notion	 of	 trauma	 through	 the	 “social	 suffering”	
framework,	 which	 better	 accounts	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	 individual	
experience	 and	 social	 processes.	 Finally,	 I	 introduce	 my	 research	 aim,	 that	 is,	
exploring	 the	 asylum	 system’s	 predicaments	 through	 the	 analysis	 of	 refugees’	
experiences	of	breakdown.		
Chapter	2	describes	the	broad	context	of	my	research,	outlining	the	forced	









on	 the	 ordinariness	 of	 precarity	 with	 Butler’s	 view	 of	 its	 paradoxical	 character.	
Finally,	I	review	de	Martino’s	analysis	of	psychopathological	disorders	as	objects	for	
ethnographic	investigations.		
The	 second	 part	 of	 this	 work	 constitutes	 three	 case	 studies	 exploring	
refugees’	 “intimate	 experiences	 of	 state”.	 The	 three	 chapters	 address	 a	 common	
question:	 how	 do	 refugees	 perceive	 and	 embody	 resettlement	 policies	 and	
citizenship	 projects?	 And	 how	 do	 they	 try	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 these	 experiences,	
articulating	them	through	language	in	the	effort	to	make	them	communicable?	The	
case	studies	analyse,	respectively,	temporal,	spatial	and	bodily	experiences	of	crisis,	








orient	 herself	 in	 the	 new	 world	 while	 re-orienting	 the	 new	 world	 around	 her.	















discussion	 of	 qualitative	methodology,	 by	 providing	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 the	

















proceed	 to	 review	 existing	 research,	 identifying	 two	 dialectical	 approaches:	
“refugee	making”	and	“refugee	experiences”.	By	examining	relevant	contributions	




In	 this	 analysis,	 I	 employ	 the	 term	“migration”	 in	a	very	broad	sense.	The	
intent	is	to	encompass	the	multiple	trajectories	and	temporalities	of	people	moving	




authorizes,	 and	opposes	 some	 forms	of	human	mobility	over	others.	Moreover,	 I	
want	to	acknowledge	the	variable	and	provisional	character	of	migratory	projects	





In	 this	work,	 therefore,	 I	 think	 of	migration	 as	an	 unstable,	 recursive,	 and	
open-ended	 process	 of	 displacement	 and	 contested	 emplacement.	 With	 this	 last	
attribute,	 I	want	 to	draw	the	boundaries	of	 this	broad	meaning	and	discriminate	
between	migration	and	other	 forms	of	human	mobility.	 In	 this	analysis,	 I	 look	at	
migrants	as	individuals	for	whom	the	right	to	move	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.1	
Hence,	migration	is	a	process	implying	a	contact	between	mobile	subjects	–	that	is,	
people	 moving	 across	 national	 borders	 –	 and	 political,	 legal,	 social,	 and	 moral	
systems	 of	mobility	 control	 on	 the	 other.	 The	 relational	 asymmetry	 is	 clear,	 for	
migrants	occupy	a	marginal,	subordinated	position.	However,	the	outcome	of	this	
encounter	 is	not	very	predictable,	and	 it	can	 take	different	shapes	–	a	struggle,	a	
resistance,	a	negotiation,	a	collision.	
This	 research	 looks	 at	 such	 encounters,	 and,	 specifically,	 at	 their	




whether	 in	 compliance,	 violation,	 or	 defiance.	 However,	 bearing	 in	 mind	 the	






refugee	experience	and	 to	 look	at	 the	effects	of	dispossession	 (of	a	 familiar	place,	 social	
network,	affects,	belongings,	status,	citizenship	rights,	etc.).	
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a	 phenomenological	 perspective	 allows	me	 to	 see	 a	whole	 horizon	 and	 different	










refugee	 studies.	 In	 particular,	 I	 examine	 research	 drawing	 on	 a	 Foucauldian	
approach	and	 focusing	on	 the	productive	 effects	of	political	 and	 legal	 categories.	
This	body	of	research	addresses	the	truth	claims	and	truth	effects	of	serious	speech	
acts	 and	 discursive	 formations	 (Dreyfus	 &	 Rabinow,	 1982;	 Foucault,	 1980),	
exploring	the	ways	in	which	macro	forces	enter	the	process	of	subject	formation,	











to	Malkki,	 the	 refugee	 label	 includes	 a	 broad	 variety	 of	 forced	movements	 with	
diverse	historical	and	political	 causes,	 socioeconomic	statuses,	personal	histories	
and	 psychological	 conditions.	 When	 addressing	 such	 an	 unstable	 social	
phenomenon,	 we	 cannot	 assume	 an	 essentialized	 “refugee	 identity”	 or	 “refugee	
experience”.	The	author	examines	the	history	of	the	category,	recognizing	that	it	was	
instituted	as	a	specific	sociolegal	classification,	and	consequentially	as	an	epistemic	





















in	 the	 “national	order	of	 things”	 (p.	5).	 She	privileges	 this	definition	over	 that	of	
“nationalisms”	to	define	the	nation	as	a	system	of	cultural	signification:	“a	powerful	









4	Malkki	 refers	 to	 van	 Gennep’s	 (1981)	 classic	 definition	 of	 liminality	 in	 rites	 of	
passage	as	a	transition	phase	in	which	people	are	on	the	threshold	of	entering	a	new	status,	
having	 left	 the	 previous	 one	 behind.	 See	 also	 Turner	 (1967),	who	 describes	 the	 liminal	









challenging,	Foucault’s	notion	of	biopolitics,	Aihwa	Ong	 (1995)	enquires	 into	 the	
social	 techniques	 that	 make	 refugees’	 bodies	 governable,	 not	 only	 through	
oppression,	but	also	through	their	aspirations.	Specifically,	the	author	focuses	on	the	
use	of	the	medical	gaze	as	means	to	discipline,	describing	biomedicine	“as	a	mix	of	
good	 intentions,	 desire	 to	 control	 ‘diseased’	 and	 ‘deviant’	 populations,	 and	 the	
exigencies	of	 limited	resources	which	often	compel	medicalization”	 (p.	1244).	By	
investigating	 the	 encounter	 between	 health	workers	 and	 Khmer	 refugees	 in	 the	
United	States,	the	author	observes	how	refugees	are	considered	both	contagious	to,	
and	 dependent	 upon	 society,	 and	 thus	 they	 must	 be	 treated,	 normalized,	
transformed	into	healthy	and	culturally	proper	subjects.	However,	Ong	emphasizes	
the	dialectical	nature	of	power	relationships,	of	oppression	and	contestation.			










The	 body	 of	 the	 refugee	 becomes	 a	 locus	 of	 resistance,	 refusing	 and	
subverting	medical	 discipline.	 In	 the	micropolitics	 of	 clinical	 encounter,	 refugees	






In	 her	 research,	 Ong	 focuses	 on	 the	 multiple	 ways	 in	 which	 migrants	
negotiate	institutionally	produced	categories	and	identities	(2003;	see	also	Zetter,	
1991,	2007).	Following	Deleuze,	 she	 looks	at	power	as	an	assemblage	and	at	 the	
process	of	citizen-making	as	the	aggregated	effect	of	multiple	actors:	
Instead	of	considering	citizenship	solely	in	terms	of	the	state’s	power	to	give	or	deny	
citizenship,	 I	 look	at	social	policies	and	practices	beyond	the	state	that	 in	myriad	


















Sassen	 (2002a)	points	 out,	 this	 relationship	 can	 assume	different	 configurations,	
depending	on	the	definition	of	the	polity.	In	Europe,	during	ancient	and	mediaeval	
times,	citizenship	was	linked	to	the	city;	subsequently,	the	process	of	state	formation	
established	 the	 tie	 between	 citizenship	 and	 national	 state.	 Recently,	 several	
transformations	 associated	 with	 globalization	 –	 such	 as	 economic	
privatization/deregulation,	the	significant	role	played	by	the	international	human	












—	has	also	been	 transformed	even	when	 it	 remains	 centered	 in	 the	national	 state. … In	
considering	denationalization,	 the	 focus	moves	on	 to	 the	 transformation	of	 the	national,	
including	 the	 national	 in	 its	 condition	 as	 foundational	 for	 citizenship.	 Thus	 it	 could	 be	
argued	 that	 postnationalism	 and	 denationalization	 represent	 two	 different	 trajectories.	
Both	are	viable,	and	they	do	not	exclude	each	other”	(Sassen,	2002a,	p.	88).	
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nation-state	 and	 the	 practices	 of	 social	 membership	 enacted	 by	 people	 facing	
exclusion	 from	 full	 participation.	 The	 author	 points	 out	 the	 difference	 between	
formal	 and	 effective	 citizenship	 in	 order	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 “informal	 social	
contract”	between	the	state	and	citizens	who	can	be	“unauthorized	yet	recognized”	
(such	as	undocumented	immigrants	raising	a	family,	schooling	children,	holding	a	
job)	 or	 “authorized	 yet	 unrecognized”	 (full	 citizens	 who	 are	 not	 recognized	 as	
political	 subjects,	 such	 as	 housewives,	 mothers,	 immigrant	 women).	 As	 Sassen	
(2002a)	argues,	those	informal	and	extra-statal	 forms	of	participation	allow	for	a	









exclusion	 from	 others,	 such	 as	 welfare	 and	 citizenship.	 However,	 differential	





(2008)	 argues,	 the	 “noncitizenship	of	 citizens	 and	 the	 citizenship	of	noncitizens”	
reveal	 that	 citizenship	 is	 not	 a	 unified	 institution	 but	 the	 outcome	 of	 different	
conventions	 and	 practices	 that	 are	 both	 converging	 and	 autonomous.	 In	 other	
words,	citizenship	is	not	binary;	it	can	be	better	understood	as	a	continuum,	or	a	
series	of	concentric	circles	of	belonging.	Although	citizenship	is	related	to	political	
participation,	 full	 inclusion	 is	 actually	 unachievable,	 and	 the	 tension	 between	
inclusion	and	exclusion	cannot	be	reconciled.	Rather,	the	issue	at	stake	is	where	to	
properly	 locate	 the	 boundaries	 with	 regards	 to	 responsibility	 and	 belonging.	
According	to	Bosniak,	 it	 is	the	paradoxical	condition	of	aliens	who	can	partake	in	




Citizenship	 policies,	 categories,	 and	 practices	 aim	 at	 perpetuating	 the	
national	order	against	the	risk	posed	by	migrants	who	claim	forms	of	belonging	from	







a	 cut	 is	 placed.	 This	 cut	 is	 citizenship.	 …	 There	 is	 a	 paradox	 in	 this	 function	 of	
citizenship	 as	 the	 regulatory	mechanism	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion:	 the	more	 a	
society	 moves	 towards	 citizenship,	 the	 more	 it	 creates	 the	 conditions	 for	 its	
disappearance	as	a	form	of	governance.	If	you	include	everyone	and	if	you	assign	
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rights	 to	 everyone,	 citizenship	 becomes	 obsolete.	 “Citizenship	 for	 all”	 is	 an	
impossible	term.	(Papadopoulos	&	Tsianos,	2013,	p.	182)		
As	 a	 consequence,	 migrants	 are	 differentially	 included	 into	 society	 and	





and	 exclusion	 produces	 a	 contradiction.	 Categories	 co-exist	 with	 spaces	 of	 non-
classification,	 that	 allow	 for	 some	 forms	 of	 partial	 recognition.	 Malkki	 and	 Ong	














founding	 truths	 of	 contemporary	 asylum:	 the	 sacred	 right	 to	 protection	 in	 an	
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permits,	 narrowing,	 and	 almost	 shutting,	 the	 previous	 entry	 route,	 asylum	
applications	 started	 to	 increase.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 asylum	 under	 the	 logics	 of	









they	 are	 founded.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 asylum	 system	 is	 based	 on	 systematic	
suspicion,	 and	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 search	 for	 the	 truth	 (Fassin,	 2013).	 The	 author	







Refugees	 are	 considered	 objects	 of	 compassion,	 rather	 than	 subjects	 of	
rights.	Specifically,	Fassin	focuses	on	migration	policies	in	France,	that	generate	a	






exhibit	 their	wounds.	The	casuistry	underlying	 the	 supposedly	 fair	processing	of	
applications	 is	 itself	 based	 on	 an	 extreme	 singularity	 of	 situations.	 Each	 case	 is	
different,	we	are	 told,	and	 therefore	 justifies	distinct	 treatment.	Accordingly,	 it	 is	
each	biography	that	 is	explored,	each	anatomy	that	 is	searched.	As	 in	 the	case	of	
other	dominated	categories	–	the	poor	or	the	foreign	–	the	government	of	refugees	
in	French	society	operates	through	…	[a	process]	of	production	and	submission	of	
the	 subject	 whose	 body	 is	 supposed	 to	 deliver	 the	 “ultimate	truth”.	 (Fassin	 &	
D’Halluin,	2005,	p.	606)	
Fassin	 and	 colleagues	 show	 how	 exception	 –	 and,	 specifically,	 exception	
founded	 on	 humanitarian	 obligation	 towards	 “victims”	 –	 represents	 a	 discourse	
granting	 legitimacy	 to	 some	 positions	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	 denying	 others.	 These	





most	 investigated	 objects	 in	 migration	 studies.	 Borders	 and	 “borderscapes”	 are	




main	guiding	principles	–	opening	and	closure.	Those	 two	poles	 create	a	 tension	
between,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 purpose	 of	 attracting	 investments,	 allowing	 free	
circulation	of	goods	and	“desired”	migrants,	and	on	the	other	hand,	protecting	the	
territory	and	discouraging	unwanted	immigration.	This	tension	is	manifested	quite	
clearly	 in	 the	 border	 apparatus.	 As	 Balibar	 (2001)	 argues,	 the	 positioning	 and	
functioning	of	Europe’s	borders	concerns	not	only	external	relations	but	also	its	own	
governmentality:	the	border	has	become	the	device	allowing	access	to	a	territory	
where	 human	 rights	 are	 granted	 while	 at	 once	 protecting	 the	 boundaries,	 and	
therefore	the	existence,	of	that	territory.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	process	of	European	
integration	 did	 not	 involve	 the	 destruction	 of	 internal	 borders.	 Rather,	 borders	
continued	 to	 operate	 by	 being	 displaced,	 transformed	 into	 bordering	 measures,	
multiplied	 and	 spread	 over	 the	 whole	 territory	 (Rigo,	 2007),	 producing	 and	
regulating	relationships,	not	only	between	political	entities,	but	also	with	political	
entities	 and	 individuals	 located	 outside	 those	 entities	 (Luhmann,	 1982).	 That	 is,	
borders	 not	 only	 separate,	 but	 establish	 areas	 of	 contact,	 and	 therefore	 of	
differentiation.		
Asylum	 and	 border	 are	 two	 inseparable	 institutions:	 they	 constitute	 each	
other	 whilst	 also	 defying	 each	 other.	 Indeed,	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 are	
created	through	at	least	one	border	crossing	which	triggers	the	Geneva	Convention	
signatory	state’s	obligations	(Loescher	&	Milner,	2011;	Long,	2012).	States	are	not	




principle	 contained	 in	 the	 Convention,8	 they	 are	 required	 to	 process	 asylum	
applications	and	cannot	return	asylum	seekers	to	countries	where	they	face	a	well-
founded	fear	of	persecution.	Therefore,	the	asylum	system	depends	on,	and	at	once	
challenges,	 the	 nation-state,	 for	 it	 restricts	 state	 sovereignty,	 and	 implies	 time	
consuming	 and	 expensive	 legal	 procedures	 to	 process	 claims	 (Hansen,	 2014).	
Nation-states	 react	 by	 establishing	 barriers	 to	 prevent	 asylum	 seekers	 from	
reaching	 their	 borders	 or	 staying	 in	 their	 territories	 after	 rejection:	 visa	
requirements,	 lists	 of	 (often	 questionable)	 “safe”	 countries,	 extraterritorial	
detention	facilities	and	increasing	deportation	measures	(Hansen,	2014).	European	
states	have	also	increasingly	engaged	in	an	effort	to	shift	their	borders	outwards.	
Borders	 are	 “dispersed”	 and	 expanded	 to	 third	 countries	 through	 the	
externalization	of	border	authorities	and	control	responsibilities	to	other	countries’	
sovereign	 territories	 (Casas-Cortes	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 This	 is	 often	 justified	 using	
humanitarian	reasons,	as	a	means	to	protect	the	rights	and	safety	of	migrants,	and	
not	 only	 as	 a	 policing	 strategy	 (Walters,	 2011).	 Specifically,	 the	 European	Union	
(EU)	 politics	 of	 externalization	 includes	 measures	 of	 transnational	 coordination	
between	 countries	 of	 origin,	 transit	 and	destination,	 such	 as	 the	 development	 of	







transit	 countries	 for	 the	external	processing	of	 claims;	 the	2008	 Italy-Libya	agreements,	
renewed	in	2017,	to	counter	illegal	immigration,	human	trafficking,	and	reinforce	border	
security	 in	return	for	 financial	support;	 the	2016	EU-Turkey	deal	 that	allowed	Greece	to	
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Aiming	 at	 “de-naturalizing	 the	 border”	 and	 arguing	 for	 a	 constructivist	
approach	 beyond	 the	 dualism	 structure/agency	 (Walters,	 2002),	 several	 authors	
have	 analysed	 how	 borders	 and	 migration	 co-constitute	 each	 other,	 looking	 at	
borders	 as	 sites	 of	 encounter,	 tension,	 and	 conflict,	 where	 power	 works	 as	 an	
assemblage	instead	of	a	unitary	logic	(Casas-Cortes	et	al.,	2015).	Moreover,	scholars	
have	 introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 “border	 regime”	 to	 analyse	 borders	 and	





Borders	 are	 external	 and	 internal,	 objective	 and	 subjective:	 they	 are	 imposed	






In	 particular,	 borders	 discriminate	 between	 citizens	 and	 non-citizens,	 producing	
dynamics	of	differential	inclusion	and	exclusion.	The	notion	of	differential	inclusion	
points	 to	 the	 productive	 effects	 of	 the	 border,	 emphasizing	 the	 link	 between	
migration	 control	 and	 labour	 management	 in	 creating	 precarity,	 vulnerability	
																																																								
return	irregular	migrants	in	exchange	for	an	increase	in	the	resettlement	of	Syrian	refugees	
residing	 in	 Turkey,	 accelerating	 visa	 liberalization	 for	 Turkish	 nationals,	 and	 boosting	
existing	financial	support	for	Turkey’s	refugee	population.	
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and/or	 opportunities	 by	 allowing	 or	 preventing	 access	 to	 resources	 and	 rights	
(Casas-Cortes	et	al.,	2015).	In	other	words,	borders	create	the	polis	by	establishing	
and	 sustaining	 the	 institution	 of	 citizenship	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	 differentiation,	
creating	 asymmetries	 in	 belonging,	 affiliation,	 and	 entitlements	 (Rigo,	 2007).	
Finally,	in	recent	years,	research	has	focused	on	the	multiple	nature	of	borders,	not	









the	 “irregular”	 migrant	 (De	 Genova,	 2002,	 2013a).	 Border	 zones	 are	 indeed	
relational	 sites	 that	 differentiate	 between	 regular/irregular	 and	
legitimate/illegitimate	migration.	While	the	first	is	considered	as	a	productive	force	



















not	 simply	 produced,	 but	 also	 contested	 and	 (re)appropriated,	 separated	 from	
regularity	by	an	obscure	line	(Coutin,	2005).		
	
In	 this	 first	 section,	 I	 have	 examined	 research	 drawing	 on	 a	 Foucauldian	
approach,	 and	 investigating	 the	 productive	 effects	 of	 migration	 categories.	
Following	Lisa	Malkki,	I	have	looked	at	the	interstices	within	the	categorical	order,	
and	at	the	threat	they	pose.	With	Aihwa	Ong,	I	have	focused	on	the	system’s	efforts	
to	 control	 the	 threat,	 producing	 disciplined	 and	 acceptable	 subjects.	 I	 have	





focusing	 on	 two	 of	 the	most	 fruitful	 epistemic	 objects	 of	 this	 field:	 the	 refugee’s	








The	 body	 of	 literature	 discussed	 above	 analyses	 the	 encounter	 between	
migrants	 and	 migration	 policies,	 laws,	 and	 institutions	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 the	
oppression-resistance	 axis.	 Power	 relations	 are	 considered	 in	 their	 dialectical	






1986,	 p.	 173).	 There	 is	 always	 something	 exceeding	 power,	 a	 possibility	 for	 an	
independent	action	–	an	act	and	not	a	response.	Therefore,	the	second	section	of	this	
chapter	 focuses	 on	 research	 that	 questions	 the	 power-resistance	 axis.	 I	 start	 by	
analysing	studies	that	focus	on	the	active	role	of	migrants	in	both	their	countries	of	
origin	and	of	arrival.	I	continue	by	reviewing	literature	elaborating	on	the	notion	of	
agency,	 and	 introducing	 that	 of	 autonomy.	 I	 conclude	 by	 looking	 into	 literature	
debating	the	idea	of	migrants’	experiences.	The	aim	is	to	focus	on	research	that	looks	
beyond	 the	 power	 resistance	 dialectic,	 opening	 up	 an	 additional	 angle	 through	
which	to	investigate	the	implicit	sides	of	life	in	migration.		
			






establish	 social	 fields	 crossing	 geographic,	 cultural,	 and	 political	 borders,	
maintaining	 multiple	 familial,	 economic,	 social,	 religious	 and	 political	 relations	
(Glick	Schiller	et	al.,	1992;	see	also	D.	S.	Massey	et	al.,	1993)	Research	following	this	
approach	 focuses	 on	 migrants’	 involvement	 –	 how	 they	 “take	 actions,	 make	
decisions,	and	feel	concerns”	(Glick	Schiller	et	al.,	1992,	p.	ix)	–	in	both	home	and	
host	 societies,	and	 the	 links	 that	are	developed	among	different	countries.	These	





in	 life	 (Salazar	 &	 Smart,	 2011).	 The	 so-called	 “mobility	 turn”	 (Urry,	 2000)	 in	
anthropology	 and	 social	 theory	 looks	 at	 human	 movement,	 and	 the	 related	






7).	 Particularly,	 Salazar	 and	 Smart	 (2011)	 argue	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 move	 is	
distributed	unevenly,	and	 the	very	processes	producing	movement	also	generate	
immobility,	 thus	 blurring	 the	 line	 between	 constraint/choice,	 forced/voluntary	
movement.	 In	 other	words,	 a	 critical	 approach	 questions	 the	 idea	 of	mobility	 as	







this	 perspective	 argue	 for	 a	 different	 gaze	 on	migration,	 one	 that	 prioritizes	 the	
subjective	practices,	desires,	expectations	and	behaviours	of	migrants	themselves,	
without	 romanticization,	 and	 always	 bears	 in	mind	 their	 inherent	 ambivalences	
(Mezzadra,	 2010).11	 Autonomy	 refers	 precisely	 to	 those	 ambivalences,	 as	 the	
moments	 of	 excess	 in	 the	 tension	 between	 migration	 processes	 and	 politics	 of	
control	(Mezzadra,	2010;	see	also	Squire,	2010).	The	autonomy	of	migration	theory	
(see,	 among	 others	Mezzadra,	 2006;	Mitropoulos,	 2007;	Moulier-Boutang,	 1998;	
Papadopoulos,	Stephenson,	&	Tsianos,	2008)	draws	attention	to	the	irreducibility	of	
contemporary	migration	 to	 economic	 factors	 of	 supply	 and	 demand,	 or	 to	 state	


















Drawing	 on	 this	 approach,	Mezzadra	 (2010)	 studies	 the	 relation	 between	
citizenship	 and	 	 migration	 by	 shifting	 the	 focus	 from	 categories	 produced	 by	




layered,	 and	 often	 racialized,	 system	 in	 which	migrants	 live	 and	 struggle.	 Thus,	
drawing	on	Isin’s	definition	of	“acts	of	citizenship”	(Isin	&	Nielsen,	2008),	Mezzadra	
discriminates	between	the	juridical	and	institutional	frame	of	citizenship	on	the	one	
hand,	 and	 citizenship	 movements,	 practices	 and	 everyday	 acts	 on	 the	 other.	
Following	Butler,	the	author	argues	that	migrants	act	as	citizens	independently	of	
their	citizenship	status:	“they	are	exercising	these	rights,	which	does	not	mean	that	




to	 merely	 integrating	 the	 macroanalysis	 of	 the	 structural	 processes	 with	 a	
microanalysis	 of	 the	 subjective	 dimensions	 of	migration”	 (2010,	 p.	 129).	 On	 the	
contrary,	this	line	of	research	deals	with	elements	of	“turbulence”	(Papastergiadis,	
2000),	that	is,	with	the	multiplicity	and	unpredictability	of	patterns	of	contemporary	
migration.	 Hence,	 this	 turbulence	 is	 analysed	 in	 its	 tension	 with	 the	 social	 and	
economic	 conditions,	 and	 the	 “equilibriums”	 (the	 functioning	 and	 reproduction),	
within,	 and	 against	 which,	 it	 occurs.	 According	 to	 Mezzadra	 the	 autonomy	 of	
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migration	 approach	 argues	 that	 “migration	 is	 structurally	 in	 excess	 of	 these	
equilibriums”.		










“mundane	 ontology	 of	 moving	 people”	 (2013,	 p.	 179).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 two	
authors	look	at	migration	from	the	multiplicity	of	its	organizational	practices	and	
“mobile	 commons”,	 that	 is,	 migrants’	 “shared	 knowledge,	 affective	 cooperation,	
mutual	support	and	care”	(ibid.).	From	this	angle,	migration’s	autonomy	refers	to		
the	capacity	to	develop	its	own	logics,	its	own	motivation,	its	own	trajectories	that	
control	comes	 later	 to	respond	to,	not	 the	other	way	round	…	 .	 In	 this	sense,	 the	
autonomy	of	migration	thesis	is	about	training	our	senses	to	see	movement	before	






labour	 markets	 and	 migratory	 movements	 by	 adjusting	 the	 flow	 of	 mobile	
	48		
individuals	to	the	speed	of	assimilation	 into	 local	markets	(see	also	De	Genova	&	




However,	 the	 autonomy	 of	migration	 theory	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 being	
overly	 encompassing	 of	 a	 broad	 diversity	 of	 migration	 experiences.	 It	 has	 been	
emphasized	 how	 this	 approach	 risks	 to	 homogenize	 and	 erase	 different	
subjectivities	and	forms	of	mobility	(Düvell,	2006	cit.	in	Papadopoulos	and	Tsianos	
2013).	In	response,	Papadopoulos	and	Tsianos	(2013)	argue	that	this	approach	does	
not	 aim	 at	 flattening	 differences;	 rather,	 the	 effort	 is	 towards	 an	 articulation	 of	
commonalities	 among	 several	 forms	 of	 movement,	 and	 diverse	 struggles	 for	
movement.	 Moreover,	 the	 two	 authors	 question	 whether	 autonomy	 can	 be	
considered	 a	 form	 of	 political	 action,	 asking	 what	 kind	 of	 politics	 characterize	
migrant	practices.	They	conclude	that	it	is	a	form	of	mobilization	that	goes	beyond	
the	 traditional	 collective	 organizations	 fighting	 against	 oppression	 and	 for	 civil	
rights.	 Papadopulos	 and	 Tsianos	 choose	 to	 define	 it	 as	 a	 form	 of	 non-politics,	
breaking	 with	 the	 dominant	 canon	 which	 assumes	 that	 migrant	 practices	 can	
become	political	only	if	they	are	integrated	into	the	existing,	recognized,	system	of	
representation.	 They	 imagine	 migrants’	 collectivity	 as	 a	 “spectre”	 rather	 than	 a	
social	class	or	a	political	movement:	
The	 spectre	 of	migration	will	 never	 become	 a	 new	working	 class.	 It	will	 always	
remain	a	spectre,	which	comes	in	the	night	through	the	backdoor	of	your	nation	on	
a	smuggled	vessel,	by	using	false	papers,	by	crossing	hundreds	of	miles	of	snowed	









their	own	 logics	which	are	almost	 imperceptible	 from	the	perspective	of	existing	







From	 this	 perspective,	 I	 have	 emphasized	 the	 multiplicity,	 irreducibility,	 and	
unpredictability	 of	 human	mobility,	 for	 it	 is	 redundant	 –	 disentangled	 from	 the	










categories,	 we	 may	 eventually	 reduce	 mobility’s	 excess	 into	 another	 category.	
However,	as	both	anthropologists	of	the	reflexivist	turn	(see,	among	others,	Clifford	
&	 Marcus,	 1986;	 Geertz,	 1973)	 and	 theorists	 of	 the	 second-order	 cybernetic	
(Maturana	&	Varela,	1992)	remind	us,	research	cannot	be	considered	as	an	objective	
gaze	on	 facts.	Rather,	 it	 is	 a	performance	enacted	by	a	polyvocality	of	narratives	
(Clifford,	1986b),	an	heteroglossia	(Rabinow,	1986).	The	act	of	knowing	can	be	best	
understood	 as	 a	 process	 shaped	 through	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 elements	
involved:	what	we	know	are	not	the	objects	per	se,	but	only	the	relation	between	




narrated	 and	 thus	 re-experienced	 in	 the	 relationship	with	 the	 researcher.	 In	 the	
following	 section,	 I	will	 analyse	anthropological	 literature	 looking	at	 the	 relation	
between	 the	 collective	 and	 the	 individual	 through	 the	 notion	 of	 experience.	








The	 trauma-focused	 approaches.	 There	 is	 a	 large	 body	 of	 literature	 in	
psychological	and	medical	sciences	 focusing	on	 the	 traumatic	character	of	 forced	
migration	and	 considering	migrants	 as	 a	high-risk	population	 for	 trauma-related	
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disorders	 (for	 a	 systematic	 review	 see	Nickerson,	 Bryant,	 Silove,	 &	 Steel,	 2011).	
Besides	 epidemiological	 studies,	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 trauma	 is	 also	 employed	 by	
humanitarian	organizations	to	represent	the	condition	of	refugees	(Pupavac,	2008;	
Rajaram,	2002).	However,	 this	perspective	has	been	criticized	 for	 importing	 into	
research	diagnostic	 categories	whose	 universality	 and	 cross-cultural	 validity	 has	
been	 widely	 questioned	 (Kienzler,	 2008;	 Littlewood,	 1990;	 Pupavac,	 2002;	
Summerfield,	1998).	Furthermore,	when	 it	 comes	 to	policymaking,	 this	approach	
shows	its	implications	beyond	epistemological	or	methodological	issues.	Indeed,	it	
generates	a	sort	of	loop	between	academic	inquiry	and	professional	practice.		
Firstly,	 by	 framing	mental	 distress	mainly	 in	 terms	 of	 negative	 impact	 of	
conflict	and	violence,	this	perspective	contributes	to	inform	and	validate	some	of	the	
assumptions	 underlying	 humanitarian	 programmes	 addressing	 the	 psychological	
needs	 of	 people	 who	 have	 survived	 violence	 and	 promoting	 their	 well-being	
(Watters,	2001).	One	of	the	fundamental,	and	at	once	most	criticized,	assumptions	






literally	beyond	 the	 imagination	of	most	people,	we	mustn’t	assume	 that	 refugee	
status	 in	 and	 of	 itself	 constitutes	 a	 recognizable,	 generalisable	 psychological	
condition”	(Malkki,	1995b,	p.	510).		








their	 diagnosed	 disorders,	 programmes	 of	 treatment	may	 be	 overwhelmed	 by	 a	
“responsibility	to	act”,	and	renounce	critical	analysis	in	favour	of	a	pragmatism	that	
reproduces	 biomedical	 categories.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 the	 name	 of	 people	 to	 be	
protected,	humanitarian	organizations	appeal	to	the	moral	obligation	to	intervene,	






as	 a	 “new	 form	 of	 international	 governance	 based	 on	 social	 risk	 management”	
(2001,	 p.	 258).	 According	 to	 the	 author,	 humanitarian	 interventions	 focusing	 on	
trauma	 take	 for	 granted	 not	 only	 that	 traumatic	 events	 cause	 psychological	
disorders;	also,	more	significantly,	that	“unresolved”	traumas	ignite	new	violence.	
The	 author	 argues	 that	 psychosocial	 programmes	 thus	 “[make]	 a	 link	 between	
psychological	well-being	and	security,	and	[seek]	to	foster	personalities	able	to	cope	
with	 risk	 and	 insecurity”	 (Pupavac,	 2005,	 pp.	 161–162)	 and	 have	 indeed	 a	
homogenizing,	 pathologizing,	 controlling,	 and	 depoliticizing	 approach	 to	 conflict	
(Pupavac,	2001).	Ticktin	(2011)	speaks	of	“regimes	of	care”	to	describe	the	critical	
role	of	exceptional,	humanitarian	clauses	and	the	related	institutions	in	governing	





recognized	 as	 morally	 legitimate.	 Migrants	 can	 access	 rights	 only	 insofar	 they	
remain	disabled	and	worthy	of	compassion.	
In	 sum,	we	may	 speak	 of	 a	 self-perpetuating	 process:	 research	 looking	 at	
mental	suffering	as	a	negative	outcome	will	contribute	in	informing	health	policies	
and	interventions	aimed	at	dealing	with,	and	containing,	such	impact.	The	result	is	
the	 prioritization	 of	mental	 health	 issues	 and	 a	 reification	 of	 a	 vulnerable	 social	
group	 that	 will	 eventually	 come	 back	 as	 object	 of	 research.	 The	 risk	 is	 to	 get	
entangled	 in	 a	 circular	 process	 that	 prevents	 us	 from	 looking	 beyond	 the	
traumatized	 subject,	 and	 defies	 the	 original	 purpose.	 We	 aim	 at	 focusing	 on	
interstices	and	margins,	what	lies	above	categories,	but	risk	eventually	fixing	that	
excess	 into	 a	 diagnosis.	 As	 Summerfield	 (1999)	 points	 out,	 trauma-focused	
approaches	pigeonhole	 forced	migrants	 as	 suffering	 from	PTSD	but	neglect	 their	
own	 perceptions,	 interpretations,	 and	 choices	 regarding	 suffering.	 I	 will	 now	




group	 under	 the	 label	 “anthropology	 of	 social	 suffering”	 (Bourdieu,	 2000b;	 Das,	
Kleinman,	 Ramphele,	 &	 Reynolds,	 2000;	 DelVecchio	 Good,	 Brodwin,	 Good,	 &	
Kleinman,	 1994;	 Kleinman,	 Das,	 &	 Lock,	 1997;	 Scarry,	 1985),	 suffering	 can	 be	
considered	 as	 a	 social	 experience.	 According	 to	 Kleinman	 (1995),	 suffering	 is	 a	
universal	human	experience,	but	it	is	not	experienced	by	everyone	in	the	same	way.	
Burdens,	 troubles	 and	wounds	 are	perceived	 and	 expressed	differently,	 not	 only	
across	 the	world,	 but	 in	 the	 same	 community.	 Suffering	 is	 social,	 for	 it	 happens	
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within	 social	 relationships,	 and	 is	 both	 a	 social	 and	 moral	 construction	 and	 a	
professional	discourse.	By	introducing	this	concept,	Kleinman,	Das	and	Lock	(1997)	
offer	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 to	 anchor	 individual	 experiences	 of	 pain	 within	
political,	 economic,	 and	 cultural	 processes.	 As	 Kleinman	 and	 Kleinman	 argue	




responses	 to	social	problems.	 Included	under	 the	category	of	 social	 suffering	are	
conditions	 that	 are	 usually	 divided	 among	 separate	 fields,	 conditions	 that	
simultaneously	 involve	 health,	welfare,	 legal,	moral	 and	 religious	 issues.	 (...)	 For	




























in	 the	 devastating	 injuries	 that	 the	 existing	 social	 order	 of	 the	world	 inflicts,	 in	
variable	degrees	according	to	local	situations,	on	the	experience	of	individuals	up	to	




Drawing	 on	 the	 social	 suffering	 perspective,	 Fassin	 and	 d’Halluin	 (2005,	
2007)	 argue	 that	 trauma	 has	 been	 increasingly	 employed	 as	 a	 technology	 of	
governing	 in	 the	 form	 of	 medical	 certificates	 or	 expert	 testimonies.	 Trauma	




Other	 authors	 problematize	 the	 notion	 of	 trauma	 by	 including	 in	 their	
analyses	not	only	pre-migration,	but	also	post-migration	risk	factors,	such	as	loss	of	
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social	 support,	 economic	 pressures,	 low	 socioeconomic	 status,	 prejudice	 and	
discrimination,	 isolation,	 prolonged	 stress	 before	 or	 during	 immigration	 (Ager,	
1999;	 Levecque	&	Van	Rossem,	 2015;	 Psoinos,	 2007).	Moreover,	 Ingleby	 (2005)	
points	out	that	the	trauma	approach	reduces	the	causes	of	migrants’	suffering	to	a	
single	 catastrophic	 event,	 forgetting	 a	 whole	 context	 (both	 past	 and	 present)	 of	
uncertainty	 and	 deprivation,	 and	 the	 re-traumatizing	 potential	 of	 the	 asylum	
process	 itself	 	 (Rousseau,	 Crépeau,	 Foxen,	 &	 Houle,	 2002;	 Steel	 &	 Silove,	 2000).	




that	 the	 “social	 embeddedness”	 of	 emotions	 is	 emphasized	 in	 their	 accounts	
(Brough,	 Schweitzer,	 Shakespeare-Finch,	 Vromans,	 &	 King,	 2013;	 Haas,	 2012;	
Hutchinson,	2010).	Negative	affects	(frustration,	uncertainty,	hopelessness,	shame,	




traumatic	 events	 pre-migration	 (Fozdar,	 2009).	 Migrants	 experience	 a	 social	




Anthropology	 of	 experience.	 There	 is	 a	 rich	 tradition	 of	 studies	 in	
anthropology	focusing	on	experience	by	drawing	on	a	phenomenological	approach	
(Csordas,	 1990,	 1993,	 1994;	 Good,	 1994;	 Jackson,	 1996,	 2002,	 2005;	 Jenkins	 &	
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Barrett,	 2004),	 while,	 at	 once,	 critically	 questioning	 the	 use	 of	 the	 notion	 of	
experience	itself	(for	a	comprehensive	review,	see	Desjarlais	&	Throop,	2011;	Willen	
&	 Seeman,	 2012b).	 Desjarlais	 (1997)	 argues	 for	 a	 “critical	 phenomenological	
approach”	 in	 anthropology	 that	 allows	 a	 fine-grained	 investigation	 of	 cultural	
phenomena,	how	 they	are	perceived	and	experienced,	whilst	moving	beyond	 the	















intersubjective	 grounding”	 (p.	 5).	 By	 focusing	 on	 intersubjective,	 embodied	












those	 forces	 enter	 migrants’	 lifeworlds.	 Thus,	 a	 citizenship	 category,	 such	 as	
“illegality”,	is	analysed	as	threefold:	as	a	juridical	status,	a	socio-political	condition	
and	an	embodied,	sensory	experience.	Ethnography	becomes	a	prism	through	which	





The	 notion	 of	 experience	 has	 been	 employed	 to	 provide	 a	 fine-grained	
account	of	what	happens	on	the	ground,	when	migration	policies	are	implemented	
and	have	an	impact	on	people’s	lives.	Agier	(2008)	describes	the	new	forms	of	being-
in-the-world	 engendered	 by	 refugees’	 practices,	 identifying	 the	 three	 founding	
moments	of	their	“existential	context”	–	destruction,	confinement,	action.	Besides,	
the	 author	 argues,	 the	 analysis	 of	 this	 specific	 experience	 reveals	 something	
inherently	human,	since	when	we	look	at	“human	identity	at	the	sites	of	its	denial,	













Other	 authors	 show	 how	 migration	 policies	 produce	 positions	 of	 structural	






In	 this	chapter	 I	 reviewed	 literature	addressing,	 from	different	angles,	 the	
question	 of	 how	migration	 affects	 individual	 lives.	 I	 opened	 by	 examining	 some	
seminal	works	exposing	the	paradoxes	inherent	to	migration	policies.	The	analysis	
focused	on	 the	 interstices	 that	 result	 from	 the	 constant	production	of	 categories	
aimed	at	controlling	and	ordering,	mainly	through	practices	of	exclusion.	Following	
these	 considerations,	 I	 argued	 that	 migrants	 are	 subjects	 of	 exception,	 living	 in	
marginal,	 contested,	spaces.	 	 I	 then	 looked	at	 the	ways	 in	which	 those	paradoxes	
operate,	and	on	the	sites	where	they	emerge	and	are	resisted	–	the	suffering	body,	
and	 border	 regimes.	 In	 the	 second	 section	 of	 the	 chapter,	 I	 drew	 on	 research	
challenging	 the	 oppression-resistance	 framework	 and	 focusing	 on	 migrants’	
actions,	 rather	 than	 their	 reactions.	 Firstly,	 I	 analysed	 the	 contributions	 about	
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mobility	 as	 a	 form	 of	 agency,	 also	 problematizing	 this	 assumption.	 Secondly,	 I	
focused	on	what	lies	beyond	categories	and	acts	of	resistance	against	categories	–	
migration	autonomy,	and	excesses,	as	efforts	to	generate	new	ontologies.		





critical	 phenomenological	 approach,	 to	 consider	 how	 that	 excess	 is	 experienced	
rather	than	reduced	to	a	fact.		
In	particular,	the	analysis	followed	the	misuse	and	misunderstanding	of	the	




categories.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 I	 suggested	 turning	 to	 anthropological	 literature	 on	
social	suffering	to	look	differently	at	migrants’	mental	distress.	By	comparing	these	




will	 apply	 a	 critical	 phenomenological	 approach	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 structural	
vulnerabilities	 that	are	produced	and	re-produced	by	asylum	categories,	policies,	
and	practices:	 how	 is	 the	 asylum	system	perceived,	 experienced,	 and	embodied?	
How	 do	 inequalities	 enter	 and	 impact	 individual	 lifeworlds?	 By	 following	 a	
phenomenological	 approach,	 this	 research	 looks	 at	 critical,	 marginal	 states	 as	
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objects	with	a	heuristic	potential.	Drawing	on	ethnographic	fieldwork	on	migrants’	




In	 this	 work,	 I	 consider	 marginality	 as	 a	 possible	 space	 for	 autonomy.	












the	 outer	 (presumed)	 balance	 and	 create	 disorder	 among	 ordering	 practices.	
However,	my	aim	is	not	to	idealize	marginality,	or	to	overestimate	the	influence	of	
people	who	are,	in	fact,	consistently	excluded	and	subjected	to	discriminatory	and	





Still,	 those	 exhausting	 lives	 are	 not	 fully	 enclosed	 in,	 nor	 are	 entirely	
determined	 by,	 their	 oppressive	 conditions.	 Something	 is	 exceeding	 those	
conditions.	When	going	off	course,	eluding	containment	and	even	comprehension,	
these	lives	produce	an	effect,	a	turbulence.	While	it	is	crucial	to	continue	drawing	
attention	 to	 structural	 inequalities,	 I	 think	 that	 we	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 what	
exceeds	the	structure,	representing	a	potential	break	and	a	form	of	political	action.	
As	 I	will	argue	 in	 the	coming	chapters,	 in	 this	excess	 I	 find	an	effort	 to	reclaim	a	
chance	to	act,	or,	at	least,	to	create	the	condition	for	thinking	and	meaning	making.	
Indeed,	 the	 turbulence	 usually	 affects	 the	 structure	 only	 marginally,	 or	 briefly,	
before	 it	 is	 contained	 and	 classified	 as	 a	 disorder	 of	 the	 individual.	 Even	 so,	 a	
disorder	represents	for	the	individual	an	existential	possibility	–	a	transformation	
whose	outcome	is	unpredictable,	since	the	stakes	are	high.	The	movement	that	is	
created	 reverberates,	 shaking	 the	 people	 around,	 and	 thus	 creating	 other	
possibilities	for	movement	and	change.	
Consequently,	 by	 considering	 migrants’	 psychological	 distress	 as	 an	
autonomous	act	exceeding	the	order,	I	ask:	what	does	the	asylum	system	look	like	
when	 observed	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 experiences	 of	 suffering?	 The	 aim	 is	 to	
investigate	 the	 ambiguities	 of	 the	 asylum	 system,	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 psychic	





articulate	 perception	 in	 words,	 and	 moving	 between	 intelligible	 shapes	 and	









the	 long	 history	 of	migration	 towards/in	 Europe.	 I	 give	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 first	
supranational	measures	implemented	to	address	the	phenomenon,	initially	to	foster	
the	right	to	asylum,	and	later	to	restrict	 it.	 I	 identify	the	historical	conjuncture	in	
which	the	figure	of	“the	refugee”	emerged,	describing	how	it	changed	over	time	and	






for	 the	 assessment	 of	 asylum	 claims,	 and	 provisions	 regarding	 the	 reception	 of	







situated	 within	 the	 history	 of	 migration	 from	 and	 towards	 Europe.	 The	 current	








and	 from	 and	 towards	 other	 continents.	 Whereas,	 until	 the	 Second	World	War,	
Europe	was	mainly	an	area	of	labour	emigration,	since	the	economic	recovery	of	the	
1950s,	it	has	seen	an	increase	in	internal	flows,	mainly	from	Southern	and	Eastern	
countries	 towards	Central	and	Western	Europe,	and	 in	 immigrants	arriving	 from	
other	continents	(Ambrosini,	2005).		
In	 the	 last	 century,	 another	 kind	 of	 mobility	 has	 emerged	 alongside	 the	
enduring	 movements	 of	 labour	 migrants.	 The	 totalitarian	 regimes	 established	
during	the	20th	century	and	the	persecutions	and	violence	committed	before	and	
during	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 engendered	 increasing	 flows	 of	 people	 seeking	












rights	which,	 in	 Europe,	 led	 to	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 and	 the	
adoption	 of	 the	 1950	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 (ECHR)	 (Fiddian-




Refugees.	 The	 document	 defines	 who	 is	 a	 refugee	 and	 what	 kind	 of	 protection,	










Union	 has	 continued	 to	 further	 develop	 the	 initial	 supranational	 agreements	
through	the	years	and	to	establish	a	common	refugee	protection	system	founded	on	
the	 principles	 of	 the	 Geneva	 Convention	 and	 the	 ECHR.	 During	 the	 Cold	 War,	
European	countries	had	liberal	asylum	policies.	Refugees,	as	with	other	immigrants,	
																																																								





were	 generally	 welcomed	 due	 to	 the	 need	 for	 workforce	 during	 the	 post-war	
reconstruction.	Refugee	status	was	quite	 readily	granted,	 the	Geneva	Convention	
was	 applied	 not	 only	 to	 individuals,	 but	 to	 groups,	 and	 residence	 permits	 were	







Central	 Europe	 (Joly	 &	 Suhrke,	 2004).	 During	 the	 late	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s,	
European	countries	began	to	implement	increasingly	restrictive	migration	policies,	
first	 separately	 and	 then	 in	 cooperation,	 while,	 simultaneously	 engaging	 in	 the	
process	of	European	integration.	Alongside	the	dismantling	of	internal	barriers	and	
the	constitution	of	an	area	of	free	movement,	Europe	established	several	measures	
to	 reinforce	 its	 external	 borders	 and	 to	 limit	 and	 regulate	 immigration,	 thus	
establishing	 what	 scholars	 have	 termed	 “Fortress	 Europe”	 (Geddes,	 2008;	 Rigo,	
2005,	2007).			
Since	 the	 1980s,	 immigration	policies	 have	moved	 towards	 restrictionism	
and	deterrence	against	entry	(Squire,	2009;	Zetter,	2005).	For	instance,	in	the	1990s,	
refugees	 from	former	Yugoslavia	 fleeing	 the	Balkan	wars	were	granted	a	 form	of	
“temporary	protection”	that	required	them	to	return	to	their	countries	of	origin,	or	





European	 countries	 began	 to	 adopt	 large-scale	 approaches,	 developing	 a	
“comprehensive	refugee	policy”	to	extend	the	range	of	the	intervention	beyond	their	





The	 figure	 of	 “the	 refugee”.	 The	 figure	 of	 “the	 refugee”	 emerges	 with	 the	
Geneva	 Convention,	 as	 a	 person	 who,	 “…owing	 to	 a	 well-founded	 fear	 of	 being	
persecuted	 for	 reasons	 of	 race,	 religion,	 nationality,	 membership	 of	 a	 particular	
social	group	or	political	opinion,	is	outside	the	country	of	his	[or	her]	nationality	and	
is	 unable	 or,	 owing	 to	 such	 fear,	 is	 unwilling	 to	 avail	 him	 [or	 her]	 self	 of	 the	
protection	of	that	country;	or	who,	not	having	a	nationality	and	being	outside	the	
country	of	his	[or	her]	former	habitual	residence	as	a	result	of	such	events,	is	unable	





those	 fleeing	post-decolonization	 conflicts	 in	 the	 global	 South	or	non-communist	
regimes	 in	 Southern	 Europe	 (Castles,	 2007;	 Chimni,	 1998).	 In	 1967,	 the	
geographical	and	war-linked	limitations	of	the	Convention	were	amended	and	the	
refugee	 category	 was	 expanded,	 enabling	 people	 from	 the	 global	 South	 to	 seek	





Through	 the	 decades,	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 “refugee”	 acquired	 a	 growing	







progressive	 reduction	 of	 legal	 channels	 of	 entry	 in	 Europe,	 and	 a	 consequent	
increase	in	asylum	applications.	Following	the	abolition	of	guest-worker	schemes,	
the	 reduction	 of	 migration	 quotas,	 and	 increasing	 restrictions	 on	 family	




complex,	 in	 which	 motivations	 for	 movement	 are	 mixed,	 and	 often	 inextricable	
(Scheel	&	Squire,	2014).	As	a	consequence,	another	category	emerged	–	that	of	the	
“bogus	 asylum	 seeker”	 falsely	 claiming	 to	 be	 a	 forced	 migrant,	 while	 in	 fact	
migrating	for	economic	reasons,	and	thus	exploiting	the	asylum	system	(Scheel	&	
																																																								







or	 of	 humanitarian	 intervention	 (Scheel	&	 Squire,	 2014).	 The	 system	 reacted	 by	
taking	 an	 even	 more	 restrictive	 direction,	 developing	 “preventive	 protection”	
measures	 in	 countries	 of	 origin	 and	 policies	 of	 deterrence	 and	 containment	 of	
“illegal	 migrants”	 within	 the	 EU,	 and	 tightening	 the	 procedures	 of	 asylum	









that	 could	 be	 defined	 as	 “permaconflict”	 (Cohen	 &	 Van	 Hear,	 2017).	 In	 the	 last	
twenty	 years,	 the	 global	 population	of	 forcibly	displaced	people	has	 grown	 from	
33.9	million	in	1997	to	65.6	million17	in	2016,	with	a	peak	between	2012	and	2015	
																																																								















hosting	 84	percent	 of	 the	world’s	 refugees	 under	UNHCR’s	mandate	 (about	 14.5	
million	 people),	 with	 the	 least	 developed	 countries	 providing	 asylum	 to	 a	
considerable	 proportion	 (4.9	million	 refugees,	 28	 percent	 of	 the	 total)	 (UNHCR,	
2017).18	







who	 have	 applied	 for	 international	 protection	 as	 a	 refugee	 and	 are	 awaiting	 the	
determination	of	their	status)	(UNHCR,	2017).	
18	 Europe	 receives	 only	 a	 small	 part	 of	 the	world	 refugee	population,	 around	16	
percent	(UNHCR,	2017).	
19	When	referring	 to	 “industrialized	countries”	UNHCR	considers	 the	28	Member	
States	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	 Albania,	 Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina,	 Iceland,	 Liechtenstein,	
Montenegro,	Norway,	 Serbia	 and	Kosovo	 (S/RES/1244	 (1999)),	 Switzerland,	 the	 former	





570,800	 in	 2014,	 with	 a	 44	 percent	 increase	 between	 2013	 and	 2014	 (UNHCR,	
2010a,	2015).	Although	Germany	 remains	 the	 first	European	 country	 for	 asylum	
applications	 registered,	 during	 the	 last	 few	 years	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increase	 in	
applications	registered	in	Southern	Europe.	In	2009,	Germany	received	the	largest	
number	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 (27,600	 claims),	 followed	 by	 Sweden	 (24,200),	 Italy	
(17,600),	 Norway	 (17,200),	 Belgium	 (17,200),	 and	 Greece	 (15,900)	 (UNHCR,	





sulla	 protezione	 internazionale	 in	 Italia	 2017,	 2017).	 Together	 with	 France	 and	
Austria,	those	countries	represent	79.6	percent	of	asylum	claims	registered	in	the	
EU.		
Journalists	 and	 politicians	 have	 represented	 the	 peaks	 of	 sea	 arrivals	 to	
Southern	 Europe	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 “crisis”.	 Several	 scholars	 have	 considered	 the	
productive	dimension	and	the	consequences	of	declaring	a	state	of	emergency	and	













enforcement	 and	 restricting	 immigration	 and	 asylum	 policies;	 also,	 a	 state	 of	
emergency	tends	to	mask	the	responsibilities	of	macro-actors,	both	governmental	
and	non-governmental,	by	“personalizing	crisis”	and	relocating	the	problem	in	the	
migrant’s	 body,	who	 becomes	 a	 carrier	 of	 a	 “contagion”	 (De	 Genova,	 Tazzioli,	 &	
Álvarez-Velasco,	2016).		
To	manage	 the	 increasing	 flows	and	the	recurrent	 “crises”,	EU	states	have	
promoted	 supranational	 policies	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 so-called	 “durable	
solutions”	 –	 local	 integration,	 resettlement,	 repatriation.	 Particularly	 in	 the	 last	
decades,	EU	states	have	engaged	in	a	shared	effort	to	define	a	European	Agenda	on	
Migration21	 and	 a	 Common	 European	 Asylum	 System	 (CEAS).22	 The	 Agenda’s	
purpose	is	to	manage	migration	into	Europe	by	enhancing	cooperation	with	non-EU	
countries	of	transit	and	origin,	by	promoting	agreements	with	neighbour	countries,	
and	 implementing	 internal	 and	 external	measures,	 such	 as	 providing	 funding	 to	
Frontex	(the	European	Border	and	Coast	Guard	Agency),	 the	Regional	Protection	
and	 Development	 Programmes	 for	 relocation	 and	 resettlement,	 and	 to	 the	most	
affected	 Member	 States	 at	 the	 EU’s	 external	 borders.	 Moreover,	 the	 Agenda	








at	 harmonizing	 standards	 of	 protection	 by	 aligning	 EU	 State’s	 asylum	 laws,	 and	
enhancing	 cooperation	 and	 solidarity	within	 the	EU,	 and	between	 it	 and	non-EU	
countries.	On	the	other	hand,	the	CEAS	established	several	measures,	such	as	the	





rights	 to	 be	 granted	 to	 refugees;	 the	 Dublin	 regulation,	 to	 determine	 the	 State	
responsible	 for	 examining	 the	 application	 (usually	 the	 first	 European	 country	 of	





made,	 and	 to	 have	 access	 to	 support,	 accommodation,	 free	 health	 care	 and	 legal	
representation.	 If	 the	 claim	 is	 accepted,	 the	asylum	seeker	 can	be	either	granted	
international	 protection,	 subsidiary	 protection,	 or	 humanitarian	 protection,	 and	
thus	a	temporary	permission	to	stay	(that	can	be	converted	into	citizenship	status	
usually	after	five	years).	Applicants	who	are	rejected	can	appeal	against	the	decision,	




assessment	 of	 asylum	 claims	 and	 the	 reception	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 within	 the	
common	 institutional	 framework.	 The	 Italian	 asylum	 system	 consists	 of	 the	
	74		
















security”	 (Ddl	 840/2018).	 Among	 other	 measures,	 the	 law	 abolishes	 humanitarian	






camilli/2018/11/27/decreto-sicurezza-immigrazione-cosa-prevede,	 last	 visited	 on	 29	
November	2018).		
24	Any	time	before	the	interview,	the	asylum	seeker	can	add	to	his/her	application	







or	 she	 can	 appeal	 to	 Court.26	 Positive	 decisions	 on	 asylum	 claims	 can	 provide	
different	forms	of	recognition	and	different	citizenship	statuses:	




after	 five	 years	 (instead	 of	 ten,	 as	 usual),	 the	 right	 to	 apply	 for	 family	







the	 asylum	 seeker	 from	 leaving	 the	 country.	 Beneficiaries	 of	















The	 reception	 system	 is	organized	 in	 three	 stages:	 a	preliminary	phase	of	
rescue,	 first	 assistance	 and	 identification	 conducted	 in	 governmental	 centres28	
based	 in	 the	main	 landing-points;	 a	 “first	 reception”	phase,	during	which	asylum	
seekers	are	transferred	into	governmental	facilities29	for	completing	identification	
(when	needed),	submitting	the	asylum	application	and	undergoing	a	general	health	






Extraordinary	 Reception	 Centres).	 The	 SPRAR	 system	 is	 controlled	 by	 local	
authorities	that	outsource	the	service	to	local	NGOs	(associations	and	cooperatives)	




abrogation	of	 the	humanitarian	protection.	The	new	 law	 replaces	 the	permit	 to	 stay	 for	
humanitarian	 reasons	 with	 a	 permit	 to	 stay	 for	 “special	 cases”,	 which	 grant	 a	 more	
precarious	juridical	status.	For	instance,	unlike	other	permits,	they	do	not	grant	free	access	
















needed,	but	with	a	 lower	standard.	Therefore,	a	 sort	of	 second-class	 reception	 is	
established.	 SPRAR,	 the	 ordinary	 system,	 is	 organized	 according	 to	 national	
guidelines	 and	 regularly	 monitored;	 other	 than	 basic	 resources	 (food,	
accommodation,	 healthcare),	 it	 provides	 complementary	 services	 such	 as	 legal	
support,	social	guidance	and	individualized	programmes	to	promote	socioeconomic	
inclusion	and	integration.	Within	the	SPRAR	system,	some	reception	facilities	are	






services	 for	 legal	 advice,	 job	 guidance	 and	 healthcare	 support,	 and	 their	
management	 is	 less	 closely	 monitored	 (In	 Migrazione,	 2017;	 LasciateCIEntrare,	
																																																								
30	 The	 so-called	 “security	 decree”	 (Ddl	 840/2018)	 approved	 in	 November	 2018	
downsizes	significantly	the	SPRAR	system,	which	will	be	dedicated	only	to	those	who	have	
been	 already	 granted	 international	 protection	 and	 to	 unaccompanied	 minors.	 Asylum	
seekers	will	be	accommodated	in	CAS	and	CARA	centres.		
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Cittadinanzattiva,	 &	 Libera,	 2016;	 Marchetti,	 2016).	 Although,	 according	 to	 the	
directives,	 the	 SPRAR	 system	 is	 considered	 the	 ordinary	 reception	 channel,	 data	
show	 almost	 the	 opposite:	 in	 July	 2017,	 CAS	 provided	 accommodation	 for	 77.4	
percent	of	all	asylum	seekers	living	in	reception	centres,	while	only	15.3	percent	had	


















are	 to	 promote	 an	 “emancipatory	 reception”,	 support	 refugees	 in	 “(re)acquiring	




protagonist	 in	 the	 path	 towards	 social	 inclusion”,	 autonomy	 and	 empowerment.	
Each	 asylum	 seeker	 is	 therefore	 entitled	 to	 receive	 a	 “personalized	 project”,	
respecting	the	individual’s	time,	needs	and	well-being,	taking	into	account	his/her	
background	and	aspirations,	but	always	considering	that	the	reception	system	is	of	
a	 “temporary	 nature”.32	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 overcome	 a	 “welfare	 mentality”,	 by	
“encouraging	 asylum	 seekers	 not	 to	 be	 passive	 recipients,	 but	 rather	 active	
protagonists	 in	the	pathway	towards	social	 inclusion.”	Projects	should	“detail	 the	
different	 services	 provided,	 objectives	 achieved	 and	 to	 be	 achieved,	 actions	
implemented	and	 to	be	 implemented,	 and	a	 timetable”	 and	 should	be	monitored	
regularly	to	verify	progress.	
The	issue	of	autonomy	is	expressed	mainly	in	socioeconomic	terms.	Among	
the	 listed	priorities	 to	support	 integration	 through	personal	autonomy,	 there	are	
several	 interventions	 aimed	 at	 fostering	 access	 to	 the	 job	 market,	 focused	 on	






are	 temporary	 and	 usually	 (entirely	 or	 partially)	 funded	 by	 the	 government	
(Rapporto	sulla	protezione	 internazionale	 in	 Italia	2017,	2017),	are	often	the	only	
channel	through	which	asylum	seekers	access	the	job	market.	However,	as	argued	
																																																								
32	 Asylum	 seekers	 are	 entitled	 to	 live	 in	 reception	 facilities	 until	 Commissione	
Territoriale	 comes	 to	 a	 final	 decision	 and	 for	 six	 months	 after	 a	 positive	 decision.	 In	


















usually	 occupy	 a	 marginal	 position	 vis-à-vis	 the	 state	 and	 the	 community.	 As	 I	




articulate	 a	 liveable	world,	 focusing	 on	 their	 failures,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 system’s	
practices	of	citizen	making.	 I	present	my	research	methodology,	reflecting	on	the	
issues	raised	by	fieldwork	and	on	the	methodological	choices	I	have	made.	Firstly,	I	
describe	 my	 research	 setting,	 the	 sites	 that	 constitute	 my	 ethnographic	 field.	










section,	 in	 the	SPRAR	system	 there	are	 some	reception	 facilities	and	services	 for	




the	 opportunity	 to	 be	 included	 in	 those	 projects	 hinges	 on	 the	 recognition	 and	
recognizability	 of	 vulnerability.	Both	 local	 asylum	boards	 and	 central	 authorities	
have	wide	discretionary	power	in	judging	what	counts	as	vulnerable	and	what	does	
not.	 Particularly	 in	 respect	 of	 health	 issues,	 decisions	 are	 based	 on	 the	 evidence	
provided	 –	 an	 evidence	 that	 is	 more	 convincing	 if	 is	 visible	 on	 the	 body	 or,	 if	
invisible,	certified	by	medical	experts.			
																																																								
33	 Before	 starting	 fieldwork,	 my	 research	 project	 underwent	 an	 ethical	 review	
process.	My	field	research	at	all	times	possible	kept	to	the	agreed	protocols	I	had	proposed	
in	 my	 application	 for	 ethical	 clearance	 and	 which	 were	 approved	 by	 Oxford	 Brookes	
University	 Research	 Ethics	 Committee	 (UREC)	 (see	 Appendices).	Moreover,	 I	 addressed	
ethical	 considerations	 throughout	 the	 fieldwork,	 discussing	 emerging	 issues	 with	 my	
supervisors	and	my	advisors	on	the	field.		
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existing	 network	 of	 relationships	 with	 people	 working	 and	 volunteering	 with	
migrants	 that	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 valuable	 starting	 point	 for	 defining	 the	 field	 and	
establishing	contacts	with	gatekeepers.		
																																																								










in	 provincia	 di	 Torino:	 rapporto	 2016	
http://www.comune.torino.it/statistica/osservatorio/stranieri/2016/.	 last	 visited	 on	 6	
December	2018).	During	 the	 last	 two	decades,	 the	 city	began	 to	 receive	 its	 first	 refugee	
flows.	In	the	early	2000s,	Torino	was	one	of	the	first	cities	to	implement	the	initial	asylum	
national	 programme	 (Piano	 Nazionale	 Asilo,	 later	 transformed	 into	 the	 SPRAR	 system).	
However,	 the	 refugee	 presence	 has	 become	 significant	 only	 since	 2011,	 after	 the	 Arab	



















refugees,	 and	 are	 (more	 or	 less)	 recognized	 as	 members	 of	 the	 different	
communities	 they	 live	 in	 –	 the	 workplace,	 their	 children’s	 school,	 church,	
associations,	 etc.	Therefore,	other	 than	spending	 time	 in	NGOs,	 I	met	 refugees	 in	
more	informal	places,	in	their	daily	lives.				
During	this	scoping	period	I	identified	sites	at	which	to	conduct	participant	
observation,	 presenting	 my	 research	 and	 making	 agreements	 with	 gatekeepers.	
While	combining	sites	in	a	sort	of	geography	of	vulnerability,	I	confronted	with	the	
issue	 of	 establishing	 a	 field	 of	 observation	 that	 was	 comprehensive	 but	 not	 too	
dispersive.	I	drew	my	field’s	boundaries,	excluding	in	particular	two	settings	that	
engaged	me	at	first,	but	would	have	radically	changed	my	research	focus:	a	camp	in	







- Associazione	Tela,35	 a	 refugee	association,	 aimed	at	 fostering	 inclusion	
and	integration.	Among	the	several	activities	provided	by	the	association	
(hosting	 an	 information	 point	 about	 refugees’	 rights	 and	 support	
network,	 legal	 counselling,	 awareness-raising	 events),	 I	 chose	 to	
participate	in	the	women’s	group,	held	once	a	week	and	aimed	at	offering	
refugee	 women	 an	 occasion	 to	 talk,	 exchange	 ideas,	 and	 building	 a	
support	network.	
- Gaia,	 a	women’s	 centre,	 offered	 a	wide	 range	of	 activities	 (such	 as	 job	
training,	 career	 counselling,	 legal	 advice,	 psychological	 support,	 art	
laboratories,	 cultural	 activities	 and	 language	 classes)	 and	 promoted	
women’s	 political	 participation.	 I	 decided	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 Italian	
language	classes	for	refugee	women.	
- Centro	Kalima,	run	by	a	team	of	psychologists,	psychiatrists,	physicians,	
cultural	 mediators	 and	 anthropologists,	 providing	 psychological	
counselling	to	migrants	and	refugees.	Other	than	getting	involved	in	the	
clinical	 centre,	 we	 agreed	 that	 I	 could	 volunteer	 in	 Oasi,	 a	 reception	
project	for	refugees	suffering	from	mental	illness.	
	
Participant	 observation	 and	 interviews.	 The	 ethnography	 was	 carried	 out	
across	multiple	sites,	selected	as	representative	examples	of	a	range	of	not-for-profit	





and	 activities	 I	 could	 have	 access	 to,	 and	 I	 obtained	 permission	 to	 conduct	
participant	 observation	 (see	 Appendix	 III).	 I	 worked	 to	 establish	 a	 space	 of	
collaboration	with	the	participants,	based	on	mutual	trust	and	confidence,	in	which	
we	 negotiated	 research	 aims,	 co-constructed	 meanings	 and	 addressed	 ethical	








As	 discussed	 in	 literature	 (Green	 &	 Thorogood,	 2013),	 consent	 can	 be	
problematic	 to	secure	 in	observational	 studies,	especially	when	participants	may	
change,	or	new	people	can	enter	the	field	over	the	period	of	research.	Also,	since	
most	 of	 the	 participants	 underwent	 immigration	 control	 and	 asylum	 screening	
process,	and	some	of	them	were	also	non-literate,	I	did	not	employ	written	material,	
or	ask	to	sign	consent	forms,	which	may	be	intimidating	and	undermine	the	research	
relationship.	 Therefore,	 I	 considered	 informed	 consent	 as	 an	 ongoing	 relational	
process,	 rather	 than	 a	 one-off	 event,	 and	 I	 based	 it	 on	 conversations	 and	 verbal	
agreements:	 I	 found	several	occasions	 to	 talk	about	my	research	and	renegotiate	
consent	throughout	the	fieldwork	period.	However,	in	a	setting	such	as	my	field	site,	
it	is	usually	difficult	to	make	sure	that	all	the	people	present	at	every	moment	of	the	














conducted	 and	 the	 data	 handled,	 and	 they	were	 offered	 the	 option	 of	 having	 an	
interpreter.	 Informed	 consent	 was	 obtained	 verbally	 and,	 when	 the	 participant	
agreed,	also	audio-recorded.	In	case	of	follow-up	interviews,	informed	consent	was	
revisited.		
To	 assure	 confidentiality,	 pseudonyms	 were	 used	 at	 all	 times	 and	 any	
identifying	detailed	 information	 (such	as	where	 they	were	 located	at	 the	 time	of	
research,	 the	 name	 of	 the	 NGO	 where	 they	 have	 been	 contacted,	 the	 particular	




men.	 Five	 were	 in	 the	 25-30	 age	 range	 and	 three	 in	 the	 35-45	 age	 range.	 Five	
informants	come	from	West	and	East	Africa;	the	remaining	three	come	from	Turkey,	
Iran	and	Pakistan.	At	the	time	of	the	interview,	all	the	informants	had	been	living	in	
Europe	 and	 in	 Italy	 for	 years,	 had	 spent	 years	 in	 the	 asylum	 system,	 and	 were	
beneficiaries	 of	 international	 protection.	 However,	 only	 three	 of	 them	 lived	 in	 a	
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rented	 apartment	 and	 had	 a	 source	 of	 income,	 while	 the	 others	 were	 still	 in	
precarious	living	conditions.	Their	life	stories	are	ordinary	and	extraordinary	at	the	










they	understood	my	questions,	and	the	direction	of	 the	 interview.	The	result	 is	a	
collection	of	personal,	 intimate	conversations,	which	took	shape	 in	 the	particular	
encounter	with	each	of	them.		
Six	 interviews	were	audio-recorded	and	 then	 transcribed,	while	 two	were	
recorded	 through	written	 notes.	 Throughout	 the	 fieldwork	 period	 I	 kept	 several	
journals,	 in	which	 I	noted	my	observations	daily.	To	 interpret	data,	 I	employed	a	
narrative	 analysis	 approach	 (Riessman,	 2008).	 Firstly,	 I	 familiarised	 with	 the	
material,	 by	 listening	 to	 recordings	 and	 re-reading	 transcripts	 and	 fieldnotes.	
Following	on,	I	did	a	thematic	analysis	of	each	interview,	to	find	recurrent	contents.	










case	 studies,	 to	 give	 account	 for	 the	 specificity	 of	 each	 research	 encounter	 and	








being	 a	 researcher,	 I	 have	 both	 a	 clinical	 understanding	 of	 mental	 illness	 and	
experience	 with	 patients,	 that	 helped	 me	 initially	 to	 win	 confidence	 with	
gatekeepers.	 However,	 my	 double	 “gaze”	 on	 mental	 illness	 also	 posed	 a	 risk	 of	
confusing,	 or	 misunderstanding,	 my	 role.	 Therefore,	 throughout	 the	 fieldwork	
period,	 I	 constantly	 sought	 to	 keep	 a	 self-reflective	 stance,	 while	 repeatedly	




Together	 with	 the	 NGOs’	 project	 coordinators,	 I	 reflected	 on	 how	 to	
participate	 in	 their	 activities.	 At	 first	 it	was	 difficult	 to	 define	my	 role:	 I	 neither	
wanted	to	be	a	detached	observer,	nor	to	act	as,	or	be	identified	as,	a	community	










the	 delicate	 balance	 of	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 in	 the	 group,	 which	 was	 very	
diverse	and	included	young	and	elderly,	migrant	and	national	women.	Realizing	this,	
I	 took	 a	 step	 back,	 accepting	what	 initially	 seemed	 a	more	 passive	 role.	 I	 began	
attending	 the	Monday	 class,	 sitting	 at	 the	 big	 table	with	 the	 other	 students,	 and	
observing	the	interactions	between	them.	Day	by	day,	I	realized	that	I	was	becoming	
more	and	more	involved,	in	a	different	way	than	I	had	imagined.	Sometimes,	as	I	had	
expected,	 I	 was	 asked	 for	 practical	 help	 by	 both	 refugee	 women	 and	 the	 NGO	
workers.	 I	 was	 comfortable	 with	 these	 requests,	 since	 I	 felt	 they	 helped	 me	
significantly	 with	 my	 research	 and,	 by	 reciprocating,	 I	 wanted	 to	 redress	 the	
imbalance	of	fieldwork	(MacClancy	&	Fuentes,	2013).	But	mostly	I	was	asked	to	be	
honest,	transparent	–	ultimately,	to	be	“knowable”.	They	asked	me	to	be	engaged	in	




doing	 research.	 When	 engaging	 in	 activities,	 as	 a	 volunteer	 teaching	 Italian	 or	
helping	 students	 navigate	 the	 university	 system,	 I	 gave	 priority	 to	 participants’	
needs	 and	 then	went	 back	 to	 them	with	my	 observations,	 asking	 for	 their	 view.	
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Researcher-participant	relationships	are	usually	very	complicated,	especially	when	
the	 researcher	 has	 an	 active	 role	 in	 the	 field.	 I	 paid	 attention	 not	 only	 to	
communicate	that	their	decision	not	to	participate	in	my	research	would	not	affect	
our	 relationship	 or	 the	 support	 offered.	 Also,	 I	 tried	 to	 be	 sensitive	 about	 their	
reactions,	hesitancies,	and	gentle	resistances.	When	I	was	able	to	establish	a	trust	
relationship,	 I	 was	 usually	 also	 able	 to	 ask	 explicitly	 about	 their	 questions	 or	
concerns,	and	to	have	an	honest	answer.	Whenever	this	was	not	possible,	or	if	I	still	
sensed	that	something	was	unclear,	I	decided	to	privilege	participants’	interests	and	
to	 leave	 research	 aside,	 excluding	 those	 notes	 and	 conversations	 from	 the	 final	
writing.	
During	 the	 first	months	of	 fieldwork	 I	 realized	that	ethnography	 is	 indeed	
something	very	personal.	It	is	a	praxis,	informed	by	theory,	or	rather	by	the	practice	
of	 other	 ethnographers,	 always	 rooted	 in	 the	 interpersonal	 experience	 of	 the	
researcher.	 Every	 ethnography	 originates	 from	 the	 researcher’s	 personal	




puts	 it,	 when	 embarking	 on	 fieldwork,	 anthropologists	 experience	 “a	 particular	
instance	of	boundary	disruption”	(pos.	3258):	at	the	threshold	between	the	familiar	
and	the	foreign,	ethnographers	lose	the	normal	balance	between	being	open	to	the	
world	 of	 others	 while	 protecting	 their	 own	 sense	 of	 self.	 Therefore,	 the	
ethnographer	should	consistently	practice	reflectivity,	which	Jackson	defines	as	“the	
twofold	movement	 that	 takes	 one	 out	 into	 the	world	 of	 others	 and	 returns	 one,	
changed,	to	oneself”	(2007,	pos.	3020).	
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According	 to	 Devereux	 (1967),	 the	 researcher	 is	 deeply	 upset	 by	 the	
investigation	 of	 other	 human	 beings.	 When	 studying	 human	 behaviour,	 the	
researcher	is	confronted	by	the	complexity	of	life,	and	strives	to	bring	an	illusory	
order	in	situations	that	undermine	her	sense	of	security.	In	his	seminal	work	From	
Anxiety	 to	 Method,	 Devereux	 looks	 at	 the	 research	 process	 through	 a	
psychoanalytical	 lens,	 arguing	 that	 the	 unconscious	 communication	 between	
observer	 and	 observed	 raises	 anxiety	 and	 engenders	 a	 defence	 reaction	 in	 the	
observer.	 The	 research	 encounter,	 and	 ethnography	 in	 particular,	 can	 arouse	
idiosyncratic	 fears	 or	 threaten	 existential	 vulnerabilities.	 Facing	 such	 a	 risk,	 the	
researcher	 could	 resort	 to	 methodology	 as	 a	 “professional	 defence”,	 to	
“decontaminate”	 the	research	material	by	removing	 its	emotional	content	–	what	
resonates	 with	 her.	 When	 employed	 as	 a	 defence,	 methodology	 allows	 the	
ethnographer	 to	 detach	 herself	 from	 the	 emotional	 resonances	 raised	 in	 the	
research	 encounter,	 by	 scotomising,	 simplifying	 or	 intellectually	 systematizing	
material.		
For	 Devereux,	 such	 efforts	 can	 only	 lead	 to	 distortions.	 Indeed,	 when	
investigating	 human	 behaviour,	 it	 is	 neither	 possible	 or	 desirable	 to	 remove	
subjectivity.	 Drawing	 on	 Heisenberg’s	 uncertainty	 principle,	 the	 author	 argues	
instead	 for	 a	 creative	 use	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 research,	 suggesting	 to	 bring	 back	 the	
observer	 in	 the	 research	 scene,	 as	 a	 source	 of	 information.	 The	 presence	 of	 the	
observer	 produces	 “disturbances”	 in	 the	 field	 while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 field	
generates	unconscious	reactions	–	in	psychoanalytical	terms,	a	countertransference	
–	 in	 the	 observer.	 According	 to	 Devereux,	 a	 “good	 methodology”	 considers	





information.	 Following	 the	 theorists	 of	 relativity,	 Devereux	 suggests	 studying	
phenomena	happening	 “at	 the	observer”,	 at	 the	point	when	she	 says:	 “And	 this	 I	
perceive”.	In	other	words,	the	researcher	should	allow	the	subject	“to	reach	–	and	to	
reach	 into	 –	 [her]”,	 studying	 the	 echoes	 and	 the	 reverberations	 produced	 in	 the	
encounter,	the	disturbances	occurring	“within”	the	observer.	
Ethnography	 can	 be	 very	 demanding,	 for	 it	 engages	 the	 researcher	




nothingness”	 (Jackson,	 2007,	 pos.	 3143).	 The	 ethical	 encounter	 with	 the	 other	
requires	 for	 the	 ethnographer	 to	 be	 vulnerable,	 “to	 be	 reached	 into”.	 Then,	 her	






Unpredictability.	 I	 realized	 quickly	 that,	 despite	 my	 efforts	 to	 design	 the	
research	process,	 fieldwork	 is	a	 rather	uncertain	 journey.	Therefore,	 I	 learned	 to	












on	which	 I	 had	 spent	 time	and	energy.	 I	was	discouraged	and	even	 felt	 unfit	 for	
research.	I	had	to	find	another	site,	while	my	research	deadlines	were	approaching.	
I	was	 in	 the	middle	 of	 a	 “data	 rush”,	worried	 about	 not	 having	 enough	 research	
material.	With	the	help	of	my	supervisors	and	my	mentors,	I	came	to	realize	that	
while	doing	ethnography,	failures	are	themselves	research	material,	for	they	offer	
the	 chance	 to	 interrogate	 our	 assumptions	 and	pose	new	questions.	 Therefore,	 I	
have	 come	 to	 appreciate	 even	 those	 brief	 encounters	 as	 hints	 for	 further	
investigation.	There	is	a	large	part	of	fieldwork	that	remains	in	the	background	of	
this	 work	 but	 contributed	 in	 moulding	 it.	 Every	 person	 I	 met	 during	 fieldwork	
offered	 suggestions	 that	 resonated	 with	 each	 other,	 aiding	 me	 in	 defining,	 or	
changing,	my	research	questions.	For	instance,	I	talked	to	Nadine,	who	described	the	
reception	projects	as	a	“trap”;	to	Ahmad,	a	student	in	Economics,	who	felt	“stuck”	in	
university	 procedures,	 struggling	 between	 a	 present	 suspension	 and	 a	 strong,	
almost	stubborn,	projection	towards	the	future;	and	to	Viola,	who	thought	that	the	
“bad	attitude”	of	her	male	classmates	could	be	explained	with	their	need	to	“defend”	
themselves.	 Those	 similar,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 different,	ways	 of	 experiencing	
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restrictions	 and	 a	 sense	of	 immobility	 eventually	 led	me	 to	be	mindful	 of	Asha’s	
words,	a	“prison	open	on	the	top”,36	about	the	asylum	system’s	inequalities.	
Furthermore,	 missed	 encounters	 often	 revealed	 the	 daily	 precarity	
experienced	 by	 refugees.	 Indeed,	 along	 with	 temporary	 citizenship	 status,	 job	
insecurity	 and	 social	 exclusion,	 I	 perceived	 also	 a	 relational	 precarity.	
Hypermobility	 affects	 the	 sense	of	belonging,	but	 immobility	 can	also	hinder	 full	
participation	in	the	social	space.	Refugees	moving	throughout	Europe	can	count	on	
networks	of	solidarity	or	on	forms	of	exchange	that	are	not	only	economic:	friends	
of	 friends,	 aunts	 and	 uncles,	 cousins	 offering	 a	 place	 to	 sleep,	 contacts	 in	 a	 new	
country,	 some	 money,	 that	 are	 eventually	 reciprocated.	 However,	 both	





running.	 The	 project	 was	 set	 up	 by	 two	 faculty	 members	 of	 the	 Department	 of	
Anthropology	to	support	refugees	studying	at	the	University	of	Torino.	As	with	other	
universities	in	Italy	and	Europe,	the	University	of	Torino	had	instituted	a	fee	waiver	
for	 students	 who	 were	 granted	 international	 protection	 (political	 asylum	 or	
subsidiary	 protection).	 As	 the	 two	 faculty	members	 noticed,	 refugees	were	 thus	
encouraged	to	enrol,	but	faced	several	difficulties	thereafter,	both	regarding	their	










students,	 and	 to	 hear	 their	 concerns	 and	 hopes	 about	 the	 future.	 My	 research	
questions	were	thus	reoriented	and	I	began	to	reflect	about	the	relation	between	
memory	 and	 imagination,	 and	 the	 interplay	 between	 different	 temporalities.	
Moreover,	 the	 project	 represented	 a	 good	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 field,	
assuming	an	active	role	that	is	still	lasting	beyond	the	research	period.	As	I	describe	
in	Chapter	5,	my	 role	 in	 the	project	 gave	me	a	direct	 experience	 that	helped	me	
understand	the	reactions	of	other	project	workers.	As	they	often	experienced,38	I	felt	
“implicated”.	 By	 playing	 an	 active	 role,	 however	 minor,	 I	 had	 the	 chance	 of	
experiencing	directly	the	ambivalence	of	participating	in	the	system	and	benefitting	
from	it,	while	at	once	being	aware	of	its	inequitable,	sometimes	oppressive,	nature.	
Also,	 I	 established	meaningful	 relationships	with	 some	 students,	 tackling	 several	
dimensions	 of	 complexity.	 I	 had	 to	 consider	 participants’	 expectations	 about	my	
role,	 clarify	 boundaries	 and	 try	 to	make	 understandable	 a	 research	 process	 that	
often	appeared	intangible	or	futile.	









At	 Gaia	 I	 was	 approached	 by	 Amal,	 a	 Somali	 woman.	 She	 did	 not	 speak	 Italian	
fluently,	but	I	understood	she	was	interested	in	my	research,	and	wanted	to	talk	to	
me.	She	gave	me	her	phone	number,	and	after	a	few	days	we	arranged	a	meeting	









then	 never	 showed.	 Noticing	 this,	 one	 of	 the	 NGO	 assistants	 decided,	 without	
consulting	me,	to	call	her	and	ask	why	she	was	late.	She	used	the	words,	manner	and	
tone	of	the	usual	“reproach”	call	that	is	made	when	someone	in	the	project	misses	a	
mandatory	 activity.	 Later,	 I	 talked	 at	 length	 about	what	 had	 happened	with	 the	
interpreter,	and	this	“failure”	became	a	good	cue	for	further	reflections	on	how	to	
negotiate	my	relationship	with	the	NGO,	and	the	active	role	I	decided	to	assume.		














was	 a	 psychologist	 and	 a	 researcher,	 not	 a	 lawyer.	 “Tu	 solo	 scrivi?”	 (“You	 only	
write?”)	was	her	reply,	and	I	repeated:	“Io	solo	scrivo.”	She	nodded,	and	then	she	left.		
I	 reflected	 a	 lot	 on	 this	 incident,	 which	 showed	 clearly	 the	 dynamic	 and	




or	 even	 abusive.	 Even	 more,	 when	 doing	 research	 with	 people	 labelled	 as	
“vulnerable”,	not	only	the	chance	of	doing	harm,	but	also	the	burdensome	process	
of	ethical	review,	can	be	discouraging	(see	MacClancy	&	Fuentes,	2013).39	However,	









Also,	 when	 the	 research	 involves	 “vulnerable”	 groups,	 ethical	 regulations	 can	 involve	 a	
burdensome	 review	 process,	 that	 can	 dissuade	 researchers	 from	 studying	 “ethically	
complex	subjects”	(Ibid.,	p.	19).	
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of	 the	 research	 relationship	 and	 the	 need	 to	 safeguard	 vulnerable	 participants,	
ethnographers	should	also	respect	participants’	agency	and	resources	in	managing	
relationships,	 acknowledging	 their	 capacity	 of	 positioning.	 Disappointed	 by	 my	
honest	answer,	Amal	left	the	room,	clearly	expressing	her	intention.	
	
Conversations.	 As	 usually	 happens	 in	 ethnography,	 I	 combined	participant	























After	 some	reflection,	 I	decided	 to	conduct	open,	unstructured	 interviews.	
These	usually	began	as	conversations	and	became	a	series	of	recorded	interviews	
over	 a	 period	 of	 time.	 I	 aimed	 at	 investigating	 refugees’	 experiences	 of	 crisis,	
focusing	on	the	relationship	between	mental	distress	and	the	social,	political	and	
historical	context	in	which	they	live.	My	initial	plan	was	to	start	with	an	open-ended	
question,	 to	collect	 life	stories,	and	continue	with	a	semi-structured	 interview,	 to	
focus	on	the	experience	of	illness.	I	wanted	to	employ	the	McGill	Illness	Narrative	
Interview	(Groleau,	Young,	&	Kirmayer,	2006)	which	is	designed	to	elicit	different	





to	get	rid	of.	 In	particular,	 the	 importance	of	working	with	“coarse	material”	and	
roaming	 around	 the	 several	 threads	 of	 a	 spontaneous	 narrative,	 to	 keep	 the	
complexity	of	those	experiences,	was	pointed	out	to	me.41		
My	interviews	thus	became	long	conversations	in	which	narratives	about	the	
migration	 trajectory	 and	 life	 in	 Europe	 intersected	with	 descriptions	 of	 somatic	























of	 Torino,	 a	 few	 days	 after	 I	 arrived	 to	 begin	my	 fieldwork.	 The	 convenors	 had	
invited	 academics	 studying	 migrant	 families,	 professionals	 working	 in	 public	
services	and	NGO	activists.	I	felt	immediately	that	the	atmosphere	was	strained,	and	
that	there	was	something	important	at	stake.	Almost	all	the	academics	expressed	a	
political	 commitment,	 sometimes	 with	 a	 harsh	 tone,	 accusing	 state	 actors	 for	






few	 days	 later	 I	 attended	 a	 seminar	 organized	 by	 Associazione	 Tela	 for	 World	
Refugee	Day.	A	legal	counsellor	opened	the	seminar,	describing	the	refugee	situation	
in	 the	Mediterranean	 and	 pointing	 to	 the	 several	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 European	
migration	policy.	After	the	presentation	was	over,	the	association’s	president	gave	a	
brief	but	firm	talk.	He	started	by	saying:	“We	all	have	to	choose	where	we	stand.”	I	
felt	 that	 his	 plea	 concerned	 me,	 too.	 I	 was	 aware	 that	 I	 had	 to	 assume	 my	







anthropologist	 should	 not	 be	 a	 spectator,	 but	 a	 witness,	 “practicing	 an	
anthropology-with-one’s-feet-on-the-ground,	 a	 committed,	 grounded,	 even	 a	
‘barefoot	anthropology’”	(Ibid.,	p.	420):	“Witnessing	…	is	in	the	active	voice,	and	it	





Refugee	Students	Programme	mentioned	above,	 I	participated	 in	 the	University’s	
Refugee	Law	Clinic,	a	group	of	law	students	coordinated	by	two	senior	scholars	and	
lawyers	to	work	as	legal	advisors	for	asylum	seekers.	During	my	fieldwork,	the	clinic	








my	background	and	 the	 “double	 role”	 I	 had	 in	 the	 field,	 I	 decided	not	 to	 leave	 it	
completely.	While	I	believed	it	was	necessary	to	close	the	research	period,	putting	
an	 end	 to	 the	observation/interviewing	phase	 to	 take	 the	distance	necessary	 for	




and	practice.	Thus,	 I	have	worked	on	this	 thesis	whilst	remaining	engaged	 in	 the	
field.	Writing	and	clinical	practice	have	informed	one	another:	the	work	of	research	
helped	 me	 making	 sense	 of	 my	 patients’	 lifeworlds,	 while	 clinical	 encounters	













in	 particular	 on	 personal	 experiences	 of	 crisis	 and	 failures	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	
asylum	system’s	mechanisms	and	processes.		
As	discussed	previously,	the	object	“refugee”	has	come	to	represent	a	sort	of	
historical	 figure	embodying	not	only	an	 “Otherness”,	 as	 it	has	been	 for	migrants,	























exposure	 of	 crises	 of	 others.	 In	 reflecting	 a	 “breakdown	 of	 a	 basic	 relationship	
between	state	and	citizen”	(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh	et	al.,	2014),	the	figure	of	the	refugee	
poses	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 very	 foundations	 of	 our	 political	 system.	 As	 Malkki	
effectively	puts	it,	the	refugee	acts	as	a	“denaturalizing,	questioning	stance	toward	
the	national	order	of	 things”	 (1995b,	p.	517).	Scholars	assuming	 this	perspective	









to	outline	a	method	to	 investigate	ordinary	suffering,	 to	make	use	of	 its	heuristic	
potential	in	the	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	the	social	and	the	psychological.	
Firstly,	I	review	and	compare	two	theoretical	perspectives	that	will	help	me	detail	













close	 on	 some	 considerations	 about	 the	methodology	 and	 ethics	 of	 carrying	 out	
research	in,	with,	and	about	vulnerability.		
The	first	voice	I	want	to	follow	appears	to	be	that	of	a	choir	directed	by	Pierre	
Bourdieu	 and	 composed	 of	 all	 the	 investigators	 and	 respondents	 who	 together	
wrote	The	Weight	of	the	World	(2000b).	Despite	its	almost	fragmented	appearance	
–	a	collection	of	interviews	and	conversations	–	the	book	stands	in	continuity	with	
Bourdieu’s	 previous	writings,	 and	 is	 inscribed	 in	 the	 epistemological	 framework	
that	the	author	described	elsewhere	as	both	a	“structuralist	constructivism”	and	a	





conveyed	by	 the	French	word	 that	are	 lost	 in	 the	English	 text.	The	original	 term	 indeed	
suggests	 both	 an	 economic	 and	moral	 poverty,	 and	 a	 sense	 of	misery,	 unhappiness	 and	
misfortune.	
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pursued	all	 through	his	work	a	sort	of	 “double	 reading”	of	 social	phenomena,	by	
focusing	on	 the	 relation	–	 the	dialectical	 articulation	–	of	objective	positions	and	
subjective	dispositions,	external	limits	and	lived	experiences.	Therefore,	the	author	
argues	 for	 a	 theory	 of	 practice,	 a	 mode	 of	 knowledge	 that	 reflects	 both	 on	 the	
experience	of	the	world	 in	 its	making,	and	on	the	condition	of	 its	own	possibility	
(Bourdieu,	1977).		
To	be	precise,	The	Weight	of	the	World	interrogates	the	lack	of	the	possible,	

























all-too-visible	 subjective	 violence.	 It	may	be	 invisible,	 but	 it	 has	 to	be	 taken	 into	
account	if	one	is	to	make	sense	of	what	otherwise	seem	to	be	“irrational”	explosions	
of	subjective	violence.	(2009,	pp.	1–2)	
Žižek	 provides	 a	 standpoint	 on	 violence	 that	 can	 be	 employed	 also	 in	 the	
investigation	of	its	consequences	–	oppression,	suffering,	grande	misère.	Specifically,	
when	we	turn	to	our	object	of	study,	we	face	a	phenomenon	that	is	apparently	in	
plain	 sight,	 made	 visible,	 excessively	 visible,	 and	 present,	 almost	 immediate,	 by	





position	 comes	 into	 play.	 When	 addressing	 la	 misère,	 researchers	 assume	 the	
responsibility	 of	working	 toward	 an	 “understanding”	 (comprendre),	 defined	 as	 a	
“constant	 labor	 of	 construction”	 in	 which	 they	 are	 “capable	 of	 mentally	 putting	
themselves	 in	 [their	 interviewees’]	 place”	 (Bourdieu,	 2000b,	 pp.	 612–613).	 This	






the	 means	 of	 understanding,	 by	 constructing	 a	 framework	 within	 which	 those	
conversations	 can	 be	 placed	 and	 juxtaposed,	 one	 to	 another,	 revealing	 their	
multiplicity,	 conflicts,	 and	 shades.	 This	 framework	 should	 disclose	 the	 “social	
conditions	and	conditionings”	of	the	persons	talking,	what	remains	at	once	hidden	
and	 working	 in	 the	 conversation.	 Bourdieu	 thinks	 of	 research	 as	 a	 “realist	
construction”	that	allows	us	to	read	in	the	words	of	the	interviewees	the	present	
and	 past	 objective	 relations	 between	 their	 trajectory	 and	 the	 encompassing	
structure:		














The	emphasis	on	 the	 self-reflexive	gaze	 leads	 to	 the	 second	 issue	at	 stake	
when	investigating	suffering:	the	standpoint	that	the	researcher	is	called	to	take	is	








To	 conclude,	 The	 Weight	 of	 the	 World	 can	 offer	 two	 significant	
methodological	 recommendations	 for	 the	 investigation	 of	 suffering.	 Firstly,	 it	
provides	a	framework	for	analysing	the	exceptional	crisis,	the	one	appearing	in	the	













distress	 question	 this	 assumption	 and	 expose	 its	 inconsistency.	 These	 are	











In	 the	 case	 studies	 presented	 in	 the	 following	 chapters,	 I	 will	 describe	 how	
symptoms	 reverberate	 in	 the	 social	 space,	 reaching	 into	 people,	 and	 exposing	
others’	vulnerability.	Accepting	to	be	touched	and	challenged	by	those	“unsettling	
presences”	 rather	 than	 building	 protective	 boundaries,	 has	 a	 transformative	
potential.		
Furthermore,	 the	 inquiry	 into	mental	distress	poses	a	second	challenge	 to	
Bourdieu’s	 theoretical	 framework.	 In	 The	Weight	 of	 the	World,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	
idiosyncrasies	 and	 singularities	 can	 be	 grasped	 only	 by	 bringing	 to	 light	 their	
immanent	structures.	This	claim	is	linked	with	a	fundamental	assumption	recurring	
all	 through	 Bourdieu’s	 work:	 social	 structures	 precede,	 enable,	 and	 determine	
individual	 trajectories.	Despite	 the	emphasis	on	 the	dual	dynamic	of	habitus	and	
subjective	dispositions,	which	are	at	once	structured	and	structuring,	the	primacy	is	
attributed	 ultimately	 to	 the	 objective	 structure.	 It	 is	 an	 argument	 that	 has	 been	
















and	 black	 patient	 –	 between	 the	 colonial	 medical	 institution,	 and	 the	 opaque,	
resistant,	ill	body	of	the	colonized.	It	is	precisely	through	clinical	practice	that	he	is	
in	contact	with,	and	literally	touches,	suffering	subjectivities	demanding	an	analysis	
that	 is	 capable	 of	 combining	 political,	 cultural	 and	 psychopathological	 objects	
(Cherki,	2006).	His	writings	centre	around	the	body,	which	becomes	an	instrument	
to	 read	 politics	 –	 a	 prism	 reflecting	 power	 relations,	 and	 capturing	 the	 lies	 and	
contradictions	 of	 the	 colonial	 situation	 (Beneduce,	 2012).	 Fanon	 does	 not	 just	
historicize	mental	illness,	understanding	it	as	an	effect	of	structural	violence.	Rather,	
he	 employs	 the	 psychic	 idiosyncrasy,	 the	 opaqueness	 of	 psychopathological	
experience,	as	a	device	to	unveil	and	explore	the	ambivalent	knots	inherent	to	the	
relation	 between	 oppressor	 and	 oppressed.	 Frantz	 Fanon’s	writings	 represent	 a	








structure	 and	 subjectivity,	 is	 more	 tangled	 than	 Bourdieu	 argued,	 we	 face	 a	
methodological	 challenge.	 Bourdieu	 identified	 a	 direction	 in	 the	 relationship	
between	 social	 structures	 and	 subjectivities,	 giving	 primacy	 to	 the	 first,	 and	











something	 unitary	 and	 coherent,	 and	 emphasize	 instead	 the	 fragmented	 and	
ambivalent	nature	of	state	entities.		No	longer	a	rationally	organized	entity,	if	it	was	
ever	 one,	 the	 state	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 multifaceted	 ensemble	 of	 practices	 and	
processes,	not	a	thing	or	a	system,	but	“a	significantly	unbounded	terrain	of	powers	
and	techniques	…	cohabiting	in	limiting,	tension	ridden,	often	contradictory	relation	




illusion”	 that	 can	be	 recognized	 through	 its	 effects	 (2003).45	By	 emphasizing	 the	






At	 the	 core	 of	 this	 experience	 there	 is	 an	 “unbearable	 ambiguity”	 –	 an	
ambiguity	both	of	and	toward	 the	state	–	 that	can	be	 less	 impenetrable	when	we	




historical	 traces	 suddenly	 become	 present	 and	 “normal”	 in	 everyday	 life	 (Good,	
2015;	A.	 F.	 Gordon,	 2004;	 Taussig,	 1992;	Weismantel,	 2001).	 Such	 a	 perspective	
draws	 on	 Freud’s	 notion	 of	 uncanny	 (unheimlich)	 as	 something	 that	 has	 been	
repressed	and	is	then	revived	by	some	event,	engendering	a	feeling	of	strangeness	
and	familiarity	at	the	same	time	(2003).	However,	this	approach	aims	at	extending	
the	analysis	beyond	 the	psychological	dimension,	 looking	at	historical	 and	 social	










realities	 that	 are	 at	 once	 political	 and	 psychological	 and	 reveal	 what	 remains	
unspeakable	–	secrets,	often	hidden	in	plain	sight	–	in	the	societies	they	analyse.46	
At	 the	 end	of	 this	 first	 imaginary	dialogue	 around	 the	 ordinariness	 of	 the	
effects	 of	 power,	 we	 are	 left	 with	 a	 puzzling	 thought	 and	 a	 question.	When	 we	
consider	the	ambiguity	of	postcolonial	mental	illness,	or	of	experiences	of	altered	
states,	 as	 Fanon	 and	 Aretxaga	 suggest,	 what	 we	 called	 a	 “structure”,	 meant	 as	













conveying	 a	 “simultaneity	 of	 the	 opposites”	 (Pillen,	 2017).	 A	 Janusian	 word	 is	






antithetical	 terms	 –	 a	 sort	 of	 suspended	 betweenness	where	meanings	 and	 acts	
work	 simultaneously	 in	 opposite	 directions.	 Janusian	 words	 express	 paradoxes,	
irony,	and	ambiguity.	Thus,	they	can	be	a	site	where	to	look	at	the	relationality	of	




Bourdieu,	we	 emphasized	 the	 ordinariness	 of	 precarity,	 Butler’s	 reflections	 shed	
light	 on	 its	 paradoxical	 character.	 According	 to	 the	 author,	 human	 relations	 are	
based	 on	 a	 fundamental	 dependency	 that	 establishes	 our	 vulnerability	 to	
deprivation,	 and	 in	 consequence	 implies	 an	 ethical	 responsibility:	 “vulnerability	
seem[s]	to	follow	our	being	socially	constituted	bodies,	attached	to	others,	at	risk	of	








positions.47	 In	 addition,	 Butler	 and	 Athanasiou	 (2013)	 employ	 this	 angle	 also	 to	
																																																								
47	Stuart	Hall	(1996)	argues	that	postmodern	social	sciences	have	largely	questioned	
the	 idea	 of	 a	 unified	 subject	 and	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 subjectivity.	 According	 to	 this	
perspective,	individuals	are	not	representatives	of	social	groups	or	class;	rather,	they	use,	





suffering,	 for	 it	 is	 a	 process	 of	 disownment	 and	 abjection.	 In	 the	 first	 sense,	
interdependency	represents	the	“heteronomic	condition	for	autonomy	…	a	limit	to	
the	autonomous	and	impermeable	self-sufficiency	of	the	liberal	subject”		(Butler	&	
Athanasiou,	 2013	 pos.	 141).	 In	 the	 second	meaning,	which	 is	 bound	 to	 the	 first,	
dispossession	is	an	imposed	mode	of	subjugation,	entailing	“painful	interpellations,	
occlusions	and	foreclosures”.	In	other	words,	dispossession	implies	a	simultaneous	





or	 for	 being	 receptive	 to	 others.	 Yet,	 this	 condition	 of	 bodily	 exposure	 is	
differentially	 distributed.	 Vulnerability	 depends	 on	 pre-existing	 norms	 of	
recognition	and	social	frames	of	intelligibility	that	establish	legitimacy	and	define	
whose	lives	are	more	possible	and	thinkable	than	others.		
Precarity	 is	 indeed	 a	 “politically	 induced	 condition”	 of	 vulnerability	 and	
exposure,	 characterised	 by	 a	 “differential	 allocation	 of	 recognizability”	 (Butler,	
2009,	 pp.	 II–III).48	 Butler	 and	 Athanasiou	 define	 as	 an	 “injurious	 interpellation”	
(2013	pos.	298)	the	norms	of	intelligibility	that	make	recognition	possible.	Subjects	
are	 at	 once	 acted	 upon	 by	 these	 norms	 and	 acting	 –	 adhering	 to	 them,	 but	 also	
																																																								
48	 Butler	 differentiates	 between	 precariousness	 and	 precarity:	 whereas	 the	 first	
expresses	 an	 existential	 condition	 of	 vulnerability	 equally	 shared,	 the	 latter	 represent	 a	
socially	produced	condition	of	inequality	and	destitution	(Butler	&	Athanasiou,	2013).	
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opening	 up	 possibilities	 of	 non-normative	 re-signification.	 Hence,	 presence	 is	
always	produced	against	its	absences,	misrecognized	presences,	and	“inassimilable	
remains”	(2013	pos.	319).	Butler	(2009)	links	recognisability	to	performativity	and	
compliance,	 or	 non-compliance,	 to	 norms.	 Yet	 performativity	 is	 understood	 as	 a	
process	of	acting	and	being	acted	–	a	process	involving	a	certain	degree	of	openness	
and	a	risk	of	going	adrift,	or	having	effects	that	are	not	fully	foreseen	and	possibly	
disruptive.	 Thus,	 the	 author	 suggests	 to	 address	 a	 fundamental	 question:	 who	
counts	as	subject	and	who	does	not?	And	what	kind	of	performativity	is	exercised?		
Finally,	 the	 logic	 of	 dispossession	 is	 also	 related	 to	 conditions	 of	
“situatedness”,	 displacement	 and	 emplacement.	 Dispossession	 is	 inscribed	 onto	




emerge	 from	 the	 “refusal	 to	 stay	 in,	 or	 to	move	 to,	 one’s	 assigned	proper	 place”	
(2013	pos.	391).	
The	 intertwined	 bodily	 and	 territorial	 forces	 of	 dispossession	 play	 out	 in	 the	










when	 looking	 at	 dispossessed,	 unaccountable	 and	 unaccounted	 for	 bodies,	 we	
should	 apply	 a	 “non-linear	 critique”	 of	 power	 formations.	 Non-linearity	 should	
indeed	 enable	 us	 to	 account	 for	 and	 engage	 with	 the	 co-occurring	 process	 of	
repression/production,	 subjectivation/desubjectivation.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	
analysis	should	address	the	norms	of	intelligibility	and	the	tension	between	what	is	
recognisable,	 and	 the	 “disavowed	 losses	 and	 avowed	 excesses”	 challenging	
recognizability	(Butler	&	Athanasiou,	2013	pos.	541).	In	other	words,	the	authors	









an	 otherwise	 working	 machine.	 Hence,	 our	 analysis	 should	 not	 aim	 at	 an	
assimilatory	inclusion	of	the	non-recognizable,	that	contributes	to	reproducing	and	
reaffirming	the	oppressive	frame.	Rather,	our	critique	should	seek	to	“subvert	those	
norms	 and	 open	 the	 human	 to	 radical	 rearticulations	 of	 humanness”	 (Butler	 &	














off-side	 in	 the	 language	 game:	 the	 terror	 of	 having	 exceeded	 the	 limits	 of	 social	
intelligibility;	 the	 fascination	of	being	able	 to	observe	 from	the	exterior,	or	more	
exactly	from	the	threshold,	even	if	only	for	an	instant,	the	apparatus	that	constructs	
us	as	subject.	…	Transition	is	the	name	given	to	the	process	that	supposedly	allows	
one	 to	 pass	 from	 femininity	 to	masculinity	 (or	 vice	 versa)	 via	 the	 legal-medical	















As	 argued,	 dispossession	 is	 indeed	 a	 notion	 that	 links	 migrants	 to	 non-
migrants,	 offering	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 to	 understand	 political	 subjectivities	
outside	legal	categories	(Glick	Schiller	&	Çağlar,	2015).	The	frame	of	dispossession	
has	already	a	potential	 to	unsettle	 the	game	of	recognition,	 to	move	forward	and	
take	 place.	 Following	 our	 imaginary	 dialogue	 with	 Bourdieu	 and	 Butler	 around	
misère	 and	 dispossession,	 we	 can	 start	 outlining	 our	 own	 methodological	
framework.	Precarity,	as	a	politically	produced	 form	of	dispossession,	provides	a	
fruitful	perspective	 to	 account	 for	 the	 ambiguity	of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	
subject	and	the	power	structure.	Nonetheless,	it	requires	the	investigator	to	take	an	
ethical	and	political	position	vis-à-vis	her	field	and	objects	of	study.	Therefore,	the	
investigation	 aims	 not	 only	 at	 describing	 an	 object,	 but	 at	 deconstructing	 and	
transforming	it	as	well.	In	the	following	section,	I	will	focus	on	a	tradition	of	studies	








published	 in	 French	 on	 Liberation	
(http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2016/05/27/identite-en-transit_1455650,	 last	 visited	






Drawing	 on	 literature	 about	 subjectivity,	 postcolonialism	 and	 social	
suffering,	DelVecchio	Good	and	colleagues	(2008)	suggest	to	assume	“postcolonial	
disorders”	 –	 contemporary	 disorderly	 and	 disordered	 states	 –	 as	 objects	 of	
ethnographic	 exploration.	 The	 authors	 argue	 that	 disorders	 provide	 a	means	 to	
analyse	 “modalities	 of	 social	 life	 and	 subjectivities	 that	 reflect,	 ironically,	 the	
establishment	of	political,	moral,	and	epistemic	orders	through	state	violence	that	
reproduces	 disorder”	 (2008,	 p.	 8).	 They	 provide	 a	 perspective	 in	 which	 mental	
disorder	 ceases	 to	 be	 considered	 exclusively	 as	 an	 unintended	 outcome.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 it	 becomes	 a	 mode	 of	 experiencing	 the	 world,	 with	 a	 potential	 of	
subverting	 the	 surrounding	order.	DelVecchio,	Good	 and	 colleagues	 thus	 suggest	
conducting	 ethnography	 by	 juxtaposing	 two	 images,	 “disordered	 states”	 and	
ordering	 practices.	 Their	 work	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 stimulate	 a	 reflection	 on	 the	
boundaries	 of	 ethnographic	 methodology,	 and	 deliberately	 leaves	 some	 crucial	
questions	open:	what	do	we	mean	by	juxtaposition?	How	can	we	draw	a	comparison	
between	 two	 materials	 –	 psychological	 and	 socio-political	 objects	 –	 that	 are	 so	
divergent?	And	finally,	what	use	can	we	make	of	it?	
In	recent	decades,	a	rich	body	of	literature	exploring	the	notion	of	experience	
has	 been	 produced	 by	 anthropologists	 investigating	 private	 lifeworlds	 alongside	
social	systems,	their	usual	objects	of	research.	This	tradition	of	studies,	which	can	
be	 grouped	 under	 the	 label	 of	 anthropology	 of	 experience,	 is	 interested	 in	 “the	
dialectical	 structure	 and	 contingent	 flow”	 of	 human	 life	 (Kleinman	 &	 Kleinman,	
1991).	 Lived	 experiences	 are	 explored	 ethnographically,	 by	 combining	 the	
conventional	 ethnographic	perspective	with	phenomenology	 and	psychoanalysis.	
According	 to	Biehl,	Good	and	Kleinman	 (2007),	 the	 relation	between	experience,	
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subjectivity,	and	social	life	can	be	considered	as	a	work	of	refraction	of	individual	
processes	 through	 different	 political,	 technological,	 psychological,	 and	 linguistic	




As	 Jason	 Throop	 (2010)	 points	 out,	 phenomenological	 approach	 and	
anthropological	attitude	intersects	in	the	“thickness”	of	the	ethnographic	encounter	
which	 is,	 primarily,	 an	 encounter	 of	 corporeities.	 In	 the	 field,	 ethnographers	
establish	 through	 their	 bodies	 relationships	 with	 subjects	 embodying	 cultural	




taken-for-grantedness	of	the	world	(Throop,	2010).	Thus,	 in	the	 last	decades,	 the	
aim	of	an	anthropology	of	experience	has	been	 to	engage	with	 the	uncertainties,	
inquietudes	and	opacities	 (Willen	&	Seeman,	2012a)	 too	often	overlooked	 in	 the	
effort	 of	 building	 coherent	 representations	 of	 cultural	 systems	 (Csordas,	 1993,	
1994;	Jackson,	2012).	Also,	the	very	notion	of	experience	has	been	transformed	and	
problematized	 by	 the	 anthropological	 investigation.	 In	 proposing	 a	 “cultural	
phenomenology”	 (Throop,	 2010),	 anthropologists	 have	 emphasized	 the	
situatedness	 and	 partiality	 of	 experience	which	 are	 considered	 specific	 forms	 of	
social	 life	 in	 a	 particular	 setting	 (Biehl	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Jackson,	 2005).	 Therefore,	
anthropologists	 cannot	 help	 but	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 historical,	 political	 and	
discursive	 forces	 crossing	 lifeworlds	and	establishing	power	 relations	within	 the	
setting.	As	Robert	Desjarlais	argues	in	Shelter	Blues	(1997),	a	foundational	work	for	
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this	 tradition	of	 study,	 there	 is	 a	need	 for	a	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 links	 the	
phenomenal	 and	 the	 political	 while	 looking	 at	 the	 notion	 of	 experience	 itself	 as	
culturally	and	politically	situated.	Drawing	on	Foucault’s	genealogy	of	the	subject,	
















When	 situated	against	 its	 own	background,	 experience	 can	provide	a	 lens	
through	which	to	make	sense	of	the	“local	ecology”	(Das	&	Das,	2007)	of	historical	
and	 political	 circumstances	 shaping	 it.	 Experience	 is	 the	 object	 of	 a	 constant	
movement	of	articulation,	oscillating	between	ambiguous	and	chaotic	impressions,	
to	 coherent	 and	 shareable	 meanings.	 Yet,	 the	 movement	 itself	 is	 tangled	 and	
unstable	as	some	experiences	defy	comprehension,	resisting	a	full	disambiguation,	













Ernesto	 de	 Martino	 approaches	 phenomenology	 critically,	 from	 a	 social	
perspective	 (Charuty,	 2015):	 indeed,	 lived	 experiences	 are	 never	 essentialised,	








before	 the	 risk	 of	 “not	 being-there”,	 that	 presence	 could	 be	 understood.	 Yet,	
psychological	experience	is	not	isolated,	rather	is	considered	in	its	relationship	with	











the	 intersubjective,	 communicable	 world.	 The	 ethnographer	 is	 interested	 in	 the	
relation	between	the	collapsed	presence	and	the	 intersubjective	world	 left	 in	 the	
background:	 what	 is	 emphasized	 is	 the	 heuristic	 value	 of	 psychopathological	
experiences,	that	become	an	ethnographic	document	revealing	a	relation	between	









Assuming	 crisis	 as	 object	 of	 study,	 firstly	 as	 an	 individual	 experience	 and	
finally	as	collective	representations	(Severi,	1999),	de	Martino	proposes	an	analysis	
of	 the	 experience	 of	 limit	 by	 comparing	 individual	 and	 cultural	 apocalypses	 –	








opened	 to	 a	 risk	 of	 breach	 (Severi,	 1999).	 Culture	 thus	 represents	 a	 sort	 of	
“existential	therapy	and	prophylaxis”	(de	Martino,	1995)	in	a	moment	of	crisis,	when	
we	 risk	 of	 not	 being	 in	 the	 world	 (see	 also	 Beneduce,	 2015a).	 By	 comparing	
psychopathological,	ethnographical,	cultural,	and	historical	documents,	de	Martino	
aims	at	evaluating	 the	culture’s	 capability	of	overcoming	 the	 risk	and	recovering	
from	 bewilderment,	 or,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 its	 closeness	 to	 retracing	 the	 psychotic	
collapse.		
By	 establishing	 a	 continuity	 uniting	 contemporary	 literature	 on	
cultural/critical	phenomenology	and	de	Martino’s	proposed	methodology,	my	aim	





that	 “can	 capture	 uncertainty	 and	 contradiction	 without	 having	 to	 resolve	 it”	











which	 point	 of	 view	 can	 I	 understand	 the	 simultaneity	 of	 a	 painful	 critique?	 By	
establishing	an	imaginary	conversation	between	Pierre	Bourdieu,	Judith	Butler,	and	








surrounding	 oppressive	 structure.	 However,	 I	 partially	 criticized	 those	
assumptions,	 looking	 at	 the	 nonsensical	 and	 opaque	 aspects	 of	 suffering.	 In	
comparing	 Bourdieu’s	 considerations	 with	 the	 work	 of	 Fanon	 on	 postcolonial	
psychopathology,	 and	 of	 Aretxaga	 on	 state	 madness,	 I	 exposed	 the	 illusory,	
ambivalent	nature	of	what	Bourdieu	supposed	to	be	a	structure.		
Subsequently,	 I	 looked	 for	 theoretical	 tools	 for	 an	 investigation	 of	 this	
structural	ambivalence.	If	Bourdieu	brought	to	light	the	ordinariness	of	suffering,	
Judith	Butler	helped	me	reflect	on	its	paradoxical	nature.	I	employed	the	notion	of	
dispossession	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 precarity	 as	 a	 co-occurrence	 of	 exposure	 and	
responsiveness.	 With	 Butler	 and	 Athanasiou,	 I	 considered	 the	 relation	 between	
dispossession	 and	 differential	 allocation	 of	 recognisability.	 I	 focused	 on	 its	






Finally,	 I	 considered	 mental	 disorders	 as	 objects	 placed	 in	 between	
disavowed	 losses	 and	 avowed	 excesses,	 thus	 representing	 an	 experience	 of	




















In	 the	 previous	 chapters	 I	 introduced	 the	main	 objective	 of	 this	work:	 to	
explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 migration	 policies	 are	 experienced	 subjectively	 and	
intersubjectively,	thus	shedding	light	on	the	relation	between	individual	life	stories	
and	 transnational	 forces.	 I	 critically	reviewed	 the	existing	 literature	on	 the	 topic,	
finding	 two	 dominant	 approaches.	 A	 first	 strand	 of	 research	 examines	 the	
movement	 of	 people	 across	 the	 European	 territory	 employing	 the	 notions	 of	
mobility	and	immobility.	Most	of	these	studies	focus	on	the	ways	in	which	national	
and	 supranational	 “border	 regimes”	 and	 “bordering	 practices”	 seek	 to	 control,	
manage,	or	hinder	access	to,	and	mobility	within,	the	EU	space.	Overall,	these	studies	
bring	 to	 light	 the	 double	 mechanism	 of	 simultaneous	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	
underlying	 asylum	 policies	 and	 practices.	 Conversely,	 a	 second	 line	 of	 research	
insists	on	the	autonomy	of	migration.	Scholars	sharing	this	perspective	suggest	that	




Together,	 the	 perspectives	 provide	 new	 insights	 into	 refugee	 and	 forced	
migration	studies,	by	showing	how	policies	and	interventions	are	practiced,	but	also	
contested,	by	local	actors.	They	focus	on	what	happens	in	the	everyday	experience	
of	 asylum,	 following	 migrants’	 routes	 through	 geographical,	 political,	 and	 legal	





“self-making	 and	 being	made”	 of	migrant	 subjects	 (Aihwa	Ong	 et	 al.,	 1996).	 The	
focus	shifts	from	categories	as	entities,	to	the	“struggles”	over	and	across	categories.		
However,	 most	 of	 these	 studies	 tend	 to	 position	 themselves	 on	 two	
apparently	opposed	poles,	respectively	emphasising	the	role	of	oppressive	forces	or	
of	 grassroots	 resistances.	 Indeed,	 such	 representations	 of	 the	 relation	 between	
migrants	 and	European	 institutions	 risk	being	overly	deterministic	 in	 applying	a	
dichotomy	of	oppressor-oppressed	(DelVecchio	Good	et	al.,	2008).	As	discussed	in	
the	 previous	 chapter,	 few	 studies	 have	 so	 far	 defined	 a	 perspective	 crossing	 the	










between	 individual	 and	 collective	 worlds,	 focusing	 instead	 on	 objects	 reflecting	
their	intersection	–	or	their	collapse,	as	I	will	argue	later.	In	this	chapter,	I	examine	
how	 moments	 of	 crisis	 are	 experienced	 in	 a	 context	 of	 social	 exclusion	 and	
marginalization,	 and	 how	 they	 can	 offer	 a	 particular	 angle	 on	 that	 context.	





the	 object	 of	 this	 investigation.	 Secondly,	 I	 present	 a	 case-study	 of	 how	 these	
processes	act	in	the	life	of	a	migrant	man.	My	intent	is	to	employ	the	methodological	
reflections	 described	 in	 Chapter	 3	 to	 put	 into	 dialogue	 two	 images:	 life	 in	 the	
margins	of	the	social	world,	and	the	liminal	experience	of	symptoms.	The	analysis	
will	 be	 articulated	 within	 the	 space	 produced	 by	 the	 overlapping	 of	 these	 two	
languages,	 by	 taking	 as	 object	 of	 inquiry	 a	 discourse	 defying	 reason	 and	
comprehension.	 Following	 the	 fine	 line	 between	 ordering	 and	disordering,	 I	will	
look	at	 this	dialogue	as	a	means	to	 investigate	the	ambivalences,	 the	bewildering	









How	 can	 we	 fully	 grasp	 the	 multiplicity,	 simultaneity	 and	 materiality	
inherent	 in	 the	different	 forms	of	power	and	 shed	 light	on	what	happens	on	 the	
ground	where	policies	and	categories	meet	individuals?	How	can	we	account	for	the	





Unbound	 (1994).	 In	 this	 seminal	 work,	 the	 authors	 insist	 that	 global	 economic	
restructuring	 requires	 a	 change	 of	 perspective	 on	 social	 and	 political	 relations:	
migration	 and	 the	 challenges	 it	 poses	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 citizenship	 are	 best	
understood	 from	 a	 global	 perspective,	 one	 that	 considers	 nation-states	within	 a	
transnational	 field	 and	 links	 migratory	 pathways	 to	 global	 forces.	 Within	 this	
paradigm,	 the	 object	 of	 study	 is	 the	 “transnational	 social	 field”:	 social	 relations	
should	be	traced	through	mutually	constituting,	multiple,	intersecting	networks	of	
networks	 of	 (often	 unequal)	 power.	 More	 recently,	 Glick	 Schiller	 (2015)	 has	
reviewed	the	initial	paradigm,	expressing	the	need	for	more	emphasis	on	reflexivity,	
change,	and	transformation.	The	author	suggests	to	focus	on	the	dynamics	of	“global	
historical	 conjunctures”,	 looking	 at	 their	 transformations,	 the	 possibilities	 they	
offer,	or	 the	costs	and	challenges	 they	 imply.	Glick	Schiller	details	 two	processes	
operating	in	the	current	conjuncture:	dispossession	and	displacement.	The	first	is	
connected	 to	various	 form	of	accumulation	(of	capital,	 land,	 raw	material,	 labour	
force,	human	bodies)	and	leads	to	the	second,	“that	range	from	the	forcible	removal	
of	 people	 from	 their	 land	 and	 neighborhoods,	 through	 urban	 restructuring	 and	










or	 “anthropological	 problems”	 (Rabinow,	 2005),	 may	 emerge.	 Again,	 the	
investigation	moves	 from	 seeking	 to	 disentangle	 knots	 and	 specify	 categories	 to	





relatively	 stable	 and	 balanced	 condition,	 conjunctures	 evoke	 an	 inherent	
temporariness	 and	 variability.	 As	 Isin	 (2009)	 suggests,	 we	 should	 think	 of	
citizenship	as	an	institution	in	flux,	a	changeable	process.	The	author	considers	the	
three	poles	of	this	process:	actors	(subjectivities),	sites	(fields	of	contestation)	and	
scales	 (scopes	 of	 applicability)	 of	 citizenship.	 To	 investigate	 the	 interactions	 of	
actors,	scales	and	sites	–	what	people	do	–	“means	to	investigate	acts	of	citizenship	
–	 those	 deeds	 by	which	 actors	 constitute	 themselves	 (and	 others)	 as	 subjects	 of	
rights”	(Isin,	2009,	p.	371;	Isin	&	Nielsen,	2008).	The	emphasis	is	on	relationality,	
processes,	and	subjectivity:	
Citizenship	 understood	 as	 political	 subjectivity	 shifts	 our	 attention	 from	 fixed	
categories	 by	 which	 we	 have	 come	 to	 understand	 or	 inherit	 citizenship	 to	 the	
struggles	 through	which	 these	categories	 themselves	have	become	stakes.	 It	also	
shifts	our	 attention	 from	already	defined	actors	 to	 the	acts	 that	 constitute	 them.	
Rather	 than	 asking	 “who	 is	 the	 citizen?”	 the	 question	 becomes	 “what	makes	 the	
citizen?”	(Isin,	2009,	p.	383)	









Acts	 “make	 a	 difference”,	 introducing	 a	 breakdown	 and	 unsettling	 the	
established	 order	 in	ways	 that	 are	 not	 always	 articulable	 by	 the	 subjects.	 Those	
breakdowns	are	then	chosen	as	sites	of	investigation,	because	of	their	potential	of	
unsettling	 not	 only	 the	 political	 order,	 but	 also	 our	 order	 of	 knowledge	 of	 the	
political.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 the	 very	 notion	 of	 citizenship	 that	 explodes:	 flux,	
entanglements,	 ruptures	 are	 where	 the	 relation	 between	 individual	 and	 power	
institutions	 is	 enacted,	 and	 can	 be	 unfolded.	 If	 this	 relation	 is	 understood	 as	 a	
struggle,	a	process	implying	mutual	construction,	then	we	have	to	consider	it	within	
the	most	encompassing	frame	of	subjectification	and	to	look	at	the	ways	in	which	it	
intertwines	 with	 other	 sites	 (moral,	 psychological,	 bodily,	 material)	 and	 acts	 of	
subject	 formation.	 If	 the	 debate	 over	 citizenship	 has	 offered	 different,	 and	
sometimes	 divergent,	 angles	 on	 political	 recognition,	 a	 return	 to	 the	 notion	 of	
subjectivity	 may	 provide	 a	 lens	 to	 understand	 the	 dynamic	 character	 (such	 as	
inclusion/exclusion,	 opening/closure),	make	 explicit	 the	 double	 process	 of	 claim	
making	and	being	subjected,	and	encompasses	the	imaginary	as	well	as	the	judicial-
political	 dimensions	 of	 the	 relationship	 individual-power	 (Krause	 &	 Schramm,	
2011).	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 focus	 on	 processes	 of	 subjectification	 may	 reveal	 the	
intersection	of	multiple	citizenship	position	(as	a	status,	but	also	as	a	practice,	or	a	






a	 top-down	 authority,	 or	 a	 bottom-up	 struggle	 –	 seem	 to	 fail	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
understand	the	complexity	of	people’s	experiences	and	choices.	How	can	we	explain	
the	 detours	within	migration	 trajectories	 only	 by	 looking	 selectively	 at	 the	 legal	
frameworks	or	at	personal	agency?	As	researchers,	we	tend	to	oscillate	between	a	
need	 for	 specific	 definitions,	 and	 a	 desire	 for	 a	 view	 on	 complexity,	 opacity	 and	
hidden	 sides.	 However,	 those	 superordinate	 constructs,	 such	 as	 subjectivity	 and	














body	 it	 seeks	 to	 suppress,	 it	 goes	 further	 by	 extending	 the	 bodily	 domain	 to	 be	
																																																								










approach	 to	psychoanalysis,	 the	author	 follows	up	on	 the	notion	of	proliferation,	




























syntheses,	 crossed	 by	 flows,	 social	 and	 historical	 cuts.	 Thus,	 according	 to	 the	
authors,	 our	 task	 is	 to	 look	 at	 these	 cuts,	 considering	 movement	 together	 with	
breakdowns,	 the	 machine’s	 “burst	 of	 energy”	 with	 its	 “constituent	 misfires”	





Temporalities.	 In	 sum,	 I	 consider	 subjectivity	 as	 a	 repetitive	 movement,	
productive	and	proliferating,	constituting	and	fragmenting;	a	process	crossing,	and	
crossed	by,	 other	 (and	Others’)	 processes.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 employ	 the	
construct,	or	the	image,	of	residues	to	describe	the	excessive,	misfired	productions	
of	those	processes	–	what	remains	at	the	margins	of	articulable	experiences.	I	focus	
on	 fragments,	 looking	at	 the	entanglements	 in	 conjunctures,	 their	unspoken,	and	
sometimes	unspeakable,	excesses.	I	intend	to	present	a	scene	where	I	cross,	briefly,	




23).	 	 I	 look	closely	at	the	residues	of	the	encounter,	 the	objects	remaining	on	the	
scene,	 and	 their	 relations	with	 the	 surrounding	 environment	 –	 their	 social	 life.	 I	
consider	those	residues	as	the	neglected,	implicit,	nonsensical	parts	of	our	dialogue,	
questioning	 the	 role	 they	 play	 in	 the	 scene.	 In	 particular,	 the	 following	 section	
focuses	 on	 a	 case	 study,	 an	 individual,	 intimate,	 “experience	 of	 state”	 (Aretxaga,	
2003,	2008).	The	aim	is	to	explore	how	the	European	asylum	system	is	experienced,	
and	what	are	the	residual	productions	of	the	encounter.		




Griffiths,	 Rogers,	 &	 Anderson,	 2013;	 Sigona,	 Gamlen,	 Liberatore,	 &	 Kringelbach,	
2015),	 there	 has	 been	 very	 little	 analysis	 of	 how	 control	 is	 enacted	 through	 the	
manipulation	of	time	(Khosravi,	2010,	2014).	Following	Bourdieu’s	reflections	on	
waiting	 as	 a	 way	 of	 experiencing	 the	 effects	 of	 power,	 Khosravi	 (2014)	 defines	
undetermined	 and	 prolonged	 waiting	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 liminality,	 in	 which	




brave	 opposition	 to	 this	 condition.	 Indeed,	 “waiting	 out”	 reflects	 an	 “ambivalent	
passivity”,	revealing	a	moral	dimension	underlying	temporality.	This	ambivalence	
makes	the	act	of	waiting	an	individualized	and	internalized	mode	of	governing	–	“a	
deep	 form	 of	 governmentality”	 –	 that	 valorises	 restraint	 and	 self-control.	 In	 the	
current	 permanent	 state	 of	 crisis,	 the	 “good	 citizen”	 is	 the	 one	who	waits	 “in	 an	
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orderly	 fashion”	 while	 migrants	 express	 a	 lack	 of	 will	 to	 endure	 a	 sense	 of	
immobility,	of	“stuckedness”	(Hage,	2009,	p.	99).	
So	 far,	 however,	 little	 attention	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 the	 multiple	 forms	 of	
temporality,	and	of	“time	capital”	(Andersson,	2014)	related	to	migration.	Research	
on	 time	 and	 migration	 has	 mainly	 addressed	 journey	 trajectories,	 moments	 of	
arrival	 and	 the	 process	 of	 status	 determination.	 There	 has	 been	 little	 discussion	
about	the	ways	in	which	migrants	experience	different	formations	of	time	in	the	long	
term,	 such	 as	 cycles	 of	 permanence	 and	 temporariness,	 acceleration	 and	 sudden	
changes,	or	deceleration,	stasis	and	suspension	(Griffiths	et	al.,	2013).	In	particular,	
























five	 months	 ago.	 We	 first	 met	 seven	 months	 ago	 at	 Centro	 Kalima.	 He	 had	
approached	the	centre	a	few	months	previously	to	ask	for	help	in	understanding	his	
health	 issue.	 He	 was	 suffering	 from	 dermatitis	 and	 from	 recurrent	 episodes	 of	
headache,	 nausea,	 vomiting	 and	 fainting	 whose	 causes	 were	 unknown.	 He	 had	
undergone	 a	 few	 tests	 during	 the	 previous	months	without	 getting	 a	 conclusive	
medical	diagnosis:	an	allergy	to	cornflour,	gastritis,	and	suspected	coeliac	disease	
were	 all	 suggested.	 While	 medical	 treatments	 were	 partially	 reducing	 his	
gastrointestinal	 symptoms,	 both	 doctors	 and	 Baran	 started	 thinking	 about	 the	
psychological	 origins	of	 the	problem.	At	 the	 centre,	 he	was	 counselled	both	by	a	
psychotherapist	 and	 a	 physician.	 The	 latter	 helped	 him	 read	 medical	 reports,	





one	occasion,	while	 speaking	 about	 the	 strain	 in	defining	 a	precise	diagnosis,	 he	
mentioned	that	he	was	thinking	that	his	health	condition	was	related	to	the	stress	
and	 the	worries	 caused	 by	 the	 difficulties	 he	 experienced	 in	 Italy.	 As	 a	 Kurdish	



















Yet,	 he	 also	made	 it	 clear	 that,	 despite	 this	 lack	 of	 time,	 he	wanted	 to	 be	
interviewed	and	talk	about	his	story.	I	proposed	to	split	the	interview	in	two	or	three	
shorter	sessions,	and	we	decided	to	meet	on	every	second	Monday.	Since	Baran	did	









At	first,	 I	was	not	comfortable	at	all.	 I	 felt	we	had	a	significant	limitation.	I	
knew	that	Baran	would	not	be	able	to	tell	me	everything	he	wanted	to,	and	that	we	
would	drop	nuances	and	details.	I	was	afraid	that,	other	than	lacking	time,	we	lacked	
words	 as	 well.	 Yet,	 after	 the	 first	 interview,	 this	 faulty	 language	we	were	 using	
produced	some	unexpected,	and	favourable,	outcomes.	Firstly,	Baran	told	me	he	was	
enjoying	it,	because	he	did	not	have	many	chances	of	practicing	a	language	that	even	







and	 what	 required	 a	 degree	 of	 indefiniteness.	 As	 another	 refugee	 whom	 I	
interviewed	later	made	me	realize,	without	the	interpreter,	“even	if	I	don’t	know	the	
language,	I	pick	the	words	I	need	and	put	it	together	…	There	is	no	filter.”	We	were	
inventing	a	partial,	 incomplete	 language,	 that	while	 leaving	a	 lot	unsaid,	 allowed	
somehow	Baran	to	master	what	was	said.		
																																																								
52	 All	 translations	 from	 Italian	 into	 English	 are	 mine,	 while	 Turkish	 has	 been	




Secondly,	 this	 tentative	conversation	required	me	not	 to	 take	anything	 for	
granted.	Ethnography	is	never	a	one-way	collection	of	information,	and	this	sense	
of	precariousness	made	explicit	and	visible	both	my	presence	in	the	dialogue,	and	





was	 inherently	 volatile,	 but,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 capable	 of	 comprehending	 the	
openness	of	his	experience.	What	follows	is	my	way	of	narrating	it.		
	
A	 long	 trajectory.	 Our	 interviews	 started	 with	 the	 account	 of	 his	 journey	
through	the	Italian	asylum	system.	Baran	came	to	Italy	in	May	2010	with	his	wife	





local	Questura	 (police	 station),	 and	were	 transferred	 to	Napoli,	where	 they	were	
accommodated	 in	 a	 refugee	 shelter.	 After	 five	months,	 Baran	was	 called	 for	 the	
asylum	interview	at	the	Commissione	Territoriale	(Local	Asylum	Board)	in	Caserta.	











wife,	 always	 inside	 our	 home.	When	 little	 Arin	 came,	 all	 the	 three	 of	 us…	Like…	
Whatever	[smiling].53	(Baran,	28/03/2016)	
He	 explained	 that	 they	 ended	 up	 in	 a	 reception	 project	where	 their	 basic	














54	 In	 the	 last	 few	 years	 there	 have	 been	 several	 investigations	 of	 criminal	







Also,	 they	 felt	 extremely	 isolated.	 The	 neighbourhood	 was	 dangerous	 and	 they	
avoided	going	out,	spending	a	lot	of	time	alone	in	their	room.	Time	passed,	and	they	
became	progressively	more	nervous	and	frustrated.		







were	difficult,	 I	was	worried	 she’d	been	able	 to	deal	with	all	 this,	while	 she	was	






go	 out	 of	 the	 centre.	 For	 a	 year	 and	 a	 half,	 we	 had	 those	 problems.	 (Baran,	
25/04/2016)	
Afterwards,	with	 the	 help	 of	 a	 lawyer,	 they	managed	 to	 leave	Napoli,	 and	
move	firstly	to	Rome,	and	eventually	to	Alessandria,	a	small	city	in	the	north-west,	
where	 they	 lived	 for	 about	 a	 year.	 There,	 they	 were	 accommodated	 in	 better	
conditions,	 in	a	small	house.	At	 the	end	of	2012,	with	 the	help	of	a	 friend,	Baran	
found	a	job	in	a	kebab	restaurant	in	Torino.	He	moved	there	while	Beritan	and	Arin	





in	 separate	 shelters	 or	 being	 hosted	 by	 friends.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 2015,	 Social	
Services	agreed	to	pay	the	rent	for	a	small	studio	apartment	in	social	housing	run	by	
an	 NGO,	 where	 they	 are	 currently	 living.	 In	 the	 meanwhile,	 Baran	 has	 been	













This	 is	something	 that	has	no	precedent,	according	 to	his	 lawyer,	who	has	asked	
them	to	put	together	all	the	documents	they	have	as	he	tries	to	figure	out	what	can	
be	 done.	 As	 five	 years	 have	 passed	 since	 he	 first	 received	 permission	 to	 stay	 as	
refugee,	Baran	is	now	eligible	to	apply	for	Italian	citizenship.	This	would	mean	not	






Estranged	 encounters.	 From	 time	 to	 time,	 Baran’s	 experience	 of	 suffering	






me	choose	the	right	questions	to	ask.	I	 felt	I	needed	a	guide	not	to	get	 lost	 in	the	
conversation	 and	 to	 get	 the	 information	 I	 wanted:	 what	 was	 the	 link	 between	
Baran’s	symptoms	and	the	context	in	which	they	emerged?	
While	preparing	for	the	interviews,	the	discussions	with	other	clinicians	at	
the	 centre	 were	 of	 great	 help,	 as	 they	 urged	 me	 to	 challenge	 my	 theoretical	
considerations	with	clinical	practice	and	patients	in	the	flesh.	Right	when	I	thought	
I	had	a	good	plan,	I	was	given	the	same	warning	from	two	different	clinicians,	on	two	

























share	 an	 experience	 of	 mutual	 estrangement	 and	 inquietude	 (Corin,	 2012).	
Following	Stevenson,	we	can	approach	this	uncanny	material	by	imagining	a	way	of	
expressing	without	formulating:		







facts	 falter	 and	 when	 things	 (and	 selves)	 become,	 even	 just	 slightly,	 unhinged.	
(Stevenson,	2014,	pos.	163)	
With	 Das	 (2007),	 therefore,	 I	 consider	 the	 experience	 of	 illness	 as	 an	
experience	 of	 movement	 between	 registers	 –	 normal/abnormal,	
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ordinary/extraordinary.	 Looking	 at	 symptoms	 as	 assemblages,	 as	 allegorical	
archives	 bridging	 debris	 of	 past	 events	 and	 traces	 of	 present	 dispossession	
(Beneduce,	2016),	I	ask	what	emerges	through	them	and	through	their	unfinished	
narratives.	 I	 will	 follow	 a	 thread,	 that	 of	 temporality,	 for	 how	 it	 intertwines,	





Critical	 times.	 In	 Baran’s	 account	 of	 illness,	 individual	 experience	 is	
embedded	 in	 the	 background	 of	 social	 processes	 and	 context.	 However,	 the	
relationship	between	the	two	figures	is	far	from	that	of	a	theatrical	play,	in	which	a	
subject	 is	 acting	 against	 a	 scene	 of	 objects.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 much	 closer	 to	 Vincent	
Crapanzano’s	 descriptions	 of	 imaginative	 processes	 as	 “fuzzy	 horizons	 …	 that	
always	accompany	experience	and	resist	full	articulation”,	constantly	emerging	in	a	
“dialectic	between	openness	and	closure”	(2004).	In	Baran’s	narrative,	a	personal	
crisis	 is	 articulated	 amidst	 its	 surrounding,	 and	 also	 critical,	 circumstances.	 His	
body,	as	an	ever-present	horizon	of	life	events,	is	the	place	where	his	personal	time	






















We	Turkish	 citizenship.	But	 there’s	 a	problem,	problem	of	Kurds.	 Language.	The	
other	place,	there’s	job…	But	there’s	a	problem	of	politics.	I	don’t	think	that,	don’t	
think	permission,	don’t	think…	That,	this	problem.	Arrived	here,	what	can	we	do	to	
get	 a	 permission?	What	 can	we	do?	This,	 I	 go	 there,	 I	 don’t	 understand	nothing,	
there’s	 no	 language…	 Don’t	 understand	 reading,	 this	 culture,	 writing…	 I	 always	
think	that.	When	I	go	hospital	or	I	go…	This	I	don’t	understand	nothing.	Because	of	
that,	I	always	think	think,	ehm…	There’s	a	lot	of	problems….	Always	think	those…	I	



























Per	noi	anche	c’è	tanto	problemi.	 Io	detto:	no	manda,	 io	cerca	lavoro.	Per	quello	 io	sempre	
pensa…	Quando	adesso	io	notte	dorme,	sempre…	Notte,	sempre	piange.	Quando	io	dorme,	io	
sempre	 piange.	 Quando	 c’è	 problema,	 io	 mal	 di	 testa,	 sempre	 mal	 di	 testa.	 Forse	 questa	
malattia	arriva	così.	Poi,	no	mangia	niente,	senza	vitamine,	senza…	Solo,	mangio	pane.	Adesso	
quando	 io	mangia	 una	mela,	 una…	Altro	 tipo,	 sempre	male.	…	 Sì,	 Turchia	 più…	No	 pensa	
questo.	 Ehm…	 Noi,	 cittadinanza	 turchi.	 Però	 c’è	 un	 problema,	 problema	 di	 curdi.	 Lingua.	
Dall’altra	parte,	c’è	lavoro…	Però	c’è	un	problema	di	politica.	Io	non	pensa	questo,	non	pensa	













night…	When	 I	 think…	When	 there	 is	 a	 problem,	 I	 think,	 and	 because	 of	 that…	





















B.:	 [The	doctors	have	 told	me]	When	pay	attention	eat	 this,	eat	 this,	 then	you	do	
check-up,	this	goes	away,	this	illness	goes	away.	And	I	now,	I	have	told	them,	three	
years	always	there’s	this	illness.	I	did	a	lot	of	tests,	did,	a	lot	of	doctors,	went	many	































breakdown	 in	 the	 flow	 of	 time.	When	 thoughts	 accumulate	 in	 his	 head,	 he	 loses	
consciousness	 and	 later	 wakes	 up	 experiencing	 a	 brief	 discontinuation	 in	 his	
memory.	While	the	external	time	continues	 in	 its	rhythm,	psychic	time	halts,	and	
Baran	perceives	a	misalignment	between	his	temporal	practice	–	his	own	subjective	
dispositions	 and	 production	 of	 time	 –	 and	 the	 ungovernable	 logics	 of	 the	 social	
world.	As	Pierre	Bourdieu	(2000a)	argues,	time	is	experienced	in	this	discrepancy,	
when	the	coincidence	between	expectations	and	chances	is	broken,	when	we	feel	“a	




relate	 to	 them	 [...]”	 (p.	 208).	 In	 Baran’s	 account,	 however,	 this	 breach	 does	 not	
remain	 as	 a	 vacuum,	 but	 allows	 for	 a	 process	 of	 gradual,	 and	 tentative,	 re-
articulation	 between	 past	 and	 present,	 internal	 and	 external,	 private	 and	 public,	
time.	
This	illness,	in	my	opinion,	is	related	with	the	suffering	I	lived	in	the	past.	What	was	
it?	 For	 instance,	 if	 think	 what	 I	 experienced	 in	 Turkey,	 I	 think	 of	 my	 work	 as	





















away	 from	 this	 job	 I’m	 doing	 now.	 It’s	 a	 very	 stressful,	 exhausting	 job,	 and	 I’m	









































Per	 quello	 arriva	 12.000	 euro	 Equitalia,	 io	 parlato	 con	 un	 avvocato,	 con	 Beritan	
insieme	parlato,	lui	ha	detto,	prendi	quello	documenti,	tutto	quello	arrivato	fino	adesso.	[…]	
Per	quello,	io	pensa,	cosa,	cosa	faccio	con	questo,	cosa	facciamo	questo?	[…]	E	quando	cancello	
questa	multa...	Un	po'	di...	 Tranquillo,	 tranquillo.	 […]	E	adesso	non	posso	 far	domanda	per	








In	 this	 chapter,	 citizenship	was	 considered	 a	 trajectory	 crossing	 sites	 and	
registers.	Initially	outlined	as	a	relationship	between	the	person	and	the	state,	the	
construct	of	citizenship	was	unfolded,	thus	inscribing	the	different	angles	entailed	
(as	 status,	 category,	 project,	 practice,	 belonging,	 recognition)	 in	 a	 broader	
perspective.	 Hence,	 the	 analysis	 addressed	 the	 relation	 of	 the	 individual	 with	
different	forms	of	power	as	being	incorporated	in	the	process	of	subject	formation,	
and	 as	 one	 of	 register	 of	 subjectivity.	 Furthermore,	 two	 particular	 traits	 of	
subjectification	were	evoked.	Firstly,	I	considered	its	repetitive	nature,	as	a	process	
producing	and	proliferating	at	once,	thus	creating	an	excess.	Secondly,	I	described	it	
as	 an	 intersection	 of	 flows,	 a	 moving	 machine	 encountering	 other	 machines,	
crossing	each	other,	and	generating	cuts,	fragments	and	misfires.		
Subsequently,	I	employed	this	theoretical	framework	to	reframe	the	notion	
of	 “conjunctures”	 as	 intersections	of	 dimensions	 ranging	 from	 the	 social	 and	 the	
political,	to	the	subjective	and	psychological.	By	assuming	this	as	an	object	of	study,	











starting	 point	 for	 the	 investigation	 –	 that	 of	 excess,	 of	 the	 residues	 lying	 at	 the	
margins	of	the	articulable.	
Finally,	I	presented	a	case	study,	entering	the	world	of	a	refugee	man	and	co-
constructing	 with	 him	 a	 story.	 Following	 the	 narrative	 of	 his	 experience	 of	 a	
fractured	 time,	 I	 examined	 the	overlapping,	 crossing	 and	 contrasting	of	different	






and	 local,	 informal	 economies	 of	 exploitation.	 The	 result	 is	 a	 discourse:	 a	 faulty,	
uncertain	and	sometimes	obscure	account	of	the	blend	of	sense	and	nonsense,	acts	
and	 slips,	 present	 in	 the	 asylum	 system.	 Yet,	 something	 exceeds	 this	 discourse,	
obstructing	 and	 unsettling	 it.	 Symptoms	 emerge	 as	 misfires,	 residues	 of	 the	
discourse	slipping	through	words,	but	continuing	to	be	productive.	Symptoms	are	
not	 confined	 in	 private	 experience;	 rather,	 they	 create	 echoes,	 generating	 other	
misfires	in	the	machine.	
Thus,	 the	 analysis	 employed	 symptoms	 as	 a	 heuristic	 device	 –	 a	 lens	
refracting	the	effects	of	arbitrariness	on	the	life	of	a	refugee.	I	followed	a	fragmented	
temporality	to	investigate	the	asylum	system	through	its	processes	of	production	of	
precarious	 subjectivities.	 Disordered	 states	 allowed	 me	 to	 trace	 the	 work	 of	
ordering	mechanisms,	bordering	and	marginalizing	practices.	I	saw	that,	only	for	an	
instant,	 Baran’s	 crisis	 disturbs	 the	 social	 flow	 of	 time,	 allowing	 the	 observer	 to	
discern	the	processes	through	which	individual	experiences	articulate	with	social	
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and	 wealth	 flowing	 into	 a	 dispossessed	 present.	 Baran’s	 social	 time	 is	 evoked	
through	 the	materiality	 of	 his	world:	 a	 repulsive	 but	 inevitable	 job	 and	 a	 pile	 of	




When	 they	 are	 synchronized,	 social	 time	 contains	 personal	 time.	 At	 some	 point,	
however,	when	Baran	cannot	keep	pace	and	stumble,	 lagging	behind,	his	psychic	
time	comes	to	a	halt,	turning	into	a	time	of	unproductiveness.	In	this	suspension,	the	










In	 the	 previous	 chapter	 I	 analysed	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 encounter	 with	 the	
asylum	system	by	looking	at	Baran’s	experience	of	suffering	as	a	critical	conjuncture	
of	 social,	political,	historical	dimensions,	and	 individual	 trajectories.	 I	 considered	
the	interplay	between	ordering	intents,	disordering	consequences,	and	moments	of	
tentative	 re-articulation.	 Baran’s	 experience	 of	 a	 fractured	 time	 reflected	 a	
discrepancy	 between	 a	 collective,	 unbearable	 temporality,	 and	 his	 efforts	 in	 re-
possessing	 a	 more	 personal	 time:	 “Nós	 não	 precisamos	 de	 mais	 tempo.	 Nós	
precisamos	de	um	tempo	que	seja	nosso”,	in	the	words	of	the	Mozambican	writer	Mia	
Couto.58	
The	 previous	 chapter	 has	 examined	 the	 work	 of	 restrictive	 policies,	 by	
considering	 how	 they	 affect	 the	 everyday	 experience	 of	 time.	 Following	 these	
reflections,	this	chapter	employs	the	experience	of	space	as	a	 lens	through	which	
analyse	migrants’	 efforts	 towards	 place-making	 in	 a	 condition	 of	 precarity.	 This	
chapter	 analyses	 a	 process	 of	 transition,	 focusing	 on	 how	 a	 foreign	 space	 is	
experienced.	I	will	follow	Lily,	a	refugee	woman,	in	her	effort	to	find	a	place	in	a	new	
world	and	 to	acquaint	herself	with	 it.	When	 I	meet	her,	 she	 is	about	 to	 leave	 the	
asylum	 system,	 moving	 from	 being	 a	 dependent	 user	 of	 the	 SPRAR	 project59	 to	








–	 it	 works	 toward	 promoting	 migrants’	 social	 inclusion	 through	 personal	
independence	and	empowerment.	As	Rose	(1999)	puts	it,	under	neoliberalism	the	




autonomy”.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 project	 is	 temporary.	 It	 is	 framed	 as	 a	 phase	 of	
transition	during	which	a	transformation	occurs	or	is	supposed	to	occur.	The	project	
is	 a	 device	 –	 or	 a	 manifold,	 sometimes	 incoherent,	 set	 of	 devices	 –	 aimed	 at	
producing	productive	and	independent	subjects	fit	for	the	new	environment.	This	is	
the	end	goal,	when	transition	can	be	considered	complete.		
However,	 in	 some	 cases,	 this	 transitional	 phase	 can	 last	 for	 years,	 itself	
becoming	 a	 world	 to	 which	 one	 must	 adjust,	 with	 its	 own	 cultures,	 values	 and	
practices.	Also,	it	can	entail	a	series	of	additional,	fractal	transitions.	In	other	words,	
the	 trajectory	 in	 the	 asylum	 system	 can	 take	 the	 shape	 of	 a	 chain	 or	 a	 cyclical	
sequence,	of	passages	from	one	temporary	state	to	another.	Integration,	as	the	key	
objective	of	the	reception	system,	becomes	more	a	horizon	than	a	reachable	intent.	








Following	 the	considerations	discussed	 in	Chapter	3,	 I	 look	at	 the	ways	 in	
which	precarity	is	produced	through	dispossession	by	combining	two	perspectives.	
Firstly,	 with	 Butler	 (2004,	 2009),	 I	 look	 at	 dispossession	 as	 inherent	 to	 human	
relationships	and,	still,	differentially	allocated.	From	this	perspective	dispossession	




of	 dispossession.	 Migration	 policies	 aim	 at	 producing	 “bodies-in-place”,	 that	 is,	
bodies	that	can	be	put	in	their	proper	place.	When	the	proper	place	corresponds	to	




apocalypses,	 Ernesto	 de	 Martino	 (1964,	 1977)	 argues	 that	 human	 beings	 are	
constantly	confronted	with	a	risk	of	radical	crisis.	According	to	the	author,	we	are	
exposed	to	a	permanent	risk	of	loss	of	presence,	of	not	being	in	any	possible	world,	




for	 granted,	 the	 physical	world	 ceases	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 familiar	 –	 domestic	 or	
domesticable	(domestico	e	addomesticabile),	in	de	Martino’s	words.	Therefore,	crisis	
is	related	to	the	perception	of	being-acted-by,	and	of	being	dispossessed.	The	author	
emphasizes	 how	 the	 relationship	 between	 human	 beings	 and	 world	 requires	
continuous	 investment,	 for	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 constantly	 re-established	 against	 the	
	163	 	
permanent	threat	of	dissolution.	This	work	of	construction	and	re-construction	is	a	




between	 political	 and	 psychic	 forms	 of	 destitution,	 between	 disownment,	
misrecognition,	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 radical	 crisis.	 I	 will	 begin	 my	 considerations	 by	






























61	 Following	 other	 European	 higher	 education	 institutions	 (see	
https://www.eua.eu/101-projects/541-refugees-welcome-map.html,	 last	 visited	 on	 7	
March	2019),	since	2015,	some	universities	in	Italy	have	been	developing	programmes	to	
promote	integration	of	refugees.	In	addition	to	existing	resources	for	international	students	




mandatory	 and	 can	 significantly	 delay,	 and	 even	 prevent,	 enrolment.	 Each	 university	 is	
competent	to	admit	students	but	the	evaluation	process	of	foreign	qualifications	is	allocated	
to	 a	 national	 centre	 –	 CIMEA	 (Centro	 di	 Informazione	 sulla	 Mobilità	 e	 le	 Equivalenze	




their	 school’s	 office	 and	 database.	 For	more	 information	 on	 the	 evaluation	 process,	 see	
http://www.cimea.it/en/index.aspx	and	http://qualifyme.it/,	last	visited	on	7	March	2019.		
62	 After	 enrolling	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Torino,	 refugees,	 as	 other	 international	
students,	can	apply	for	scholarships	from	EDISU	(Ente	Regionale	per	 il	Diritto	allo	Studio	
Universitario	–	Regional	Agency	 for	 the	Right	 to	Higher	Education).	This	 is	 a	government	
















looks	 like	an	 irrational	decision	or	a	mistake.	She	 is	about	 to	 leave	 the	reception	
centre	that	provides	her	accommodation,	food,	healthcare,	and	pocket	money:	what	
will	 happen	afterward?	Why	did	 she	 enter	 a	 course	 she	 is	not	 interested	 in,	 and	
which	is	too	difficult,	instead	of	finding	a	job	and	a	house?	I	am	not	completely	naïve.	
I	know	that	 it	 is	not	easy	 to	 find	a	 job,	especially	a	high-skilled	 job,	 for	a	mature	
immigrant	woman.	Most	likely,	she	could	start	with	a	low-wage	job	in	a	restaurant	
or	 as	 a	 cleaner.	 In	 the	meantime,	 she	 could	 apply	 for	 the	 validation	 of	 her	 non-





university	 course,	 for	 both	 of	 which	 universities	 are	 competent,	 or	 validating	 a	 foreign	










s-.	 Spaesamento	expresses	 the	 feeling	 of	 being	 out	 of	 a	 familiar	 place,	 and,	more	
generally,	of	feeling	uneasy,	confused,	for	having	lost	the	habitual	reference	points.	
Bewildered,	the	English	word	I	chose	as	a	translation,	involves	the	idea	of	wilderness,	
a	place	not	 inhabited	by	humans.	With	Lily,	 I	 feel	 that	 I	 cannot	 rely	on	my	usual	
coordinates,	on	that	which	I	take	for	granted,	and	I	am	disoriented.	As	has	happened	
before	during	my	fieldwork,	I	am	touched	by	this	encounter.	
As	 Sara	 Ahmed	 (2004)	 argues	 emotions	 leave	 marks	 on	 people.	 We	 are	
impressed	 by	 others,	 others	 impress	 upon	 us,	 and	 the	 traces	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	
histories	 of	 past	 contacts.	 Ahmed	 employs	 the	 term	 “affect”	 to	 emphasize	 the	















“power	 of	 discourse	 to	 produce	 effects	 through	 reiteration”	 (1993,	 p.	 20).	 By	
emphasizing	 the	 performative	 nature	 of	 discourse,	 Butler	 shows	 how	 a	 signifier	
does	not	simply	name	an	existing	object,	but	produces	a	set	of	effects,	and	therefore	
“makes”	 what	 it	 names.	 Reiteration	 refers	 to	 the	 temporality	 of	 this	 process:	
signifiers	materialize	what	is	“not	yet”	depending	upon	what	has	already	been	said,	
that	is,	previous	norms	and	conventions.	Performativity	works	by	repeating	existing	





Secondly,	Ahmed	argues	 that	 affects65	 are	 relational	 and	 intentional.	They	
depend	 upon	 touch	 and	 proximity,	 and	 involve	 “(re)actions	 or	 relations	 of	






























students’	 project,	 I	 help	 her	with	 all	 the	 issues	 related	 to	 university	 life,	 such	 as	
documentation,	 exams,	 accommodation.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 first	 semester,	 we	 go	
together	 to	 a	 small	 association	 supporting	 migrants	 for	 the	 validation	 of	 non-
European	degrees	and	offering	career	guidance.	We	meet	with	Laura,	a	case	worker	
who	 is	 very	 kind,	 and	 seems	 experienced.	 Despite	 this,	 the	meeting	 is	 a	 failure,	




other’s	 role.	 But	 the	 misunderstanding	 does	 not	 stem	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 language.	




for	 the	current	academic	year.	She	would	still	be	able	 to	enrol	again	 for	 the	next	
academic	year.	While	this	is	reasonable	and	convenient	for	Laura,	it	is	not	an	option	
for	 Lily.	 In	 trying	 to	 help,	 I	 back	 Lily’s	 position,	 probably	 worsening	 the	
misunderstanding.	 In	 Laura’s	 eyes,	 I	 should	 be	 the	 one	 who	 shares	 her	 same	
orientation,	and	perhaps	this	is	the	reason	why	my	illogical	position	is	even	more	
disorienting.	 At	 one	 point,	 when	 Laura	 asks	 Lily	 to	 show	 her	 Iranian	 university	
certificates,	Lily	starts	crying.	Pointing	to	a	paper’s	header	with	the	court’s	symbol	














end	 up	 being	 inappropriate.	 He	 seems	 engaged	 in	 trying	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 an	
unfamiliar	 “object”	 that	 escapes	 his	 system	 of	 classification.	 After	 the	 meeting,	
Giovanni	raises	some	doubts	about	the	situation,	and	tells	us	that	he	will	need	some	
time	to	think	about	Lily’s	request.	Lily	looks	tired	and	upset.	She	asks	me	if	I	think	






Carla,	 the	 new	 case	 worker,	 tells	 us	 that	 they	 have	 not	 found	 suitable	
accommodation	 for	Lily	yet	because	she	 is	 “unusual”.	But	 she	also	 tells	us	not	 to	
worry,	they	will	find	something.	Indeed,	after	a	few	weeks,	Carla	calls	Lily,	offering	
her	 a	place	 in	 the	Rifugio	Diffuso	 project.	 This	 is	 a	 small-scale	project	within	 the	
SPRAR	 system,	 aimed	 at	 promoting	 more	 effective	 forms	 of	 social	 inclusion	 of	




and	 refugees,	 offering	 support	with	possible	 issues,	 and	enabling	all	 the	 services	
provided	 by	 SPRAR	 (language	 classes,	 job	 training,	 legal	 support,	 psychological	
counselling).	
Lily	is	relieved	to	have	found	a	place	but	also	discouraged.	After	almost	three	








good	 opportunity,	 but	 expresses	 the	 desire	 to	 continue	 also	with	 her	 university	
course	in	order	to	keep	the	scholarship.	Carla	calls	me,	asking	for	help	in	persuading	












toward	 the	 best	 choice:	 leaving	 the	 university	 course	 she	 is	 not	 interested	 in,	
applying	for	the	validation	of	her	Iranian	degree,	in	order	to	find	(or	hoping	to	find)	
a	 job	 for	which	she	has	 the	experience.	Now	that	Lily	seems	 to	be	so	obstinately	
attached	to	her	irrational	choices,	Laura	feels	she	has	been	fooled.	My	first	thought	
















The	 author	 draws	 on	 Freud’s	 considerations	 of	 the	 unconscious,	 and	
psychoanalytical	understandings	of	the	economy	of	emotions,	involving	processes	
of	movement,	 association,	 and	 displacement	 (Freud,	 1964;	 Lacan,	 1977).	 Ahmed	
underlines	 how	 affects	 do	 not	 have	 a	 fixed	 referent:	 they	 are	 detached	 from	
























following	 the	 displacement	 of	 fear	 and	 the	movements	 towards,	 and	 away	 from,	
objects	of	 fear,	Ahmed	shows	how	fear	does	not	 involve	already	existing	objects;	
rather,	the	economy	of	fear	establishes	objects	from	which	the	subject	can	flee.	The	
author	 continues	 the	 analysis	 by	 asking	 what	 particular	 shape	 is	 taken	 by	 the	
surfaces	of	those	objects.	For	instance,	in	fear	“the	world	presses	against	the	body”	
and	“the	body	shrinks	back	from	the	world”	(Ahmed,	2004,	p.	69),	while	other	bodies	












anxiety	 is	 not	 cause-effect.	 Rather,	 the	 affective	 economy,	 through	 a	 process	 of	
alignment,	 transforms	 the	 event	 into	 a	 “fetish	 object”	 (Ahmed,	 2004,	 p.	 77)	 that	
acquires	 a	 life	 of	 its	 own	 –	 a	 threat	 to	 “what	 is”,	 namely,	 to	 social	 norms.	 Fear	
becomes	a	justification	for	protecting	those	social	norms.	
[T]he	fear	of	degeneration,	decline	and	disintegration	as	mechanisms	for	preserving	






























starting	 with	 her	 asking	 for	 help	 in	 dealing	 with	 an	 issue,	 and	 then	 ending	 up	
chatting	over	a	coffee.	I	keep	my	confusion	and	my	doubts	to	myself	for	a	while.	But	
after	a	few	months	during	which	I	have	seen	Lily	struggling	with	a	lot	of	difficulties,	






As	 time	 goes	 by,	 my	 confusion	 slowly	 dissolves	 and	 is	 transformed	 into	
something	 else.	 She	 describes	 her	 experience	 of	migration	 in	 terms	 of	 loss.	 “My	



















of	 an	 interpreter,	 and	 then	 translated	 into	English	by	myself.	 In	 the	 following	 interview	
(28/3/2017),	 Lily	 preferred	 to	 speak	 Italian.	 All	 the	 transcripts	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	my	
translation.	











In	 all	 the	 cases	where	 there	 are	 doubts	 on	which	 State	 is	 competent	 for	 a	 given	
request	of	international	protection,	the	proceedings	are	suspended	by	a	so-called	“Dublin	
	177	 	
Lily:	Ok,	 let’s	start…	When…	The	day	 I	arrived	 in	 Italy,	with	Swedish	police.	Very	
scared.	Very	scared	because	I	heard	Italy	bad,	Italy	people	not	good.	[…]	Perhaps,	I	
arrived	 in	 Italy,	 I	have	to	 live	 in	 the	streets,	 there’s	no	 food…	When	I	was	on	the	






of…	 All	 the	 people…	 I	 didn’t	 know.	 They	 were	 all	 men.	 Perhaps	 they	 can	make	
troubles	with	me.	 […]	 I	went	 into	 a	 corner,	 and	 sat	 there.	 I	was	very	 tired,	 but	 I	
couldn’t	 sleep	because	 I	was	 scared.	 I	was	afraid	 that	people	would	come	 to	me,	






































reception	 centre],	 I	 had	 troubles	breathing.	But	 they	didn’t	 believe	me,	 and	 they	
didn’t	buy	me	the	inhaler.	They	couldn’t	believe	I	had	troubles	breathing.	They	didn’t	
trust	what	we	said,	they	were	always	thinking	badly.	(Lily,	27/9/2016)	






person.	 Because	 […]	 for	 six	months,	 I	 always	 had	 troubles	 […].	 Slowly,	with	 the	
troubles,	my	asthma	started.	(Lily,	28/3/2017)	















Lily’s	 experience	of	dispossession	 is	 condensed	 in	 the	 image	of	 the	empty	
room.	She	finds	herself	in	a	space	without	objects,	and	she	feels	lost.	She	has	left	a	































According	 to	 Ahmed,	 the	 point	 is	 not	 to	 transcend,	 or	 put	 aside,	 what	 is	
familiar.	Rather,	the	aim	is	to	consider	precisely	what	we	overlook	when	we	are	kept	
within	 the	 familiar.	 Ahmed	 understands	 the	 background,	 the	 domestic,	 as	 the	








To	 “co-incide”	 suggests	 how	 different	 things	 happen	 at	 the	 same	 moment,	 a	
happening	that	brings	things	near	to	other	things,	whereby	the	nearness	shapes	the	
shape	of	each	thing.	Simultaneous	arrivals	are	not	necessarily	a	matter	of	chance;	













Bodies	may	become	orientated	 in	 this	responsiveness	 to	 the	world	around	them,	
given	 this	 capacity	 to	 be	 affected.	 In	 turn,	 given	 the	 histories	 of	 such	 responses,	
which	accumulate	as	impressions	on	the	skin,	bodies	do	not	dwell	in	spaces	that	are	
exterior	 but	 rather	 are	 shaped	 by	 their	 dwellings	 and	 take	 shape	 by	 dwelling.	
(Ahmed,	2006,	pos.	182)	
Migration	involves	a	process	of	disorientation	and	subsequent	orientation,	of	





them.	 Thus,	 directions	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 relationships	 between	 bodies	 and	
space.	Indeed,	space	is	not	a	container	for	the	body.	Rather,	bodies	take	up	space,	
becoming	the	space	they	inhabit.	Drawing	on	Husserl’s	(1983)	consideration	of	the	
“intimacy	 of	 touch”,	 Ahmed	 claims	 that	 “neither	 the	 object	 nor	 the	 body	 have	
integrity	in	the	sense	of	being	‘the	same	thing’	with	and	without	others.	Bodies	as	
well	 as	 objects	 take	 shape	 through	 being	 orientated	 toward	 each	 other,	 as	 an	




directions	 are	performative,	 that	 is,	 they	depend	on	 the	 repetition	 of	 norms	 and	
conventions.	 They	 are	 “well-trodden	paths”,	 routes	 created	 by	 the	 traces	 of	 past	
journeys:	“what	is	reachable	is	determined	precisely	by	orientations	that	we	have	
already	taken”	(Ahmed,	2006,	p.	31).	Following	Bourdieu	and	Butler,	Ahmed	looks	








direction,	 a	 “queer”	 or	 “failed”	 orientation,	 or	 to	 use	 an	 object	 differently,	 thus	
transforming	it	in	a	“re-orientation	device.”	
So,	 yes,	 we	 can	 remember	 that	 some	 spaces	 are	 already	 occupied.	 …	 And	 yet	
sometimes	we	reach	what	is	not	expected.	A	space,	however	occupied,	is	taken	up	















the	 threshold	of	 a	 crisis.	Here,	 Lily	 is	deprived	also	of	her	 capacity	 to	 act	 on	 the	
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these	things,	 for	other	things.	 […]	But	this	got	me	angry,	and	my	asthma	began,	 I	
couldn’t	control	it.	[One	night,	Lily	comes	back	home,	finding	the	living	room	full	of	
people.	Her	flatmates	have	invited	some	friends.	According	to	the	house	regulation,	
night	 silence	 starts	 at	 midnight]	 At	 twelve,	 everybody	 has	 to	 sleep.	 They	 go	 on	
talking	loud,	drinking	alcohol,	chatting,	chatting.	At	one,	I	told	them:	please,	I	want	
to	sleep.	But	for	two	more	hours…	[…].	But	then,	a	Nigerian	girl	told	me:	no,	you’ve	
problems,	you’re	crazy,	ehm,	and	blah	blah	blah.	 I	 said:	ok,	 tomorrow	I	go	 to	 the	






















Lily:	 [My	roommate]	 thought	 that	 I	snitched	on	her.	When	I	came	home,	she	was	










ehm,	 when	 he	 sees	 the	 blood	 test	 and	 understands	 that	 I	 took	medicines.	 They	
thought	I	wanted	to	die…	[…]	For	two	days,	I	stayed	at	the	hospital.	After	two	days,	
I	talked	to	[the	project	manager]:	please,	I	want	to	leave	this	project.	She	told	me:	











shakes,	and	she	cries].	 […]	Because	 in	 Iran,	 I	was	a	very	proud	person.	Now,	not	










think.	Also,	when	 I’m	at	work,	when	 I	 have	 a	break,	 I’m	always	quiet,	 looking	 at	
things.	 [My	 colleague]	 always	 asks:	 Lily,	where	 are	 you?	 […]	 Last	 time	 I	 had	my	







my	 parents’	 faces.	 My…	 My	 mother’s	 face…	 [She	 starts	 crying,	 and	 we	 end	 the	
interview].	(Lily,	28/3/2017)		
Lily	employs	a	term	she	knows	well,	“asthma”,	to	refer	to	an	uncanny	feeling,	
something	 familiar	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 disquieting.	 Different	 temporalities	 are	
compressed	in	a	past	experience	that	comes	back	to	the	present	in	an	altered,	but	










does	 not	 fit	 entirely	 in	 this	 object.	 She	 acknowledges	 that	 this	 breathlessness	 is	








paradoxes	 inherent	 to	 the	 asylum	 system	 and	 its	work	 of	 “refugee	making”.	 Lily	
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describes	 how	 she	 experiences	 differential	 inclusion.68	 Her	 “heaviness”	 and	
hopelessness	are	caused	by	the	perception	of	being	admitted	only	partially	to	the	
new	society:	
















narrative	 shows	 the	 limitations	 and	 contradiction	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 rhetoric	
informing	transformative	and	success	oriented	programmes.		
Following	 the	 classic	 literature	 in	 medical	 anthropology,	 and	 particularly	
a	critical-interpretive	approach	(Lock	&	Scheper-Hughes,	1990),	Lily’s	narrative	can	














The	 traces	 of	 different	 languages	 are	 condensed,	 and	 concealed,	 in	 her	
asthma.	 This	 word	 establishes	 a	 continuity	 with	 her	 past	 experience	 of	 feeling	
breathless.	Lily	appropriates	a	biomedical	language	she	encountered	in	the	past	to	
frame	and	give	meaning	 to	a	disturbing	event.	 She	 is	also	making	an	appeal	 to	a	
community	familiar	with	this	language.	Her	experience	of	crisis,	and	her	sensations	
of	 breathlessness,	 oppression,	 and	 powerlessness,	 are	 then	 translated,	 and	
transformed,	by	a	medical	institution	into	a	psychiatric	category	–	depression,	panic	





worked	 somewhat.	 Since	 she	 passed	 the	 required	 exams,	 she	 has	 received	 the	
second	year’s	scholarship.	She	has	also	applied	for	accommodation	in	a	student	hall	
because	her	time	in	the	Rifugio	Diffuso	project	is	almost	over.	She	is	now	sharing	an	
apartment	 with	 other	 undergrads,	 patiently	 enduring	 student	 life.	 The	 paid	
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internship	 has	 been	 extended	 for	 another	 three	 months.	 Lily	 is	 making	 a	





not	 have	 the	 resources	 to	 hire	 Lily	 on	 a	 regular	 contract.	 As	 happens	 often,	 he	
suggests	a	compromise	in	the	grey	area	of	the	Italian	labour	legislation,	suggesting	
that	Lily	 continue	as	an	 intern	 for	another	 six	months,	with	 the	 same	salary	and	
terms.	Again,	she	feels	that	she	does	not	have	much	choice.	She	accepts	the	contract	









a	wrinkle.	 It	 is	 a	 costly	 labour	and	an	uneven	 fight,	but	 still	produces	a	different	









As	 argued	by	Elizabeth	Povinelli	 (Turcot	DiFruscia	&	Povinelli,	 2014),	 the	
Foucauldian	approach	has	shaped	the	analysis	of	power	in	terms	of	object-effects,	
subject-effects,	 state-effects,	 and	 so	 forth,	 focusing	 on	 the	 process	 of	 production,	
rather	 than	 the	essence	of	object.	According	 to	 the	author,	as	a	consequence,	 the	
different	“modalities	of	materiality”	are	neglected,	made	disappear,	or	 irrelevant.	
Povinelli’s	analytical	framework	seeks	to	account	for	the	“dual	materiality”	without	
falling	 back	 into	 the	 “metaphysics	 of	 substance”	 and	 the	 quest	 for	 authenticity	
(Butler,	1990).	Povinelli	suggests	to	look	at	both	“corporeality”	as	“the	way	in	which	
dominant	forms	of	power	shape	and	reshape	materiality,	how	discourses	produce	
categories	 and	 divisions	 between	 categories,”	 and	 “carnality”,	 as	 “the	 material	
manifestations	of	 that	discourse	which	are	neither	discursive	nor	pre-discursive”	
(Turcot	 DiFruscia	&	 Povinelli,	 2014).	 In	 her	 book	The	 Empire	 of	 Love:	 Toward	 a	
Theory	of	Intimacy,	Genealogy,	and	Carnality	(2006),	Povinelli	analyses	a	sore	on	her	
shoulder,	 that	 she	 acquired	 during	 fieldwork,	 asking	 how	 it	 has	 been	 shaped	 by	
“multiple,	 and	 often	 incommensurate”	 discourses.	 The	 author	 looks	 also	 to	 the	
carnality	of	her	sore,	 that	 is,	 to	what	goes	beyond	the	discourse	that	produced	it,	
sickening	and	corroding	her	body.		
Povinelli’s	 considerations	 of	 what	 is	 left	 in	 the	 encounter	 between	
incommensurable	 discourses	 help	 clarify	 my	 argument	 of	 Lily’s	 crisis	 as	 an	







what	 she	 calls	 “radical	worlds”,	 that	 is,	 on	 alternative,	 subaltern,	 and	 countering	
forms	 of	 social	 life.	 For	 the	 author,	 radical	worlds	 are	 not	 necessarily	 organized	
forms	of	social	action;	rather,	they	oscillate	between	being	partially	organized	and	
partially	disorganized,	and	between	being	something	or	nothing.		
Those	 radical	worlds	 are	defined	as	 “alternative	 social	 projects”.	 If	 “social	
projects	are	the	aggregated	result	of	a	set	of	practices	coming	into	commonality”,	
then	 “[a]lternative	 social	 projects	 are	 those	 social	 projects	 that	 begin	 by	merely	
more	 or	 less	 deviating	 from	 the	 explicitly	 given	 categories	 of	 life	 and	world	 but	
slowly,	 through	 aggregating	 activities,	 come	 to	 have	 a	 content,	 being	 and	
enunciation”	(Haritaworn,	Kuntsman,	Posocco,	&	Povinelli,	2013).	The	potentiality	
of	alternative	social	projects	 lies	 in	 their	 liminality.	Drawing	on	Turner’s	seminal	
work	 on	 the	 possibilities	 of	 transformation,	 but	 also	 disruption,	 within	 liminal	
states,69	 Povinelli	 understands	 alternative	 social	 projects	 as	 produced	 by	 social	
formations	 initially	 as	 a	 “noise”	 that	 can	 afterwards	 enacts	 its	 potentiality	 to	
reformulate,	and	threaten,	the	social	order.	The	author’s	question	therefore	is:	“How	





like	 a	 definitive	 event	 occur	 in	 the	 world	 (becoming	 a	 counterpublic	 is	 an	










tremble.	 Povinelli	 looks	 at	 these	 moments	 of	 collision	 between	 semantic	 fields,	
focusing	on	the	violent	work	of	enervation,	that	is,	the	process	of	weakening,	and	
exhaustion	of	alternative	social	projects.		
Povinelli	 (2001)	 describes	 this	 dissonance	 employing	 also	 the	 notion	 of	
incommensurability,	 imagining	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 ordinary	 and	 the	
alternative	 as	 an	 effort	 to	 conceive	 the	 inconceivable.	 Drawing	 on	 literature	 of	
philosophy	of	language	about	translation	(Davidson,	2001),	the	author	focuses	on	
linguistic	indeterminacy,	distortion,	and	the	process	of	interpretation	in	the	context	







new,	 various	 and	 variant	 forms.	 Power	 implies	 a	 work	 of	 standardization,	 that	









From	 this	 angle,	 Lily’s	 discourse	 is	 unintelligible	 because	 it	 cannot	 be	
translated.	Both	her	crisis,	and	her	moral	horizon	guiding	her	choices	represent	an	















–	as	a	 thread	 for	outlining	 the	background	of	her	experience,	 the	conditions	 that	
made	it	possible.	I	walked	with	her	for	a	while,	trying	to	understand	the	path	she	
was	 following.	 I	 was	 disoriented,	 for	 I	 could	 not	 rely	 on	 predictable,	 familiar	
reference	points.	I	saw	a	similar	disorientation	in	some	of	the	actors	of	the	asylum	
system	 who	 crossed	 her	 trajectory.	 Lily	 and	 I	 saw	 emotions	 circulating	 and	
witnessed	 how	 we	 all	 were	 affected	 by	 frustration,	 sometimes	 resentment,	 or	
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distrust.	With	 Sara	 Ahmed,	 I	 looked	 at	 the	 relationality	 of	 affects,	 defining	 them	
firstly	as	repetitive,	for	they	produce	effects	through	reiteration,	and	depend	upon	




Subsequently,	 I	 focused	 on	 Lily’s	 narrative	 of	 her	 experience	 within	 the	
asylum	system.	She	told	of	the	marks	left	on	her,	her	grief,	and	the	struggles	to	find	









process	 as	 a	 work	 of	 alignment,	 orientation	 and	 re-orientation,	 imagining	 Lily’s	
trajectory	as	a	divergent,	opposing	direction.	
Finally,	I	thought	of	Lily’s	narrative	as	a	twofold	discourse.	Not	only	a	way	of	
expressing	 her	 experience,	 to	 give	 voice	 to	 her	 grief,	 but	 also	 a	 possibility	 for	
opening	different	discourses	and	for	unsettling	existing	ones.	Drawing	on	Elizabeth	
Povinelli’s	work,	 I	 concluded	 the	 chapter	by	emphasizing	 the	 critical	potential	of	
what	is	not	fully	comprehensible	and	commensurable,	looking	at	Lily’s	stubborn	and	
unreasonable	discourse	as	an	effort	to	keep	open	a	momentary,	tentative	space	for	
articulating	 an	 alternative	 world.	 Lily’s	 discourse	 is	multiple,	 resulting	 from	 the	
	196		
combination	and	entanglement	of	diverse	languages.	Some	of	these	languages	are	





is	 neither	 completely	 other,	 nor	 completely	 accessible.	Her	discourse	 is	 not	 fully	
commensurable	in	our	terms,	and	this	is	the	reason	why	it	remains	visible.	Since	it	





















had	 to	 invent	 language.	 Often,	 they	 turned	 to	 images	 –	 metaphors,	 and	 bodily	












analysed	 different	 experiences	 of	 crisis,	 in	 the	 relationship	with	 their	 social	 and	
political	circumstances.	I	examined	how	macro	forces	enter	individual	lives	and	give	










worlds:	 “They	 can	 ‘make	 over’	 the	 person	 to	 the	 social	 world,	 and	 reciprocally	





the	 interviews	 that	 follow.	 Two	 refugees	 with	 different	 experiences	 and	
































week	 to	 participate	 in	 the	Monday	 class.	 The	 class	 had	 been	 suspended	 for	 two	











In	 the	 meanwhile,	 Matilde	 comes	 in.	 As	 usual,	 they	 begin	 the	 class	 by	 asking	
questions,	 trying	 to	 stimulate	 a	 conversation.	 Unlike	 other	 classes,	 the	 Monday	
group	is	quite	unconventional.	Sara	and	Matilde	do	not	teach	Italian;	rather,	they	try	
to	 create	 a	 debate,	 encouraging	 women	 to	 express	 themselves	 using	 the	 Italian	
language.	After	a	while,	Asha,	a	Somali	woman	in	her	late	thirties,	asks	a	question,	
















she	 was	 put	 into	 prison:	 Europe	 had	 “closed”	 the	 Mediterranean	 Sea,	 the	






looking	right	 in	front	of	her,	where	Sara	and	Matilde	sit.	 It	 is	a	direct	speech	that	
does	not	need	any	translation.	We	all	listen	quietly.	































































entirely	 by	 2020.	 The	 project,	 in	 which	 several	 local	 associations	 are	 involved,	 aims	 at	
offering	 evicted	 refugees	 temporary	 housing,	 training	 opportunities	 and	 help	 finding	
jobs.	The	 project	 has	 been	 harshly	 criticized	 by	 activists	 (see	















fair	 that	 they	 got	 my	 fingers	 [fingerprints]	 here.	 Now	 they	 don’t	 take	 fingers	







Monday	class	 is	different	 from	 the	other	 Italian	 language	classes	held	during	 the	











gives	 an	 opinion,	 another	 asks	 a	 question,	 or	 shares	 her	 own	 experience,	 while	
Matilde	and	Sara	help	 them	 to	 read	and	understand	 the	 texture	of	 everyday	 life.	
Occasionally,	the	two	teachers	suggest	a	topic	to	discuss,	which	may	be	related	to	
current	 events	 or	 politics:	 “What	 is	 happening	 in	 Somalia,	 or	 Nigeria,	 at	 this	






Sara	 and	Matilde	 are	well-educated	women	 in	 their	mid-sixties	who	 have	













personally	 in	 the	discussion	 and	 encouraging	women	 to	 share	 their	 experiences.	
They	 are	both	present,	with	 their	bodies	 and	 their	 stories,	 in	 the	 class,	 and	 thus	
challenge	 the	 common	 and	 more	 or	 less	 explicit	 assumption	 underlying	 the	





produce	 about	 themselves	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 fundamental	 devices	 of	





by	reciprocally	opening	 to	 them	and	 thus	becoming	known	or	at	 least	knowable.	
Sara	and	Matilde	are	both	present	in	the	class,	showing	and	questioning	their	bodies,	
with	their	shapes,	colours,	wounds	and	afflictions.	They	participate	in	discussions	
about	 eating,	 ageing,	 sexuality	 and	 maternity.	 They	 share	 bits	 of	 their	 own	 life	





group	 too.	 At	 first,	 I	 am	 a	 new	 presence,	 with	 an	 unclear	 role.	 Women	 ask	 me	
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questions	 (“Are	 you	 a	 lawyer?”,	 “What	 is	 a	 research?”,	 “Then	 what?	 You	 only	
write?”),	becoming	curious	about	what	I	do,	why	I	am	interested	in	them.	Also,	they	
are	 interested	 in	 who	 I	 am,	 and	 what	 kind	 of	 femininity	 I	 represent	 (“Are	 you	









parole	 (De	 Certeau,	 1994),	where	women	 can	 take	 up	 language,	 holding	 it	 for	 a	
moment,	trying	to	possess	it.	With	those	acts	of	language	the	torrent	rises	and	the	
movement	 accelerates.	 I	 notice	 this	 movement	 for	 the	 first	 time	 early	 in	 my	












































UK,	 but	 nobody	 seems	 to	 have	 questions.	 Sara	 continues,	 and	 asks	 directly	 each	














state	 borders	 in	 Europe	 because	 refugees	 need	 an	 additional	 travel	 document.	
Fawzia	replies	with	a	harsh	tone,	cursing,	“Italy	haram!”:	Italy	is	evil,	impure.	Again,	











reaches	a	peak,	passing	an	 implicit	boundary,	and	risking	overwhelming	 the	 two	
teachers.	When	the	river	is	in	flood,	the	group	takes	a	voice	–	polyphonic,	unclear,	
but	 shared.	Women	 appropriate	 an	 imperfect	 and	 hybrid	 language,	 overlapping	
Italian,	Somali,	Arabic,	English	and	French:	a	choral	discourse	that	is	not	completely	
intelligible	 but	 is	 extremely	 meaningful.	 The	 discussion	 rises	 and	 the	 group	
simmers,	expressing	anger	and	conflict.	Words	start	slipping	away,	becoming	less	
governable,	 defiant,	 and	 escaping	 the	 limits	 of	 a	 language	 class.	 Here,	 Sara	 and	
Matilde	feel	the	need,	or	the	obligation,	to	intervene,	preventing	a	possible	outburst.	





I	 find	 a	 resonance	 between	 this	 double	 movement	 in	 the	 class,	 and	 the	
duplicity	of	the	surrounding	system.	The	alternation	of	giving	and	containing	voices	
mirrors	 the	double	mandate	of	 the	asylum	system.	We	respect	 and	grant	human	
rights,	we	care	 for	victims	of	violence,	but	only	 insofar	as	 the	contact	with	 those	
others	 does	 not	 compromise	 our	 presumed	 stability	 and	 safety.	 We	 struggle	
between	our	moral	horizon	and	our	fears:	we	cannot	practice	compassion	without	




are	 linked	 to	 macro-structures	 in	 a	 relation	 of	 interdependency:	 national	 and	
supranational	legal	frameworks	and	policymaking	have	an	impact	on,	but	are	also	
affected	 by,	 what	 happens	 on	 the	 ground,	 where	 they	 are	 implemented,	
transformed,	questioned,	and	resisted.	The	Monday	class,	like	the	other	sites	of	my	






entanglement.	 They	 are	 a	margin.	 They	 have	 a	 part	 in	 the	 system	 –	 a	 part	 that	
appears	most	likely	to	be	minimal	when	compared	to	the	larger	asylum	machine,	






they	 are	 committed.	 Sara	 and	 Matilde	 depend	 on,	 and	 therefore	 contribute	 to	
reproducing,	 a	 machine	 that	 enables	 them	 to	 exist	 in	 their	 role	 of	 volunteers,	
















but	 also	 away	 from	 who	 called	 them	 initially.	 The	 counter-interpellation	 would	
require	them	to	renounce	and	resist	the	machine’s	interpellation,	and	to	expose	the	
machine	 itself.	 Therefore,	 it	 cannot	 be	 easily	 answered.	 For	 Sara	 and	 Matilde,	
turning	 towards	 Asha	 and	 away	 from	 the	 original	 interpellation	 would	 imply	




since	 they	are	 involved	 in	 the	system	while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	acknowledging	 its	
inherent	 violence.	 They	 are	 volunteers,	 driven	 by	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 system	 can	
provide	 opportunities	 to	 migrant	 women,	 but	 also	 aware	 of	 the	 costs	 of	 these	
opportunities:	 having	 been	 granted	 asylum,	 Asha	was	 able	 to	 escape	 violence	 in	
Somalia	but	is	now	confined	in	a	condition	of	marginality,	for	she	does	not	have	full	
access	to	social	rights	and	 is	 thus	not	able	to	 find	a	 fair	 job,	have	a	decent	home,	
receive	proper	health	care,	or	reunite	with	her	family.		Sara	and	Matilde	embody	a	
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contradiction	 that	 sometimes	 becomes	 intolerable.	 In	 Asha’s	 act	 of	 speech,	 the	
ambiguities	are	unveiled:	whoever	participates	in	the	prison,	even	who	tries	to	bend	
































admitted	 to	 the	 hospital.	 She	 explains	 that	 she	 has	 much	 on	 her	 mind,	 a	 lot	 of	
worries.	She	got	all	the	papers	for	the	family	reunification	but	her	children	are	still	
stuck	in	Ethiopia.	“They	are	with	him	[Asha’s	father-in-law],	and	I	am	very	scared.”	













nutrients,	 but	 blood	movements	 and	 eating	 habits	 are	 not	 independent	 of	 what	
happens	around	her.	When	I	visit	the	next	day,	she	is	about	to	be	discharged.	She	

















very	 strained.	 Also,	 she	 is	 severely	 overweight,	 and	 this	 condition	 worsens	 her	
















Since	 the	 medicines	 are	 bad	 for	 me,	 I	 decided	 to	 stop	 taking	 them.”	 She	 then	
continues	 talking	about	 their	children,	and	 the	 family	 reunification.	To	prove	 the	










dead.	They	asked	Asha	 to	return	all	his	belongings	and,	according	 to	 the	custom,	
arranged	her	marriage	with	her	brother-in-law.	Initially,	she	managed	to	win	time	
by	appealing	to	the	fact	that	in	the	absence	of	her	husband’s	corpse,	she	was	not	sure	








Francesca:	Did	you	arrive	directly	 from	Somalia	 to	 Italy,	or	did	you	 travel	across	
other	countries?		
























least	 the	paper	 in	which	you	declare	 I	have	 left.	But	he	didn’t.	When	 I	arrived	 in	
Torino,	 asking	 the	 Immigration	 Office	 for	 help,	 they	 told	 me	 I	 already	 was	 in	 a	
project.	When	they	checked	on	the	computer,	they	saw	that	I	was	in	the	project.	…	
He	just	told	me	that	I	couldn’t	stay	any	longer	in	the	project,	that	for	me	it	was	over.	















finding	 a	way	 to	 earn	money,	 and	 trying	 to	move	 to	 a	 city	where	 she	 sees	more	
opportunities.	But	when	she	bumps	into	the	prison	wall,	she	employs	an	ordinary,	
well-known	tactic:	she	moves	on.	Following	De	Certeau	(1984),	I	here	employ	the	






“subject	 of	 will	 and	 power”,	 and	 determine	 politic,	 economic,	 and	 scientific	
rationality,	tactics	are	the	everyday	practices	and	temporary	victories	of	the	“weak”	




live	 and	walk	 in	 the	 city.	 Those	 spatial	 practices	 are	 creative,	 often	 illegitimate,	
modes	of	reappropriation,	attempted	productions	of	other	spatialities:		
They	are	myriad,	but	do	not	compose	a	series.	They	cannot	be	counted	because	each	









perspective,	 mobility	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 tactic	 for	 it	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 a	






the	 context	 of	 forced	 migration,	 mobility,	 or	 rather	 the	 different	 degrees	 and	
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opportunities	of	mobility,	is	often	employed	as	a	tactic	and	opposed	to	the	strategies	
of	 migration	 control	 and	 the	 production	 of	 precarious	 forms	 of	 citizenship.	 As	
previously	discussed,76	mobility,	even	when	only	imagined,	represents	a	space	or	a	
moment	of	autonomy.	 In	other	words	 illegal,	or	not	 fully	 legal,	 forms	of	mobility	
exceed	 the	 asylum	 regime	 and,	 I	 argue,	 disturb	 the	 permanence	 of	 its	 walls	 by	
generating	undisciplined,	accidental	and,	 therefore,	defiant	possibilities	of	action.	
Although	mobility	can	shake	and	even	breach	the	walls,	the	open	prison	stands	and	



























migrant	 is	 identified	and	his	or	her	 fingerprints	 are	 recorded	 into	 the	EURODAC	
database.	The	Dublin	wall	is	firm	but,	as	with	every	piece	of	the	asylum	machine,	it	












a	man	 she	 knew	when	 they	were	 both	 kids.	 At	 that	 time	 the	man	was	 living	 in	
Norway	without	 papers	 after	 being	 denied	 asylum.	 She	was	 in	 love	 and	 initially	




I	support	your	 family,	your	children,	 in	Somalia.	 I	buy	you	 jewellery,	 I	give	you	a	









































I’m	grateful	 to	 Italy,	because	they	saved	me.	But	the	 life	 I	had…	I’ve	said	this	 is	a	
prison	because	if	you	go	somewhere,	they	send	you	back	here.	We	are	prisoners!	It’s	




strict.	 It	 comes	 to	 the	 rescue,	 offers	 opportunities	 and	 promises,	 creates	
expectations,	while,	at	once	working	to	contain	and	constrain.	It	is	frustrating,	but	





and	 temporalities.	From	Somalia,	 to	Kenya,	Uganda,	 Sudan,	Libya,	 and	 then	 Italy,	
France,	Sweden,	Norway.	If	the	present	is	almost	unliveable,	for	uncertainty	is	what	
makes	the	here	and	now	unbearable,	the	next	day,	or	the	next	year,	can	offer	some	
alternatives.	 When	 projected	 in	 the	 future,	 uncertainty	 is	 what	 keeps	 open	 a	
cracking	in	the	prison	walls.		
Imagination	is	the	space	Asha	is	still	able	to	carve	out	within	the	prison	–	a	
space	 allowing	 her	 to	 go	 beyond.	 Following	 Michael	 Jackson	 (2008),	 I	 consider	
human	imagination	as	something	lying	in	between	self,	others	and	the	world.	Still,	
while	 acknowledging	 the	 relation	 between	 imaginaries77	 and	 the	 surrounding	
sociocultural	conditions,	such	as	norms	and	expectations,	Jackson	does	not	reduce	










to	 the	 human	 capacity	 to	 fantasize,	 dream,	 and	 project	 into	 other	 or	 future	worlds	 –	 a	







Imaginaries	 are	 related	 to	 objects,	 to	 the	mundane,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	
enable	one	to	go	beyond.	Therefore,	between	so-called	reality	and	our	“imaginative	
horizons”	 exists	 a	 relationship	 of	 interdependence,	 “in	which	 the	 irreality	 of	 the	
imaginary	 impresses	 the	 real	 of	 the	 reality	 and	 the	 real	 of	 reality	 compels	 the	
irreality	of	the	imaginary”	(Crapanzano,	2004,	p.	15).	As	argued	by	Stefania	Pandolfo	
(2007),	 when	 producing	 images	 and	 imaginaries,	 people	 mobilize	 collective	
configurations,	 thus	 providing	 a	 framework	 and	 a	 horizon	 within	 which	 their	
existential	experiences	are	understood	and	reconfigured.	In	particular,	migration’s	
imaginaries	of	 the	elsewhere	and	of	 exile	usually	deal	with	 the	 re-articulation	of	
subjectivity,	 the	experience	of	exclusion,	 the	 fractures	 in	social	 relations,	and	 the	





and	moral	 configurations	 of	 hope,	 struggle,	 gratitude	 and	 obligation;	 and	 on	 the	
historical	 memory,	 by	 bringing	 the	 colonial	 past	 of	 Italy	 and	 Somalia	 to	 the	
foreground.	Her	 imaginary	about	 the	act	of	moving	on	 is	a	 tactic	 to	momentarily	
escape	the	open	prison	and	its	ambiguous	present.	She	has	not	actualized	her	hopes	




























































































impossible	 to	 extinguish	 and	 instead	 continued	 to	 increase.	 Their	 condition	
worsened	 when	 their	 father	 borrowed	 some	 more	 money	 to	 pay	 for	 his	 two	
daughters’	weddings	as	the	only	means	to	grant	them	safety,	and	when	the	younger	
brother	was	accused	of	letting	some	cattle	die	during	a	flood.	Saeed’s	brother	was	











claim	 asylum.	 His	 application	 was	 denied	 and	 he	 stayed	 illegally	 for	 about	 five	
months,	hiding.	Not	knowing	about	 free	 legal	aid,	he	did	not	appeal	 the	decision.	
																																																								
78	Bonded	 labour	 is	a	practice	that	 takes	place	outside	the	 law	and	 it	 is	based	on	
informal	 agreements.	Although	debt	bondage	 is	 formally	banned	under	Pakistani	 law,	 it	

















When	 they	 ask	 him	 questions,	 the	 psychiatrist	 and	 the	 psychotherapist	 refer	 to	
Saeed’s	experience	with	the	general	and	comprehensive	term	“anxiety”	which	the	
cultural	mediator	translates	as	ghabrahat,	–		a	vernacular	Urdu	word	describing	a	
generalized	 state	 of	 anxiety,	 worry	 and	 fearfulness.	 With	 “panic	 attacks”	 and	































buy	 and	 keep	 them	with	me.	 The	 doctor	 said	 there	 is	 nothing	wrong	with	 him,	
meaning	 that	 it	 is	 vehm,	 he	 has	 depression	 [Saeed	 uses	 the	 English	 word	





























Saeed	 tells	 that	 he	 is	 feeling	 better	 since	 he	 started	 to	 work	 in	 a	 pizza	
restaurant.	The	project	has	activated	a	borsa	lavoro,	a	temporary	job	contract	aimed	







When	 we	 meet	 for	 an	 interview,	 we	 run	 from	 the	 outset	 into	 a	
communication	predicament.	I	ask	about	his	life	in	Europe,	Saeed	starts	mentioning	
the	difficulties,	but	desists	suddenly.	
S.:	…	 Leaving	 your	 country	 is	 not	 easy	 for	 anyone,	 leaving	 your	 household,	 your	














There	 is	 another	 feat,	 that	when	 the	police	 takes	 you,	 you	don't	 know	what	will	



























you	 have	 left	 your	 country.	…	When	 I	 returned	 [from	Germany],	 it	was	 2014	 in	
November,	two	years	had	passed.	I	had	been	rejected	once	and	the	second	time	I	
was	afraid	 I'd	be	rejected,	 I'd	be	rejected.	A	person	goes	crazy	 inside	 that	 if	 they	
reject	me	now,	what	will	happen	to	me?	For	such	a	long	time	I	had	it	bad,	now	after	
two	years	they	made	me	sit,	even	till	the	Commission.	One	goes	more	than	half	mad.	

















giving	you	borsa	 lavoro	 you’re	doing	 that,	aside	 from	that	 there’s	no	other	work.	
When	you’re	doing	the	borsa	 lavoro	you	can’t	do	any	other	work.	 If	you’re	 in	the	





















































































leave	 their	 country	 and	 go?	 Where	 will	 they	 go?	 When	 there	 is	 no	 majboori	
[compulsion,	necessity],	in	his	own	house	any	man	can	talk.	I	am	majboor	so	I	came	
here.	If	I	were	not	majboor,	why	would	I	come	here?	…	I	told	the	doctor	that	I	am	































they	 are	 indescribable.	 They	 mark	 the	 limit	 of	 the	 capacity	 of	 language	 to	
communicate.	If	someone	wanted	to	impart	his	physical	pain,	he	would	be	forced	to	



















contract	 is	 denied.	 In	 addition,	 the	 person	 is	 refused	 one	 of	 the	 fundamental	
elements	 constituting	 her	 existential	 experience,	 that	 is,	 the	 expectation	 of	 help.	
When	I	am	injured,	I	believe	other	human	beings	will	help	me.	But	when	I	experience	
that	 there	 can	 be	 no	 defence	 against	 that	 first	 hit,	 my	 trust	 in	 the	 world	 is	
undermined	and	it	can	never	be	re-established.	Indeed,	torture	contains		
the	border	violation	of	my	self	by	the	other,	which	can	be	neither	neutralized	by	the	
expectation	 of	 help	 nor	 rectified	 through	 resistance.	 Torture	 is	 all	 that,	 but	 in	
addition	 very	 much	 more.	 Whoever	 is	 overcome	 by	 pain	 through	 torture	















skin	 without	 even	 touching	 him.	 The	 asylum	 prison	 does	 not	 explicitly	 violate	
Saeed’s	 bodily	 boundaries,	 and,	 in	 addition,	 it	 is	 what	 offers	 him	 help	 and	
opportunities,	and	what	makes	him	dependent.	It	does	not	deny	the	social	contract.	
On	the	contrary,	the	humanitarian	regime	is	funded	on	the	respect	of	human	rights	
and	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 the	most	 vulnerable	 persons.	 Saeed	 is	 stating	 that	 the	
institute	 of	 asylum	 can	 be	 as	 violent	 as	 torture:	 “These	 people	 always	 give	 you	
everything,	but	at	the	same	time	they	keep	you	subordinate.”	Asylum	procedures	
are	 arbitrary,	 obscure,	 and	 always	 changing.	 They	 are	 scarcely	 predictable	 and	
comprehensible:	why	 did	 I	 have	 to	wait	 for	 four	 hours,	 or	 four	 years,	 and	 other	
people	do	not?	Why	the	same	application	was	rejected	the	first	time,	and	accepted	
later?	Why	do	mistakes	have	such	different	weights?	A	simple	typo	can	affect	the	




see	 and	 recognize,	 violence,	 the	 asylum	 prisoner	 is	 not	 sure	 he	 can	 define	 his	
experience	 as	 such.	 Violence	 is	 not	 evident;	 rather,	 it	 is	 mingled	 with	 care	 and	











I	 could	 say,	 with	my	 breath.	 My	 breathing	 was	 very	 difficult	 and	my	 heart	 was	












it	 could	 come	 back:	 this	 thing	 can	 come	 back,	 this	 thing	 can	 come	 back…	 It’s	 a	
problem.	 And	 it	 hasn’t	 come	 out	 of	 my	 mind	 yet.	 I’m	 fine,	 but	 it’s	 in	 my	 mind,	
somewhere.	
[…]	





















is	 comprehended	 and	 articulated	 in	 the	 religious	 discourse.	 In	 prayer	 Saeed	 can	










look	at	 images,	and	metaphors,	 to	 try	 to	make	sense	and	get	 in	 touch	with	 those	
experiences.	I	have	listened	to	Asha’s	speech	about	the	open	prison,	from	within	the	
open	prison,	considering	not	only	the	image,	in	all	its	intensity,	but	also	the	position,	
and	 timing,	 from	which	 she	 chooses	 to	make	 her	 experience	 communicable.	 She	
takes	a	stand,	responding	to	her	two	teachers’	effort	to	create	a	space	where	refugee	
women	can	take	a	stand.	From	there,	she	makes	a	claim	–	a	counter-interpellation	
that	 challenges	her	 interlocutors,	 and	 that	 cannot	be	easily	answered.	Asha	 talks	
about	an	invisible	prison,	that	becomes	tangible	only	when	she	hits	the	walls,	when	
trying	 to	 negotiate	 her	 own	 space.	 Her	 narrative	 reveals	 the	 ambiguity	 and	 the	
duality	 of	 the	 prison	 –	 a	 system	 that	 rescues	 and	 contains,	 provides	 for	 and	
constrain.	Asha	shows	the	marks	left	on	her	by	the	years	spent	in	the	open	prison,	
telling	about	 the	moments	when	her	body	 is	 losing	 its	 strengths,	 and	 is	about	 to	
surrender.	She	 tells	about	her	 tactics	 to	deal	with	 the	prison,	 to	 find	some	room,	
pushing	against	the	wall:	she	moves,	or	she	imagines	moving.	Mobility,	and	imagined	
mobility,	thus	become	her	space	of	autonomy	from	the	prison.	
Saeed	 talks	 about	 a	 prison	 as	well,	 describing	 its	 paradoxes	 as	 a	 form	 of	
torture.	 It	 is	an	 invisible,	 immaterial	 torture,	 that	however	maintains	 its	working	
mechanisms.	 As	 the	 tortured,	 Saeed	 feels	 that	 the	 prison	 has	 violated	 his	 bodily	
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boundaries,	breaking	the	most	basic	social	contract.	Language	and	communicability	
are	 undone:	 Saeed	 is	 left	 speechless,	 reduced	 by	 the	 system	 to	 only	 a	 body	 –	 a	
shaking	body.	He	employs	a	vivid	image,	that	of	an	imprisoned	and	tortured	body,	











with	her	own	kind.	According	 to	 the	 two	psychoanalysts,	 returning	 to	be	human	






























This	 research	began	with	 two	 fundamental	 questions:	what	 if	we	 think	of	
non-ordinary	 experiences	 as	 alternative,	 possible	 ways	 of	 perceiving	 and	
understanding	the	world	–	instead	of	framing	them	as	disorders?	What	can	these	
experiences	tell	about	their	social,	political,	historical	circumstances?	My	reflections	











Therefore,	 I	 have	 argued	 not	 only	 that	 mental	 distress	 happens	 at	 the	
conjuncture	between	 subject	 and	macro	 forces,	 but	 also	 that	 crises	 are	powerful	
images	 in	 which	 those	 forces	 are	 conflated.	 When	 investigated	 from	 an	
anthropological	angle,	narratives	on	breakdowns	become	heuristic	devices	through	
which	 the	 researcher	 can	 trace	 the	effects	of	 the	unacknowledged	aspects	of	 the	
asylum	 system	 –	 arbitrariness,	 exclusion	 and	 marginalization.	 In	 other	 words,	




In	 addition	 to	 accounting	 for	 the	 social	 roots	 of	 suffering,	 this	 research	
considered	also	the	impact	of	distress	beyond	the	individual,	asking:	what	happens	
to	people	encountering	 the	crises	of	others?	 In	 this	work,	 I	 referred	 to	 suffering,	
preferring	 the	 notion	 of	 crisis	 to	 that	 of	 mental	 distress/disorder,	 in	 order	 to	
emphasize	its	experiential	and	existential	dimensions	and	to	leave	aside	psychiatric	
categories,	which	 too	 often	 conceal	 the	 history	 and	 politics	 of	 experience.	 I	 also	
wanted	 to	 reclaim	 a	 word	 that	 has	 been	 overused	 and,	 therefore,	 deprived	 of	
meaning,	 becoming	 a	 worn-out	 cliché.	 Since	 2015,	 the	 word	 “crisis”	 has	 been	
employed	extensively	to	frame	the	refugee	phenomenon	in	terms	of	an	emergency,	
and	 therefore	 to	 justify	 security	 and	 containment	measures,	 and	 a	 tightening	 in	
migration	policies.		
Instead,	I	have	tried	to	recover	the	deep	and	nuanced	meanings	of	the	idea	of	
crisis.	 Drawing	 on	 de	 Martino’s	 writings	 on	 the	 crisis	 of	 presence	 and	 cultural	
apocalypses,	I	have	employed	this	word	to	describe	the	phenomenal	experience	of	
being	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 the	 fall,	 in	 the	moment	when	 the	 taken-for-granted	world	
becomes	 strange,	 unfamiliar,	 and	 disorienting.	 In	 its	 phenomenological	meaning,	










the	 larger	society.	Acknowledging	 the	social	 life	of	 crisis	means,	 indeed,	not	only	
considering	its	social	origins;	rather,	there	is	a	need	to	take	account	also	of	its	social	
repercussions	 beyond,	 as	 already	 remarked,	 the	medical	 concerns	 regarding	 the	
causes,	distribution,	 impact	 and	possible	 treatment	of	mental	disorders.	 In	other	
words,	we	should	think	at	the	political	dimension	of	mental	distress,	or	what	I	have	
defined	as	the	critical	potential	of	crisis	as	a	 form	of	political	action.	Crisis,	other	
than	 being	 an	 individual	 experience	 of	 suffering,	 entails	 a	 claim.	 Even	 when	
incomprehensible	 or	 inaccessible,	 the	 experience	 of	 crisis	 interrogates	 its	 social	


















are	 not	 clear,	 coherent	 counter	 narratives,	 for	 they	 express	 idiosyncratic	







and	can	be	understood,	migrants	make	 the	 first	 step	out	of	 a	 condition	of	 (often	
invisible)	 exile.	 The	 effort	 to	 invent	 a	 language	 to	 communicate	 what	 is	 usually	
unutterable	 opens	 what	 Viñar	 and	 Viñar	 call	 a	 “poietic	 space”,	 that	 is,	 a	 fragile	
possibility	for	transformation.	In	this	thesis,	I	have	argued	that	this	possibility	does	
not	concern	only	the	individual	who	is	trying	to	regain	a	place	within	humanity	and	
is	 inevitably	 changed	 in	 the	 process.	 Since	 crises	 pose	 questions	 out	 loud,	 they	
concern	also	those	around,	who	can	decide	to	listen,	or	to	look	the	other	way.	
It	is	in	this	sense	that	I	have	affirmed	that	crisis	is	relational.	It	leads	to	a	turn	
to	 the	 other,	 opening	 the	 possibility	 for	 social	 connection	 and	 change.	 By	
establishing	a	dialogue	between	anthropology	and	immunology,	Napier	argues	that	
to	survive	we	have	to	accept	the	risk	of	encountering	the	other.	Life	depends	on	an	











challenged.	 Immunology,	 like	 anthropology,	 shows	 how	 the	 self	 is	made	 up	 and	
constantly	 re-created	 “by	potentially	dangerous	encounters	at	one’s	boundaries”,	
“for	an	antibody	is	the	tool	that	enables	a	living	thing	to	explore	the	boundaries	of	








care.	 The	 engagement	 with	 these	 claims	 engenders	 a	 transformation	 that	 is	
inevitably	 unpredictable.	 When	 encountering	 divergent,	 critical	 experiences,	 the	
community	 can	 feel	 threatened	 and	 thus	 react	 with	 self-protective	 measures,	
closure	and,	eventually,	hostility.	In	this	thesis,	I	have	explained	this	process	through	
my	own	experience	of	fieldwork.	I	have	described	encounters	that	disoriented	me	








Since	 the	beginning	of	my	research,	 I	have	pulled	ethnography	out	of	 its	comfort	
zone.	I	have	defined	my	theoretical	framework	and	my	research	methods	drawing	







In	 this	 thesis	 I	 have	 explained	 my	 own	 understanding	 of	 ethnography.	 I	
argued	that	 it	 is	a	personal	practice,	both	because	 is	 inevitably	dependent	on	the	
ethnographer’s	perceptions	and	meanings,	and	because	it	makes	use	of	the	personal	
as	 “the	most	crucial	datum”	of	research,	 in	 the	words	of	George	Devereux.	 In	my	
research,	 I	 applied	 ethnography	 to	 the	 study	 of	 experiences	 that	 are	 usually	
considered	unique,	but	also	idiosyncratic.	I	have	focused	on	opacities,	uncertainties,	
contradictions	–	in	other	words,	experiences	resisting	language.	
Looking	 at	 Baran,	 Lily,	 Asha	 and	 Saeed’s	 efforts	 to	 put	 into	words	 bodily	
sensations,	 impressions	 and	 perceptions,	 I	 came	 to	 re-think	 the	 scope	 of	
ethnography,	 and	 its	 capacity.	 In	 employing	mental	 disorder	 as	 an	 ethnographic	
object,	I	did	not	intend	to	explore	culturally	constituted	idioms	of	distress.	In	other	
words,	 I	 was	 not	 interested	 only	 in	 investigating	 the	 social	 systems	 of	












are	 not	 fully	 comprehensible,	 or	 commensurable,	 for	 they	 resist,	 or	 escape,	
language.	 In	 the	 narratives	 about	 mental	 suffering	 there	 is	 always	 something	
slipping	 through	 the	 lines,	 exceeding	 the	 words,	 and	 remaining	 suspended,	
undefined.	I	argued	that	their	destabilizing	potential	lies	precisely	in	this	excess,	that	
leaves	mental	 distress	 fundamentally	 open,	 and	 never	 reconciled.	 I	 practiced	 an	
ethnography	of	residues,	of	what	is	captured	only	partially	by	language,	and	remains	
indefinite.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 crossed	 the	 lives	 of	 persons	 going	 through	 difficult,	
disorienting	 experiences,	 trying	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 them.	 With	 them,	 I	 have	






disordering,	between	 the	effort	 to	recompose,	give	meaning	and	closure,	and	 the	
attempt	to	perturb	existing	conditions	to	create	new	ones.		
This	 research	 contributes	 to	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 ethnographer’s	
positionality,	that	is,	the	tension	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity,	involvement	
and	 detachment	 (Bourdieu,	 2003;	 Geertz,	 1974),	 engagement	 and	 distancing	
(Borneman	 &	 Hammoudi,	 2009;	 Reed-Danahay,	 2017).	 I	 draw	 on	 the	 work	 of	
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Rabinow	 (1977)	 and	 Crapanzano	 (1980)	 in	 practicing	 an	 “experiential”	
ethnography	that	considers	fieldwork	as	fundamentally	based	on	intersubjectivity.	
In	 the	 fieldwork	 encounter,	 the	 ethnographer	 oscillates	 between	 closeness,	
sometimes	even	intimacy,	and	a	distance	that	is	the	condition	for	critical	reflexivity.	
There	 is	 a	 large	 body	 of	 anthropological	 literature	 arguing	 that	 the	 essential	
ethnographic	 experience	 of	 “being	 there”	 is	 what	makes	 it	 an	 act	 of	 witnessing.	
However,	 there	 is	 little	 agreement	 on	 how	 witnessing	 should	 be	 intended.	 For	
instance,	Marcus	(2005)	argues	that	the	ethnographer	should	be	a	detached	witness,	
less	 engaged	 and	 more	 disinterested,	 and,	 therefore,	 more	 independent.	 On	 the	
contrary,	Scheper-Hughes	rejects	 firmly	neutrality,	while	claiming	 for	a	“barefoot	
anthropology”	 in	 which	 the	 researcher-witness-activist	 is	 “responsible,	 reflexive	
and	 morally	 committed”	 (1995,	 p.	 419),	 and	 hence	 takes	 sides	 and	 makes	
judgements.	Or,	Behar	draws	attention	to	the	emotional	aspects	of	fieldwork	and	on	





their	 research.	The	challenge	 is	 to	put	 the	bodily	experience	of	ethnography	 into	

















of	 the	 idiosyncratic.	 Or,	 we	 can	 acknowledge	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 opening.	 In	












Name, position and contact address of Researcher: 
Francesca Morra 
PhD student 
Department of Social Sciences 
Oxford Brookes University  
francesca.morra-2015@brookes.ac.uk 
(Project mobile number to be added) 
 
 
Research study: The lived experiences of the Italian asylum system 
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take 
part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This research study wants to learn more about the experience of people who claim asylum in Italy. 
Through this research I want to find out more about: 
• What it means to go through the asylum claim process.  
• What it is like to be given, or refused, permission to stay as a refugee or for humanitarian reasons: 
how people deal with the opportunities and problems they face.  
• What it is like to be included in, or excluded from, support projects. 
  
The study wants to learn more also about the experience of people working or volunteering with 
refugees: 
• How and why they started working in projects supporting refugees. 
• Which kind of satisfactions and difficulties the job entails, and how they deal with them. 
 
Why are we doing the research? 
While we know quite a lot about the difficulties that forced migrants lived escaping war or 
prosecution, we know much less about their experiences in Europe. In particular, we seldom take 
into consideration how they feel when they go through the process of claiming asylum and then 
adjusting to a new condition. In the same way, there is not much attention given to the daily 
experience of people employed in projects supporting refugees. Your involvement will enable a 
better understanding of the opinions of the people involved in the asylum system, so that the 
research can help to inform better policies and practices, reducing the likelihood that decisions are 
based on stereotypic information. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you 
are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason, or to withdraw any information 
you have given. Your decision not to take part in the research, or to withdraw, will not affect in 
any way the relation that you have with me or with the NGO I am volunteering for. 
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What will taking part in the research involve? 
If you choose to participate, I will ask you take part in an interview. This will last about two hours 
or as long as much time as you are willing/able to give. We will meet at a time and place that is 
convenient for you so that you feel comfortable. 
At first, I would like to discuss with you my research topic. I will ask your opinion about it and 
which questions do you think would be important to ask. The interview will continue with an open 
question about your experience as a professional working with migrants and then we will talk 
about the topics described above. At any time during the interview, you can ask for a break: the 
interview will be resumed when you feel ready. If a particular question causes you discomfort or 
distress you can refuse to answer; you can also stop the interview if you do not feel comfortable 
to continue.  
If you are willing, I would like for you to be involved in the research process after the first 
interview. Practically, I would like to stay in contact with you over a period of about one year, and 
do one or two follow-up interviews. This will help me to discuss further the issues that came out 
during the first interview and to ask your opinion about my research findings. In practice it will 
mean being contacted and arrange one or two meetings.   
Between each meeting, and after the end of the study, you will be able to keep in touch with me 
as much or as little as you want, to know how the research is going on. If you like, I can give you 
the transcript of the interview before I use it in my research, so that you can review it and, in case, 
make amendments. When I first meet you, we will talk about the different ways in which we can 
stay in touch and what would suit you best. 
 
How will the information I give you be recorded? 
If you agree, then the easiest way to keep a good report of what you tell me is to record the 
interview, using a small digital recorder. Only I will listen to this so that I can write down correctly 
what you say and then the recording will be erased. This recorded information will not be shared 
with anybody else. If you do not want the interview to be recorded using a digital recorder, then I 
will take detailed notes of the discussions with you. 
 
How will the information I share be kept and used?  
All the information you provide during the interviews will be stored on a computer, encrypted and 
protected with a password. I am the only person that will have access to these files. When I store 
the information I will remove your name and any information which could identify you. Instead 
the information will be coded with a number (or a false name – which you might like to choose). 
The only possible reason for sharing this information with anyone else would be if I thought that 
from what you had told me that you or someone else was at risk of serious harm. If so, I will talk 
to you first about the best thing to do. 
When I come to write up the findings from the research, there will be no way of anybody 
identifying you from what I write. I will always use a different name to the one you have given us 
and I will make sure that people will not be able to identify you in another way (such as from 
where you are living).   
We will present the findings from the research to different people: to other researchers; to policy 
makers; and to people who work with people in similar situations to you. We will also provide a 
summary of the findings to everyone who takes part in the study. When they are ready, these can 
be sent to you or will be available on a study website.   
Data generated by the study will be retained in accordance with the University's policy on 
Academic Integrity and kept securely in paper or/and electronic form for a period of ten years 
after the completion of the research study. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you choose to take part, you can come to me at the NGO during my working hours (more 
information will be provided), or send me an email (francesca.morra-2015@brookes.ac.uk), or call 
me (project mobile number to be added). I will ask you to formally give consent and then we will 
arrange a time and place for the interview. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am conducting the research as part of my PhD at Oxford Brookes University, Department of Social 
Sciences. My research is funded by a University Research Studentship. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, Oxford Brookes 
University. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
If you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisor. Our 




(Project mobile number to be added) 
 
Prof. Beverley Clack 
Department of History, Philosophy and Religion  
Oxford Brookes University 
bclack@brookes.ac.uk 
 
If you have any concern about the way in which the study has been conducted, you should contact:  
(detail of the NGO referring person will be given). 
Or the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk. 
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Francesca Morra 
PhD student 
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francesca.morra-2015@brookes.ac.uk 
(Project mobile number to be added) 
 
Research study: The lived experiences of the Italian asylum system 
 
	 Please initial 
box 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
	
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
	





	 Please initial 
box 
	 Yes No 
I agree to the interview being audio recorded (to be checked at each 
interview). 
	 	
I agree to the interview being recorded through notes (to be checked at 
each interview). 
	 	
I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications. 	 	
I understand that: 
• anything I say will be kept in a safe place 
• audio-recordings will not be shown to anyone outside of the researcher 
• nobody will be able to identify me in the research 
	 	
I understand that if the researcher think that, from what I had told her, I 




Name of Participant ________________  Date ______________ Signature _______________ 
 
 









Department of Social Sciences 
Oxford Brookes University  
francesca.morra-2015@brookes.ac.uk 
(Project mobile number to be added) 
 
 






Request for permission to conduct research 




Dear Mr/Ms   , 
 
I am writing to request permission to conduct a research study at your organization. I am a PhD 
student at Oxford Brookes University, Department of Social Sciences, and I am conducting a 
research about the experience of people who claim asylum in Italy. Through this research I want 
to find out more about: 
• What it means to go through the asylum claim process.  
• What it is like to be given, or refused, permission to stay as a refugee or for humanitarian reasons: 
how people deal with the opportunities and problems they face.  
• What it is like to be included in, or excluded from, support projects. 
The study wants to learn more also about the experience of people working or volunteering with 
refugees: 
• How and why they started working in projects supporting refugees. 
• Which kind of satisfactions and difficulties the job entails, and how they deal with them. 
 
I am hereby seeking your consent to conduct research in your organization. This will involve 
joining your organization as a volunteer (from ______________ to ______________) and 
participating in the daily activities. I will record my observations in a field notebook and will 
engage in informal conversations and interactions with members of your staff and with clients. I 
hope to recruit people interested to be interviewed about their experience of the Italian asylum 
system, as migrants or as social/health worker.  
 
Moreover, I would like to identify a referring person within the senior members of your 
organization who will help me to monitor the research process and who can be contacted by 
research participants if concerns should arise.  
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To prevent identification, name and location of your organization will be anonymysed in the final 
write-up and in field notes. However, they will be known to participants. 
 
I have provided you with a copy of my research proposal which includes copies of the information 
sheet and consent form to be used in the research process, as well as a copy of the approval letter 
which I received from the University Research Ethics Committee, Oxford Brookes University.  
 
Your approval to conduct this study will be greatly appreciated. If you require any further 




Francesca Morra  
francesca.morra-2015@brookes.ac.uk 
(Project mobile number to be added) 
 
Prof. Beverley Clack 
Department of History, Philosophy and Religion  
Oxford Brookes University 
bclack@brookes.ac.uk 
 
If you consent for me to conduct this study at your organization, kindly sign below and return the 
signed form.  
 








Department of Social Sciences 





_______________________________   _________________________        _________ 
  
Print your name and title here    Signature                                 Date 
 
 
Referring person in the organization: 
 
 
_______________________________      _________________________        _________ 
  










Research study: The lived experiences of the Italian asylum system 
 
 
My name is Francesca Morra and I am a research student from the Oxford Brookes University, in 
the UK. My research study wants to learn more about the experience of people who claim asylum 
in Italy. Through this research I want to find out more about: 
• What it means to go through the asylum claim process. 
• What it is like to be given, or refused, permission to stay as a refugee or for humanitarian reasons: 
how people deal with the opportunities and problems they face. 
• What it is like to be included in, or excluded from, support projects. 
 The study wants to learn more also about the experience of people working or volunteering with 
refugees: 
• How and why they started working in projects supporting refugees. 
• Which kind of satisfactions and difficulties the job entails, and how they deal with them. 
 
I would like to ask you some questions. At first, I would like to talk about my research topic. I will 
ask what do you think about it and which questions do you think would be important to ask. Then 
I will ask you what it is like to be a migrant and we will talk about what you think is most important 
about that. At any time during the interview, you can ask for a break: the interview will restart 
when you feel ready. You can tell me that you do not want to answer if a particular question makes 
you uncomfortable or disturbs you. You can also stop the interview if you do not feel comfortable 
to continue.  
 
If you agree, then the easiest way to keep a good report of what you tell me is to record the 
interview, using a small audio recorder. I will be the only person to listen to this. This will help me 
to write down correctly what you say. Then the recording will be erased. This recorded information 
will not be shared with anybody else. If you do not want the interview to be audio-recorded, then 
I will take written notes.   
 
If you are willing, I would like for you to stay involved in the research after this first interview. 
Practically, I would like to stay in contact with you over a period of about one year, and do one or 
two other interviews. In this way, we can continue to talk about what came out during the first 
interview. I would also like to ask your opinion about my research findings. In practice it will mean 
being contacted and arrange one or two meetings. Between each meeting, and after the end of the 
study, you can contact me as much or as little as you want, to know how the research is going on. 
If you like, I can give you the transcript of our conversation before I use it in my research, so that 
you can read it and, in case, change it.  
 
I will give you my email address and my telephone number. If you have any concern about this 
research, you may speak freely with me or with (detail of the NGO referring person will be given). 
 
I will do everything I can to be sure that nobody will be able to identify you. All the information 
you provide during the interviews will be stored on a computer and be protected with a password. 
I am the only person that will have access to these files. When I store the information I will remove 
your name and any detail which could identify you. Instead the information will be coded with a 
number (or a false name – which you might like to choose). The only possible reason for sharing 
this information with anyone else would be if I thought that from what you had told me that you 
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or someone else was at risk of serious harm. If so, I will talk to you first about the best thing to do. 
When I come to write up the findings from the research, there will be no way of anybody 
identifying you from what I write. I will always use a different name to the one you have given us 
and I will make sure that people will not be able to identify you in another way (such as from 
where you are living.)  
  
I will present the findings from the research to different people: to other researchers; to policy 
makers; and to people who work with persons in similar situations to you. I will also give a 
summary of the findings to everyone who takes part in the study.  
 
It is up to you to decide if you want to take part. If you decide to take part you are still free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason, or to withdraw any information you have given. 
Your decision not to take part in the research, or to withdraw, will not affect in any way the relation 
that you have with me or with the NGO I am volunteering for. Also, your decision will have no 
impact on immigration status or legal advice and support given to you regarding your case. 
 
Do you agree to be interviewed?  
 
Do you allow me to audio-record our conversation? 
 
If the participant asks not to be audio-recorded, the verbal consent will be documented in presence of 
the identified referring person of the NGO: I will record it at the beginning of my interview note and 
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francesca.morra-2015@brookes.ac.uk 




I have read and retained the Information sheet concerning the research “The lived experiences of 
the Italian asylum system” being conducted by Francesca Morra. In my role as interpreter for the 
researcher, I understand the nature of the study and requirements for confidentiality. I have had 
all of my questions concerning the nature of the study and my role as interpreter answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 
A. Maintaining Confidentiality 
 
I agree not to reveal in any way to any person other than the researcher any data gathered 
for the study by means of my services as interpreter. 
 
B. Acknowledgement of My Services as Interpreter 
 
I understand that the researcher will acknowledge the use of my services in any reporting on 
the research.  I have indicated below whether I wish that acknowledgement to be anonymous 
or whether it may recognize me by name. 
 
___ I do not wish my name to be associated with the acknowledgement of the use of an 
interpreter in data gathering for the research. 
 OR 
___ I agree that the researcher may associate my name with the acknowledgement of the use 
of an interpreter in data gathering for the research. 
 
C. Identification and Signature Indicating Agreement 
 
Name:   __________________________________________________________ 
 
Email:    __________________________________________________________ 
 






Should you require further information please feel free to contact me  
Francesca Morra 
francesca.morra-2015@brookes.ac.uk 
(Project mobile number to be added) 
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